_{[166]      For example, Minnesota requires individuals who are civilly committed as sexually dangerous persons, sexual psychopaths, or as persons with a psychopathic personality, under Minn. Stat. § 526.10, and individuals who are civilly committed as persons who are mentally ill and dangerous to the public, under Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, to register as sex offenders, regardless of whether they were convicted of a sex offense. Minn. Stat. § 243.166(1b)(c).} 

_{[167]      See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003) (“When an individual is convicted of a sex offense, no further process is due before imposing sex offender conditions.”);Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that an offender who is convicted of a sex offense in a “prior adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has received the minimum protections required by due process”).}

_{[168]      U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.}

_{[169]     United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that SORNA “is a legitimate exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority” and is constitutional as applied to sex offenders who fail to register or update information after traveling interstate); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.), (holding that SORNA and 18 U.S.C. § 2250 are constitutional under the Commerce Clause and noting that the court “join[s] every other circuit that has examined the issue in concluding that § 2250(a) is a legitimate exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority”), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019 (2010); United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that SORNA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that “SORNA is valid under . . . the Commerce Clause”); United States v. Brooks, No. 23-1694, 2023 WL 6861861, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 18, 2023) (per curiam) (relying on United States v. May and holding that “SORNA’s criminal penalties are a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause”); United States v. Lusby, No. 21-10333, 2022 WL 16570816, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2022) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) is “a lawful exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause”); United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact SORNA); United States v. Hardeman, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1042-43 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and SORNA’s registration requirements do not violate the Commerce Clause); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that “SORNA is a proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power”); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that Congress had the commerce power to enact SORNA).}

_{[170]      U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.}

_{[171]      United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 399 (2013) (holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress adequate power to enact SORNA and apply SORNA’s registration requirements to a federal offender who completed his sentence prior to SORNA’s enactment); see United States v. Brunner, 726 F.3d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to apply SORNA’s registration requirements to a federal sex offender who was convicted by a general court-martial); Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d at 1132 (holding that “the Necessary and Proper Clause provided Congress ample authority to enact [§ 20913] and to punish a state sex offender who . . . traveled interstate, for failing to register”); see also SORNA Rule, supra note 30, at 69,856 (recognizing that 34 U.S.C § 20913(d), which provides the Attorney General with the authority to specify the applicability of SORNA’s requirements to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of SORNA, “is not a constitutionally impermissible delegation of legislative authority” and “it enables the Attorney General to effectuate the legislative intent that SORNA apply to all sex offenders, regardless of when they were convicted”).}

_{[172]      U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.}

_{[173]      See Orfield v. Virginia, No. 12CV541, 2012 WL 3561920, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2012) (dismissing offender’s claim that SORNA is an unconstitutional bill of attainder and holding that “[s]ince registration of sex offenders is not punitive, it likewise does not run afoul of constitutional prohibitions on Bills of Attainder”); Pearson v. Holder, No. 09-cv-00682, 2011 WL 13185719, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2011) (holding that offender did not have a valid claim that SORNA is a bill of attainder because “[a]lthough [he] alleges that sex offenders are an identifiable group, there is no basis for the claim that SORNA denies these individuals a trial” and“[b]oth prior to the imposition of the registration requirements, as part of the individual's criminal proceeding and sentencing, and after a violation of § 2250, an individual is granted a trial”). See also Doe XLVI v. Anderson, 108 A.3d 378, 387-88 (Me. 2015) (holding that retroactive application of Maine’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999’s registration requirements to sex offender, without a judicial trial, was so punitive in effect to override the legislature’s intent that the law was an unconstitutional bill of attainder in violation of the Maine Constitution); Nguyen v. Evans, No. A21-1319, 2022 WL 1210277, at *9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2022) (holding that requiring offender charged with aiding and abetting kidnapping and false imprisonment was required to register as a sex offender even though the charges were dismissed because “the registration requirement is regulatory, and not punitive,” and “application of the predatory-offender-registration statute based on a charge supported by probable cause does not result in an unconstitutional bill of attainder”).}

_{[174]    U.S. Const. art. IV,  1.}

_{[175]     Donlan v. State, 249 P.3d 1231, 1232-33 (Nev. 2011) (quoting Pac. Emp. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939)) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Nevada to recognize California’s termination of sex offender’s requirement to register as a sex offender and noting that “[e]ven if California imposes less restrictive requirements upon sex offenders, ‘[California] has no authority to dictate to [Nevada] the manner in which it can best protect its citizenry from those convicted of sex offenses’”).}

_{[176]     Rosin v. Monken, 599 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998)).}

_{[177]     Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.}

_{[178]     United States v. Paul, 718 F. App’x 360, 364 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that enforcing SORNA against sex offender did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause because Tennessee judgment did not address offender’s SORNA obligations and to be afforded full faith and credit, he would need to show that “the Tennessee judgment validly excused him from all registration requirements under both state and federal law”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019); Rosin, 599 F.3d at 576-77 (holding it was not a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require an offender, who was convicted in New York and promised in his plea agreement that he would never have to register as a sex offender, to register when he moved to Illinois); Lindsey v. Comm’r of Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t, No. 22-10420, 2022 WL 4231823, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that requiring sex offender to register in Florida when he is no longer required to register as a sex offender in Oklahoma does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Crofoot v. Harris, 239 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1127 (2005) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require termination of offender’s obligation to register as a sex offender for life in California where offender was only required to register in Washington for 10 years and had already satisfied his obligation in Washington); Nolan v. Fifteenth Jud. Dist. Att’y Off., 62 So. 3d 805, 807 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that Louisiana did not fail to give full faith and credit to Ohio judgment and that sex offender was required to register in Louisiana based on Ohio convictions, even though offender’s duty to register in Ohio had been terminated); Lozier v. State, 284 So. 3d 745, 750 (Miss. 2019) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Mississippi to release sex offender from his registration duties where sex offender had been released from his duty to register in Massachusetts); Hixson v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 611 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that a tier III sex offender, whose offense was adjudicated in Illinois and who has been removed from Illinois’ sex offender registry, cannot rely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause to petition for removal from Missouri’s registry noting that use of the full faith and credit argument is a total misapprehension of the workings of sex offender registries); Donlan v. State, 249 P.3d 1231, 1232 (Nev. 2011) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Nevada to recognize California’s termination of offender’s requirement to register as a sex offender and requiring offender to register as a sex offender in Nevada); People v. Hlatky, 61 N.Y.S.3d 395, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (requiring defendant to register as a sex offender in New York where offender was relieved of duty to register in Washington did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause); In re Doe v. O’Donnell, 86 A.D.3d 238, 241-42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that requiring sex offender to register in both New York and Virginia did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause); In re C.B., 906 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 2018) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not prohibit North Dakota from requiring offender to register as a sex offender despite offender not being required to register in Washington).} 

_{[179]      U.S. Const. Art. VI, § 2.}

_{[180]      Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (noting that the Supremacy Clause “invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal law”).}

_{[181]      Spiteri v. Russo, No. 12-CV-2780, 2013 WL 4806960, at *43 & n.49 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013) (noting that the plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause claim is without merit and not cognizable because the “Supremacy Clause only makes a law void when it is in conflict with federal law,” “[n]othing in SORNA prevents states from keeping individuals on the registry even if they no longer reside in the United States,” and holding that New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act was not preempted by SORNA); United States v. King, 431 F. App’x 630, 633 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that, even if the defendant raised a redressable Supremacy Clause claim, it would fail because Oklahoma’s residency restriction statute did not conflict with SORNA).} 

_{[182]      Prynne v. Settle, 848 F. App’x 93, 103 (4th Cir. 2021) (“The right to interstate travel is a fundamental right.”); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that “[t]here are several constitutional bases for the right to travel, including . . . the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution; . . . the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; . . . and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012); Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 162 (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)) (“[T]he ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.”).}

_{[183]      Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 158-159 (“[M]oving from one jurisdiction to another entails many registration requirements required by law which may cause some inconvenience, but which do not unduly infringe upon anyone’s right to travel.”); Prynne, 848 F. App’x at 104 (holding that Virginia law, requiring registered sex offenders provide notice to other states of their registry status before traveling to those states, does not restrict sex offenders’ fundamental right to travel); Doe v. Jindal, No. 15-1283 SECTION R(2), 2015 WL 7300506, at *9 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2015) (holding that Louisiana’s requirement that sex offenders register for life does not “unreasonably burden the right to travel” because Louisiana’s laws “treat an out-of-state resident with an out-of-state conviction and a lifelong Louisiana resident with an out-of-state conviction the same way”); United States v. Byrd, 419 F. App’x 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500) (holding that “SORNA’s registration requirements do not implicate the fundamental right to travel of convicted sex offenders because nothing in the statute precludes an offender from ‘enter[ing] or leav[ing] another state,’ being ‘treated as a welcome visitor . . . in the second State,’ or being ‘treated like other citizens of that State’ if the offender chooses to permanently relocate”); Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2021)  (holding that Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), as applied to offenders who have relocated to Indiana from other states after the enactment of SORA, and who are required to register but would not have been required to do so if they had committed their crimes as residents of Indiana prior to the enactment of SORA and maintained citizenship in Indiana, does not violate the right to travel because, although it “may affect newer residents disproportionately,” it does not expressly discriminate based on residency); McGuire v. Marshall, 512 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1229 (M.D. Ala. 2021) (holding that provision under Alabama law requiring sex offenders who plan to travel for three or more days outside their county of residence to notify law enforcement does not violate the First Amendment noting that “the possibility that there may be ‘some kernel of expression’ in an activity ‘is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment’”), aff’d on other grounds, 50 F.4th 986 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that sex offenders’ requirement to update registration information under SORNA “is undoubtedly burdensome,” it does not violate offenders’ right to travel); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that requirement that sex offenders notify Florida law enforcement in person when they change their permanent or temporary residences may be burdensome but does not unreasonably burden their right to travel); State v. Yeoman, 236 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the requirement that offender register as a sex offender upon relocating to Idaho did not infringe on his right to travel); State v. Smith, 344 P.3d 1244, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Washington law requiring sex offenders register their residence address or transient status when they change their residence or cease to have a fixed residence does not impair their constitutional right to travel).}

_{[184]      Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).}

_{[185]      U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.}

_{[186]      Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).}

_{[187]      Id. at 2121, 2129 (holding that SORNA’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 does not violate the nondelegation doctrine); see also United States v. Cole, 823 F. App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (affirming offender’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and holding that Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Attorney General to decide whether SORNA’s registration requirements apply retroactively to offenders convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 122 (2021); United States v. Mingo, 964 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that delegation of which military offenses should qualify as “sex offenses” under SORNA did not violate the nondelegation doctrine); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that “SORNA is valid under . . . the principles of non-delegation”); United States v. Brooks, No. 23-1694, 2023 WL 6861861, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 18, 2023) (per curiam) (relying on Gundy and holding that “SORNA’s limited delegation of authority as applied to pre-Act offenders was not impermissible”); United States v. Zeroni, 799 F. App’x 950, 951 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Gundy and holding that SORNA’s delegation under 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine); United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that “SORNA provides the Attorney General with an intelligible principle, and is a valid delegation of legislative authority” and “contains a ‘clearly delineat[ed]’ policy which guides the Attorney General in the exercise of his delegated authority”); Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1213 (holding that Congress provided the Attorney General with intelligible principles to guide his exercise of discretion under SORNA and therefore delegation of authority did not violate the nondelegation doctrine); United States v. Larrier, No. 21-CR-00240, 2022 WL 1092793 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2022) (relying on Gundy and holding that SORNA’s provision delegating authority to the Attorney General is constitutional).}

_{[188]      In re McClain, 741 S.E.2d 893, 896 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that North Carolina’s registration law incorporating SORNA’s clean record provisions was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority under the North Carolina Constitution); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 15-CR-0001570-2016 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Aug. 22, 2022) (holding that Revised Subchapter H of Pennsylvania’s SORNA violates separation of powers), rev’d, No. 97 MAP 2022, 2024 WL 2789201 (Pa. May 31, 2024) (holding that Pennsylvania’s SORNA does not “usurp[] judicial power over sentencing in violation of the separation of powers doctrine”); State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935, 940-41 (Utah 2008) (holding that Utah’s sex offender registration statute did not violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Utah Constitution by delegating legislative power to the Department of Correction); State v. Batson, 478 P.3d 75, 78 (Wash. 2020) (en banc) (holding that Wash. Rev. Stat. § 9A.44.128(10)(h) is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and the state legislature may impose a duty to register as a sex offender in Washington where an individual would be required to register in the state of conviction); State v. Caton, 260 P.3d 946, 952 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the legislature’s delegation to county sheriffs to set the reporting date for sex offenders who are required to register did not violate separation of powers doctrine), rev’d on other grounds, 273 P.3d 980 (Wash. 2012).}

_{[189]      See, e.g., Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d 1165, 1169-73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding the District of Columbia’s sex offender registration statute was not punitive); Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the District of Columbia’s Sex Offender Registration Act “is a remedial regulatory enactment, not a penal law, that was adopted to protect the public, especially minors, from the threat of recidivism posed by sex offenders who have been released into the community”); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that New York’s sex offender registration laws are not punitive); Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding, in habeas context, North Dakota Supreme Court’s determination that sex offender registration statute was nonpunitive and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 577 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that Oklahoma’s sex offender registration statute was not punitive); Ridley v. Caldwell, No. 21-13504, 2022 WL 2800203 (11th Cir. July 18, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that offender’s registration as a sex offender in Georgia is a collateral consequence of his Florida battery conviction; that “Georgia courts have repeatedly held that Georgia’s sex offender registry requirement is ‘regulatory’ in nature, not punitive, and that an individual may be compelled to register based on facts not found by a jury”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 587 (2023); State v. Scott, 636 S.W.3d 768, 770 (Ark. 2022) (recognizing that “[s]ex-offender registration is not a form of punishment”); Sullivan v. State, 386 S.W.3d 507, 525 (Ark. 2012) (holding that the registration and notification requirements of the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act are “essentially regulatory and therefore non-punitive in nature”); State v. Reed, 399 P.3d 865, 904 (Kan. 2017) (holding that Kansas sex offender registration requirements do not constitute punishment); Commonwealth v. Olaf O., 786 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing that sex offender registration and community notification is not considered “punishment . . . but rather to be a collateral, regulatory measure”); State v. LaFountain, 901 N.W.2d 441, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that Minnesota registration statute is not punitive); State v. Boche, 885 N.W.2d 523, 538-39 (Neb. 2016) (holding that Nebraska’s sex offender registration requirements did not constitute punishment).}

_{[190]      See, e.g., United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive); United States v. Diaz, 967 F.3d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1424 (2021) (holding that a defendant in a SORNA prosecution may not collaterally challenge his underlying predicate sex offender conviction and that the sex offender registration requirements are not punitive); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 158-159 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012); United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive), abrogated on other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104 (2016); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919-920 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive and “[t]he only punishment that can arise under SORNA comes from a violation of § 2250, which punishes convicted sex offenders who travel in interstate commerce after the enactment of SORNA and who fail to register as required by SORNA”), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1258 (2009), abrogated on other grounds, Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are nonpunitive); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are not punitive).} 

_{[191]      See infra note 196 and accompanying text; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (outlining seven factors to be considered when determining whether a statutory scheme is punitive).}

_{[192]      See Does 1-7 v. Abbott, 945 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A statute can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Eighth Amendment, or the Double Jeopardy Clause only if the statute is punitive.”). For additional discussion concerning challenges based on the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, see supra III.A.8 and infra III.A.10, III.A.11, III.A.12, and III.A.13.}

_{[193]      U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9-10.}

_{[194]      United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 389 (2013) (assuming without deciding that Congress did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in enacting SORNA’s registration requirements); Juvenile Male II, 564 U.S. 932, 932 (2011) (declining to address whether SORNA’s requirements violated the Ex Post Facto Clause on grounds of mootness); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 442 (2010) (declining to address the issue of whether SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding federal SORNA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012); United States v. Brunner, 726 F.3d 299, 304 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the indictment, which charged offender with failing to comply with SORNA after its enactment, did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir.) (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019 (2010); Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 158-159 (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974 (2010); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 917-18 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that retroactive application of SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 203-206 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing issue of whether SORNA’s registration regime as applied to offenders who committed sex offenses before SORNA’s enactment operated to increase the punishment for those sex offenses after they had already been committed and holding that “SORNA is a civil regulation” and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding federal SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Leach, 639 F.3d at 773 (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), abrogated on other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104 (2016); May, 535 F.3d at 919-20 (holding that application of SORNA’s registration requirements to an offender who was registered pursuant to state law before SORNA’s enactment, and who traveled to another state after SORNA’s enactment, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the statute did not punish an individual for previously being convicted of a sex crime, but for not registering as a sex offender or failing to update his registration after traveling in interstate commerce and therefore, SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1258 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012); Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d at 953-54 (holding that federal SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1133-35 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution “because it is a regulatory statute and any criminal penalties attach only to future failures to register”); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1240 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012); United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); W.B.H., 664 F.3d at 851 (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements are civil rather than punitive and requiring offender convicted of a post-SORNA crime that was not a sex offense to register as a sex offender under SORNA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause where offender was convicted of a pre-SORNA sex offense in Alabama); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding federal SORNA does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); see also Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 750 & n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citing federal cases addressing SORNA and the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Juvenile Male I, 581 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that retroactive application of SORNA’s juvenile registration provisions are unconstitutional and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).}  

_{[195]      Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding that Alaska sex offender registration and notification laws were not punitive and therefore retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding retroactive application of New York’s registration amendments to an offender did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the mandatory registration and notification requirements of New York State’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which are analogous to SORNA’s requirements, do not constitute punishment, are not punitive in purpose and effect, and do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Does 1-7 v. Abbott, 945 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Texas sex offender registration and notification law is not punitive and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); King v. McCraw, 559 F. App’x 278, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that application of Texas Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) to offender, who pleaded guilty and was placed on a deferred adjudication for indecency with a child prior to SORA’s enactment, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding Tennessee’s Sex Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act and finding that it did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 921 (2008); Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 534 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act is not so punitive in purpose or effect to contravene Indiana’s nonpunitive intent for the law and therefore, it is not an ex post facto violation);Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that Wisconsin’s sex offender registration and notification laws were not punitive and therefore did not trigger the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws); Doe 1-36 v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 915-16 (D. Neb. 2010) (holding that newly enacted provisions of Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, imposing new in-person reporting requirements, requiring certain information about offenders be made available on the public registry, and replacing a system of individualized risk assessments of sex offenders with an “offense of conviction” methodology, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution); Warenback v. Ford, No. 21-16964, 2023 WL 7121405, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2023) (holding that “in-person registration, including Nevada’s in person registration, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause” and, “[l]ike any other registrant who moves to another jurisdiction, [the offender] was required to register in person when he moved to the new jurisdiction”); Does 1-134 v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding the district court erred in dismissing offenders’ ex post facto claims based on the retroactive application of Idaho’s residency, travel, and internet restrictions where the court relied on cases that only addressed sex offender registration and notification provisions and noting that “the court should consider the effects of [Idaho’s sex offender registration and notification laws’] regulatory scheme, as amended and in its entirety, in determining whether it runs afoul of the Constitution”); Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 577 (10th Cir. 2016) (affirming the retroactive application of Oklahoma sex offender registration laws and holding that Oklahoma sex offender registration and notification scheme did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that California’s requirement that sex offenders register for life did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining legislative amendments in A.B. 579, where legislation imposes registration and notification requirements based solely on the fact of conviction in Nevada, did not constitute retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the legislative intent behind California’s SORA was regulatory, rather than punitive, and therefore it did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1055 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because its effects are not punitive); Herrera v. Williams, 99 F. App’x 188, 190 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that New Mexico’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act only imposes civil burdens upon sex offenders and does not implicate criminal punishments and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Otey v. Dir. of Ala. Law Enf’t Agency, No. 16-cv-01540, 2017 WL 1317947, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2017) (quoting McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2015)) (noting that “[o]verall . . . [Alabama SORNA]’s scheme as a whole is [not] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature’s stated nonpunitive intent’”); Windwalker v. Governor of Ala., 579 F. App’x 769, 919-920 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding Alabama’s sex offender registration and notification statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); People v. Castellanos, 982 P.2d 211, 217-18 (Cal. 1999) (holding sex offender registration is regulatory in both purpose and effect and therefore is not “punishment” for the purposes of state and federal ex post facto clauses); People v. Fioretti, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1209, 1214 (1997) (holding that retroactive application of California’s sex offender registration laws does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because registration itself is not considered punitive); State v. Kelly, 770 A.2d 908, 954 (Conn. 2001) (noting that because Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute “is regulatory and not punitive in nature,” retroactive application to offender did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Getz v. State, 281 A.3d 1271 (Del. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (holding “that the sex offender registration and community notification requirements . . . [under Delaware law] are not punitive in nature and, thus, the retroactive application of those requirements does not implicate the [Ex Post Facto Clause]” and offender convicted of first-degree rape in 1989 is required to register as a tier III sex offender); Sanders v. State, 278 A.3d 1148 (Del. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (holding that offender, convicted of attempted sexual extortion, is properly classified as a tier III sex offender under Delaware law, and retroactive application of Delaware’s sex offender registration and notification laws to offender does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because they are not punitive in nature); Hickerson v. United States, 287 A.3d 237, 250 (D.C. 2023) (citing In re W.M. and holding that the District of Columbia’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Arthur v. United States, 253 A.3d 134, 143 (D.C. 2021) (affirming sex offender’s conviction for failure to comply with SORA’s registration requirements and holding that SORA’s requirements did not amount to punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 446 (D.C. 2004) (holding that SORA is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); State v. Yeoman, 236 P.3d 1265, 1267 (Idaho 2010) (affirming the retroactive application of Idaho’s sex offender registration laws to offenders who were convicted for sex crimes that occurred prior to enactment of Idaho’s statute); State v. Gragg, 137 P.3d 461, 465 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005) (holding Idaho’s sex offender registration and notification laws are not punitive and do not violate the ex post facto prohibition of the Idaho Constitution); People v. Hall, Nos. 4-19-0001, 4-19-0002 cons., 2021 WL 1251373, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 2, 2021) (holding that the re-registration requirements under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act do not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws); State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 369-71 (Ind. 2016) (holding that offender who was required to register in Michigan was already under an obligation to register and therefore requiring registration in Indiana did not violate Indiana’s prohibition against ex post facto laws); Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 96 (Ind. 2016) (holding that requirement, under Indiana’s SORA, that offenders who are required to register as sex offenders in any other jurisdiction register in Indiana, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state or federal constitutions); Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind. 2009) (holding that amendment to Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), which lengthened the mandatory registration period for sexually violent predators from 10 years to life, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, and offender convicted after the initial passage of SORA could be required to comply with the amended requirements); Crowley v. State, 188 N.E.3d 54, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that requiring offender, who was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in Michigan in 1988, prior to enactment of Indiana’s SORA, and who had a duty to register in Michigan before he moved to Indiana, to register as a sex offender did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution); State v. Aschbrenner, 926 N.W.2d 240, 250 (Iowa 2019) (holding that Iowa’s sex offender registration statute is not punitive and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses under the state or federal constitutions); State v. Huntoon, 965 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that Iowa’s sex offender registry law amendments effective July 1, 2009, requiring a sex offender convicted of an aggravated offense to register for life, where the offender was convicted of an aggravated offense in June 2009, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions); Wolf v. State, 964 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that, because Iowa’s lifetime registration requirement was in place at the time of offender’s conviction, “his ex post facto claim fails as a matter of law”); State v. Davidson, 495 P.3d 9, 13-14 (Kan. 2021) (per curiam) (reaffirming the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Petersen-Beard, and holding that Sex Offender Registration Act’s (KORA) sex offender registration requirements are not punitive in purpose or effect and, therefore, retroactive application of KORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); State v. Reed, 399 P.3d 865, 904 (Kan. 2017) (extending the holding in Petersen-Beard to apply to ex post facto challenges and holding that registration under KORA does not constitute punishment and therefore, retroactive application of the tolling provision under KORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1140-41 (Kan. 2016) (holding that Kansas’ lifetime registration requirement for adult sex offenders is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); State v. Proctor, 237 A.3d 896, 903 (Me. 2020) (vacating the defendant’s conviction and noting that, because the issue was undeveloped, the court could not determine whether retroactive application of Maine’s SORNA of 1999 to the defendant, requiring he register for life, where his original sentences did not include any registration requirement, increases the punitive burden of his sentences and therefore violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws under the U.S. and Maine Constitutions); Doe I v. Williams, 61 A.3d 718, 734 (Me. 2013) (holding that Maine’s SORNA, as amended following Letalien, is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Maine and U.S. Constitutions); Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 766-67 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that retroactive application of Missouri’s SORA to offenders convicted of sex offenses prior to its enactment does not violate the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws because registration is civil and not punitive); Hyman v. State, 208 A.3d 807, 820 (Md. 2019) (recognizing there is still some uncertainty about the circumstances in which sex offender registration is considered a “direct” consequence of a conviction as opposed to a “collateral” consequence for purposes of ex post facto claims); In reHall, 768 S.E.2d 39, 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that amendment to North Carolina’s sex offender registration and notification laws, which incorporated SORNA’s tiering structure, applied retroactively to sex offender and did not constitute a violation of ex post facto laws); Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 626-27 (Pa. 2020) (holding that Subchapter I of Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration and notification laws is not punitive and therefore does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws); Perez, 97 A.3d at 759 (holding that the federal and state Ex Post Facto Clauses did not prohibit the retroactive application of Pennsylvania’s 25-year sex offender registration requirement to the defendant); In re Vázquez Felix, No. SJ2022CV05573, 2023 WL 3371328 (P.R. Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (holding that retroactive application of Puerto Rico’s sex offender registration laws to offender convicted of an offense in New York that is equivalent to the offense of rape in Puerto Rico and requiring offender to register for life does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because Puerto Rico’s laws are “civil in nature, not criminal or punitive”); People v. Ferrer Maldonado, No. CC-2017-0478, 2019 WL 1461450 (P.R. Mar. 7, 2019) (holding that retroactive application of the amendments introduced by Law No. 243-2011 to Law No. 266-2004 requiring offender convicted of lewd acts and attempted rape to register as a sex offender for life in Puerto Rico does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Puerto Rico Constitution because the law, and its recent amendments, is civil in nature and not criminal or punitive); Ex parte Cruz Delgado, No. KLAN202200274, 2022 WL 2187757 (P.R. Cir. May 26, 2022) (holding that retroactive application of Law No. 243-2011, which requires an offender convicted of attempted rape to register as a tier III sex offender for life in Puerto Rico, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Puerto Rico Constitution because it is civil and nonpunitive); Harrison v. State, 482 P.3d 353, 357-58 (Wyo. 2021) (holding that the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act “is not an ex post facto punishment,” its purpose is “not to punish, but to facilitate law enforcement and protection of children,” and it does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 839 (Wyo. 2014) (acknowledging that Wyoming’s sex offender registration and notification laws are “intended to impose regulatory, as opposed to punitive, requirements,” and holding that they do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution).}   

_{[196]     Doe #1 v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330, 340-42 (6th Cir. 2024), aff’g in part, rev’g in part Does #1-9 v. Lee, 659 F. Supp. 3d 865 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) (holding that the district court misread Snyder and was required to engage in a “provision-by-provision analysis of Tennessee’s regulatory regime to determine which portions violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and which do not”); Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan’s sex offender registration and notification scheme, when applied to individuals whose crimes preceded the scheme’s adoption, violated the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto criminal punishments because the statute constituted punishment); Does #1-9 v. Lee, 659 F. Supp. 3d 865, 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2023), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by Doe #1 v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330 (6th Cir. 2024) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and holding that Tennessee’s sex offender registration scheme is punitive for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Does #1-9 v. Lee, 574 F. Supp. 3d 558, 561-62 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (prohibiting enforcement of any provision of the Tennessee SORVTA, against John Does #1-8, and, relying on Snyder and other recent decisions, holding that “the state’s policy of imposing ex post facto criminal punishments on some sexual offenders is unconstitutional” and Does #1-8 have established a high likelihood of success on the merits, they face irreparable harm, and the public interest would be served by removing them from the registry); Doe v. Snyder, 606 F. Supp. 3d 608, 616-17 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (holding that retroactive application of Michigan’s Public Act 295, which adopted numerous amendments to Michigan’s sex offender registration and notification laws, to conduct that occurred before March 24, 2021, the date of its enactment, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Doe v. Rausch, 461 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768-69 (E.D. Tenn. 2020) (holding in an as-applied challenge that lifetime compliance with SORVTA was punitive and unconstitutional and violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Reid v. Lee, 476 F. Supp. 3d 684, 707-08 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (granting plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief finding he presented enough evidence to support that the punitive effects of SORVTA outweigh any civil benefit and are enough to establish a strong likelihood of success on his ex post facto claim); Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1125 (D. Neb. 2012) (holding that Nebraska sex offender registration statutes, prohibiting sex offenders from using social networking sites, requiring sex offenders disclose internet identifiers, and requiring sex offenders consent to the search and installation of monitoring hardware and software, violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions); ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (D. Nev. 2008) (enjoining the enactment of Nevada’s SORNA-implementing legislation for a number of years based on ex post facto concerns), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and appeal dismissed in part, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012); McGuire v. Strange, 50 F.4th 986, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding that retroactive application of certain provisions of Alabama’s Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, including the requirement that homeless sex offenders register in-person weekly, requirement that offenders complete in-state travel permit applications, and direct community notification requirement, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), aff’g in part, vacating in part McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (M.D. Ala. 2015); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008) (holding that the retroactive application of Alaska’s sex offender registration and notification laws violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (holding that the retroactive application of Indiana’s sex offender registration and notification laws constitutes retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution); State v. Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that, under state constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws, Indiana could not require sex offender, who had been convicted of rape in Pennsylvania prior to enactment of Indiana’s sex offender registration and notification laws, to register as a sex offender); Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that requiring sex offender to register in Indiana violated the ex post facto provision of the Indiana Constitution); Flanders v. State, 955 N.E.2d 732, 752-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that 2007 amendment eliminating an offender’s eligibility to petition the court for termination of his sexually violent predator status is an ex post facto law that is unconstitutional and violates the Indiana Constitution and the offender must be allowed to petition for a change in status once a year after he has registered for 10 years); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) (holding that retroactive application of Maine’s SORNA 1999 requiring lifetime registration and quarterly in-person verification procedures to offenders originally sentenced under SORNA 1991 and SORNA 1995, without providing offenders an opportunity to be relieved of the duty to register, was punitive and therefore violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Maine and U.S. Constitutions); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 138-39 (Md. 2013) (holding that the retroactive application of the Maryland Sex Offender Registration Act violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland Constitution); Quispe Del Pino v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 112 A.3d 522, 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (holding that the retroactive application of the Maryland Sex Offender Registration Act, resulting in the increase of the offender’s registration period from 10 to 25 years, violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland Constitution); People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497, 574 (Mich. 2021) (holding that retroactive application of Michigan’s 2011 Sex Offender Registration Act increases sex offenders’ punishment for their committed offenses and violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and U.S. Constitutions and, as a result, the 2011 SORA cannot be retroactively applied to offenders whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments); State v. Hinman, 530 P.3d 1271, 1276-79 (Mont. 2023) (holding that Montana’s Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act “as amended since 2007, [which requires offenders appear in person for periodic verification and within three days of changing their address, employment, or school enrollment; appearing monthly if the offender is homeless; prohibiting Level 3 offenders from residing near schools or playgrounds; and requiring offenders provide DNA samples, driver’s license numbers, vehicle information, email addresses, and social media screen names;] is punitive in nature,” violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Montana Constitution, and the “requirements brought on by those amendments cannot be retroactively applied to defendants whose convictions predate them”); Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1101 (N.H. 2015) (holding that requiring lifetime registration without the opportunity for review violates the ex post facto provisions of New Hampshire’s Constitution and the state’s registration requirements can only be applied to the offender if he is “promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he is permitted to demonstrate that he no longer poses a risk sufficient to justify continued registration . . . [and] must be afforded periodic opportunities for further hearings, at reasonable intervals, to revisit whether registration continues to be necessary to protect the public”); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (holding that imposing Ohio’s current registration requirements, as amended by enactment of S.B. 10, on sex offenders whose crimes were committed prior to enactment of S.B. 10 is punitive and violates the Ohio Constitution); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corrs., 305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013) (holding that retroactive application of Oklahoma’s Sex Offender Registration Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution); Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d 528, 538-39 (Pa. 2021) (holding that retroactive application of Pennsylvania’s SORNA to offenders who committed their offenses in another state prior to SORNA’s enactment violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 97 MAP 2022, 2024 WL 2789201, at *26 (Pa. May 31, 2024) (holding that “weighing the Mendoza-Martinez factors does not compel the conclusion that Subchapter H is punitive”); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 591-92 (Pa. 2020) (addressing Pennsylvania’s tiering structure and remanding for additional consideration of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine whether Pennsylvania’s Revised Subchapter H is punitive); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2017), superseded by statute as stated in Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 607 n.4 (holding that retroactive application of Pennsylvania’s SORNA to offenders who committed their offenses in Pennsylvania prior to SORNA’s enactment constitutes an ex post facto violation and violates the state and federal constitutions). But see State v. Jedlicka, 747 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that Minnesota statute, which relieves offenders from the obligation to register as predatory offenders, applies retroactively and removing offenders from the registry when the statute is changed in a way that benefits them does not violate ex post facto prohibitions).} 

_{[197]      Woe v. Spitzer, 571 F. Supp. 2d 382, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that amendment to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act extending the registration period from 10 years to 20 years for level 1 sex offenders did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because “inclusion in a sex offender registry is a civil matter”); Dolak v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 186 N.E.3d 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the retroactive application of SORA’s “age provision,” which requires an offender who was at least 18 years old at the time of his offense and where the victim was less than 12 years old, to register for life, is punitive because it “does not provide any ‘channel through which he may petition the trial court for review of his future dangerousness or complete rehabilitation’” and violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution); Jensen v. State, 882 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (unpublished table decision) (holding that offender was not entitled to a 10-year registration duration, as ordered by the court per a plea agreement, when the determination of registration duration was vested in the state’s Department of Public Safety); State v. Cook, 187 P.3d 1283, 1290 (Kan. 2008) (holding that application of amendment to Kansas law, which increased punishment for a conviction of the offense of failure to register as a sex offender, to the defendant did not violate ex post facto prohibitions); Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661, 667-68 (Ky. 2010) (holding that “SORA is a remedial measure with a rational connection to the nonpunitive goal of protection of public safety” and increasing the penalties for failing to register as a sex offender does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Davenport, 948 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020) (reversing failure to register conviction under Minnesota law where offender was convicted of aiding and abetting criminal sexual conduct prior to amendment of Minnesota law requiring registration as a sex offender for a conviction of the same); State v. Brown, 243 A.3d 1233, 1240 (N.J. 2021) (holding that amendments to New Jersey’s sex offender registration and notification law, which increased punishment for offenders who fail to register after the amendments’ effective date, do not violate ex post facto protections and offenders could be charged with and convicted of the enhanced third-degree offense of failure to comply with sexoffender registration requirements under New Jersey law when each offender’s registration requirement arose from a conviction that occurred before the penalty for registration noncompliance was raised a degree); Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444, 448 (Pa. 2014) (holding that, under the terms of the offender’s plea agreement, he was not required to register as a sex offender and he was entitled to specific performance of his plea agreement, where a component of negotiation of the same was that he would not be required to register as a sex offender); Commonwealth v. Giannatonio, 114 A.3d 429, 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (holding that retroactive enforcement of 15-year registration requirement under Pennsylvania’s SORNA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution where the offender’s conviction was secured pursuant to a federal plea agreement and registration was a nonpunitive, collateral consequence of the offender’s conviction).} 

_{[198]      Johnson v. Madigan, 880 F.3d 371, 375-76 (7thCir. 2018) (holding that amendments made to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), classifying certain offenders as sexual predators and requiring registration as sex offenders, were not retroactive and therefore, SORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Stansell, 173 N.E.3d 1273, 1283-84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021) (holding that there was no violation of ex post facto principles where sex offender, who was classified as a sexually violent predator as part of his sentence, did not have a prior conviction of a sexually oriented offense, because Ohio law, defining a sexually violent predator as an offender who had previously been convicted of a sexually oriented offense was not applied retroactively to him), appeal dismissed, 195 N.E.3d 129 (Ohio 2022); State v. Wallace, 2020-Ohio-3959, No. C-190043, 2020 WL 4514702, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020) (holding sex offender classifications under Ohio’s registration law are civil and remedial and are legally distinct from the sentence for the underlying sexual offense).}

_{[199]     Doe v. Harris, 302 P.3d 598, 598 (Cal. 2013) (holding that sex offender was properly subjected to community notification in 2004 even though he had entered a plea agreement in 1991 that was silent on the issue); Commonwealth v. Moore, 222 A.3d 16, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (determining that the internet dissemination provision mandated by Pennsylvania law under SORNA II is not punitive and therefore does not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause), judgment vacated by 240 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2020), aff’d, 242 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).}

_{[200]      U.S. Const. amend. I.}

_{[201]      Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (invalidating North Carolina law generally prohibiting a registered sex offender from accessing “a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages” and holding that the sweeping terms of the statute violated the offender’s rights of speech protected under the First Amendment); United States v. Leone, 813 F. App’x 665, 669-70 (2d Cir. 2020) (distinguishing the case from Packingham and finding that it was permissible to place conditions on the offender’s use or possession of any computer or internet-capable device (i.e., requiring the offender to participate in a monitoring program or obtain advance permission) where he had a history of accessing child pornography over the internet); Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that Indiana statute prohibiting sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services and chat programs violated the First Amendment); Doe 1-36 v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 911 (D. Neb. 2010) (noting that “[p]eople who are convicted of crimes, even felony crimes related to children, do not forfeit their First Amendment right to speak by accessing the Internet”); United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding condition of supervised release, imposed upon a man who had been convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography, which completely barred the offender’s access to computers and the internet was a greater deprivation of the offender’s First Amendment rights than was reasonable); Melnick v. Raemisch, No. 19-cv-00154, 2021 WL 4133919, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2021) (holding that sex offender plausibly alleged constitutional violations, including an alleged violation of his right to free speech and assembly, based on the limitations on his use of the internet and an alleged violation of his First Amendment right to religious freedom noting a “complete prohibition from allowing [him] to go to Temple to practice his Jewish faith, as [he] alleges, runs afoul of the Establishment Clause”), appeal dismissed, No. 21-1330, 2021 WL 7627513 (10th Cir. Oct. 5, 2021); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1052-53 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act does not prohibit offender from visiting social media related websites or communicating with his family and, because he was not convicted of a child sex crime, he is not required to provide his internet identities to the registry, and, as a result his First Amendment freedom of speech claim fails); Harris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 767, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding, in an as-applied challenge, that Indiana statute prohibiting use of a social networking site by a registered sex offender violated the offender’s First Amendment rights); Mutter v. Ross, 811 S.E.2d 866, 872 (W. Va. 2018) (holding that special condition prohibiting sex offender from possessing or having contact with an electronic device enabled with internet access violates First Amendment right to free speech).} 

_{[202]      Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160 (2d Cir. 2022) (reversing dismissal of sex offender’s First Amendment claim and holding that Connecticut statute requiring disclosure of internet identifiers plausibly fails intermediate scrutiny and offender has stated a First Amendment claim where the government has not shown that the challenged law advances important governmental interests and it is not narrowly tailored to those interests); Cornelio v. State, 691 F. Supp. 3d 529, 546 (D. Conn. 2023) (holding that as applied, Connecticut statute requiring disclosure of internet identifiers violates sex offender’s right to free speech under the First Amendment); Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1112 (D. Neb. 2012) (holding that statute requiring sex offenders to disclose their internet identifiers was unconstitutional on First Amendment and other grounds); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1224-26 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that Utah statute requiring sex offenders register their internet identifiers did not violate First Amendment free speech rights); White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1300-12 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that amendment to Georgia statute requiring offender provide his internet email addresses, usernames, and passwords to law enforcement violated his First Amendment right to anonymous free speech, where there was a possibility of public disclosure and use of his information, and the statute was not sufficiently narrow to accomplish the state’s legitimate interest in protecting children from internet predators); State v. Aschbrenner, 926 N.W.2d 240, 254 (Iowa 2019) (holding that Iowa’s internet identifier reporting requirement is constitutional under the First Amendment and the Iowa Constitution); Coppolino v. Comm’r of Pa. State Police, 102 A.3d 1254, 1284 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (holding Pennsylvania’s requirement that sex offenders disclose their internet identifiers did not violate First Amendment); Ex parte Odom, 570 S.W.3d 900, 909-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (holding that Texas statute requiring registered sex offenders disclose their online identifiers did not violate the First Amendment); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 830 S.E.2d 62 (Va. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Virginia statute requiring sex offenders report any changes to their internet identifiers within 30 minutes does not violate the First Amendment).}

_{[203]      A.A. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that New Jersey’s publication of registered sex offenders’ home addresses on its public sex offender registry website does not violate the right to privacy); Willman v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 972 F.3d 819, 825 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that SORNA does not violate sex offenders’ First Amendment right to privacy and recognizing that the U.S. Constitution “does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information”); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that sex offender had “no constitutional right to keep his registry information from being disclosed”).}

_{[204]      Krebs v. Graveley, 861 F. App’x 671, 673 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that Wisconsin statute, which forbids sex offenders from legally changing their names, did not implicate offender’s speech rights and therefore offender did not present a viable First Amendment claim); In re C.G., 976 N.W.2d 318, 346 (Wis. 2022) (holding that Wisconsin statute prohibiting transgender juvenile sex offender from changing her name did not violate the First Amendment because “[p]roducing one’s legal name is properly understood as conduct, subject to government regulation, not speech” and offender’s “right to free speech does not encompass the power to compel the State to facilitate a change of her legal name”).} 

_{[205]      Doe 1 v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (holding that Alabama’s “branded-identification” requirement which requires an offender’s license include a designation that the individual is a sex offender violates the First Amendment); State v. Hill, 341 So. 3d 539, 542 (La. 2020) (holding that statutory requirement that persons convicted of sex offenses carry identification branded with the words “sex offender” violates the First Amendment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 311 (2021).}

_{[206]      McClendon v. Long, 22 F.4th 1330, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding that the warning signs Sheriff placed in sex offenders’ yards prior to Halloween are compelled government speech and their placement violates a homeowner’s First Amendment rights).}

_{[207]      United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements do not violate the First Amendment’s prohibition of compelled speech); United States v. Fox, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1222 (D. Kan. 2018) (concluding that SORNA does not compel a registered sex offender to speak in a fashion that would be protected by the First Amendment where it requires the offender to provide certain registration information); but see Hill, 341 So. 3d at 542 (holding that Louisiana’s statutory requirement that registered sex offenders carry an identification card branded with the words “sex offender” constitutes compelled speech and is unconstitutional under the First Amendment).}

_{[208]      “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.}

_{[209]      Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1127 (D. Neb. 2012) (holding that Nebraska statute requiring sex offender consent to search and monitoring of the offender’s electronic equipment, including installation of hardware or software to monitor the offender’s internet usage, was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and the Nebraska Constitution as it pertains to previously convicted sex offenders who are no longer on probation, parole, or court-monitored supervision on or after Jan. 1, 2010); Commonwealth v. Roderick, 194 N.E.3d 197, 210-11 (Mass. 2022) (holding that condition of probation requiring first-time sex offender convicted of rape to be subject to GPS monitoring was an unreasonable search in violation of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Feliz, 119 N.E.3d 700 (Mass. 2019) (recognizing that GPS monitoring as a condition of probation constitutes a search under the Massachusetts Constitution and the Fourth Amendment and that, in order for the condition to be constitutional, the government must establish that its interest in imposing GPS monitoring outweighs the privacy intrusion occasioned by the monitoring and holding that GPS monitoring was unconstitutional as applied to sex offender, imposition of GPS monitoring on any offender required an individualized hearing, and GPS monitoring as a condition of probation “will not necessarily constitute a reasonable search for all individuals convicted of a qualifying sex offense”; H.R. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 231 A.3d 617, 620 (N.J. 2020) (holding in an as-applied challenge that GPS monitoring of H.R., a tier III sex offender on parole supervision for life, was constitutional because the search (GPS monitoring) falls within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Hilton, 862 S.E.2d 806, 820 (N.C. 2021) (holding that “a search effectuated by the imposition of lifetime [satellite-based monitoring] . . . [on sex offenders who are aggravated offenders and who are not recidivists who are under State supervision] is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” and satellite-based monitoring is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution); State v. Strudwick, 864 S.E.2d 231, 234-35 (N.C. 2021) (holding that requiring sex offender to participate in satellite-based monitoring for the remainder of his life is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment where “the intrusion of lifetime [satellite-based monitoring] into the privacy interests of [the offender] is outweighed by lifetime [satellite-based monitoring]’s promotion of a compelling government interest” and “the inconvenience to [the offender] in wearing a small, unobtrusive device pursuant to [satellite-based monitoring] protocols that only provides the State with his physical location which the State may use solely for its legitimate governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting future crimes committed by [the offender], in conjunction with the added protection of judicial review as to the reasonableness of the search both at its imposition and at such times as circumstances may render the search unreasonable, . . . constitutes a pervasive but tempered intrusion upon [the offender’s] Fourth Amendment interests”); State v. Reed, 863 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that requiring a sex offender who entered an Alford plea to first-degree sexual offense of a child to register for life and participate in satellite-based monitoring was inappropriate because the offender did not plead guilty to a crime of penetration, an aggravated offense; he is not a recidivist; and he has not been classified as a sexually violent predator, while noting that an aggravated offense requires an element of penetration and although first-degree sex offense of a child requires a “sexual act,” a sexual act “can be found on the basis of cunnilingus or fellatio; neither requiring penetration”); but see State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 544-45 (N.C. 2019) (holding North Carolina statutes requiring lifetime satellite-based monitoring unconstitutional when based solely on offenders’ recidivist status and that satellite-based monitoring constitutes a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment); State v. Lindquist, 847 S.E.2d 78, 80-81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (vacating the satellite-based monitoring order and remanding to the trial court “for the limited purpose of amending the order to clarify upon which study the trial court relied in making its determination that [Lindquist] should be subject to lifetime satellite-based monitoring” where court could not determine the basis of the trial court’s decision to subject Lindquist to lifetime satellite-based monitoring because of a discrepancy between the study admitted into evidence and the study referenced in the trial court’s order).} 

_{[210]      See, e.g., Jones v. County of Suffolk, 936 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that Suffolk County program which allows a nonprofit organization to conduct home visits with individuals on the sex offender registry to confirm the accuracy of their registration address did not violate the Fourth Amendment and were reasonable under the “special needs” doctrine).} 

_{[211]      Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that registered sex offender did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his online identifiers and requiring him to report them did not violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).}

_{[212]      Johnson v. Terhune, 184 F. App’x 622, 624-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, although involuntary collection of DNA from sex offender constitutes a search, the search was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment).}

_{[213]      Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1054 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that requiring sex offender to fill out the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act registry form does not amount to an illegal search and seizure of information because offender has no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the information he is required to provide).} 

_{[214]      U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants against three types of abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).}

_{[215]      Notably, when a disclosure is compelled by a noncriminal regulatory framework, an individual seeking to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination must “show that the compelled disclosures will themselves confront the [individual] with substantial hazards of self-incrimination.” State v. Benson, 495 P.3d 717, 730-31 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that the regulatory requirement under Oregon law that sex offender acknowledge his awareness of his reporting obligations did not place him at a substantial risk of self-incrimination and did not compel self-incrimination in violation of state law or the Fifth Amendment); see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-31 (2002) (holding that a sex offender treatment program that requires disclosure of criminal conduct without guaranteeing immunity does not necessarily violate a person’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, but would if the consequences for nondisclosure were so serious that it effectively compelled the individual to make self-incriminating statements); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 1054 (holding that Colorado sex offender registration laws do not violate offender’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination because the provision of information required under sex offender registry laws does not implicate a substantial risk of self-incrimination and does not open him up to any additional criminal exposure or liability); United States v. Peters, 856 F. App’x 230, 235 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that court’s use of offender’s declaration of innocence that offender made at sentencing to deny offender’s motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for early termination of supervised release did not violate the Fifth Amendment noting that a person’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination is not violated at sentencing when a court considers the person’s “‘freely offered statements indicating a lack of remorse’”); State v. LaFountain, 901 N.W.2d 441, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that Minnesota registration statute is not a penal statute and therefore does not implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).} 

_{[216]      United States v. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019) (holding two offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes if prosecuted by different sovereigns and therefore, the state may prosecute a defendant of failure to register under state law even if the federal government has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute); United States v. Diaz, 967 F.3d 107, 109-11 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1424 (2021) (affirming conviction for failure to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, holding that a defendant in a SORNA prosecution may not collaterally challenge his underlying predicate sex offender conviction and that sex offender registration and notification requirements are not punitive and therefore SORNA does not violate the Fifth Amendment); Artway v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that New Jersey’s registration provisions of Megan’s Law does not impose “punishment” for purposes of Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 474-76 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that Tennessee sex offender registry law does not violate prohibition against double jeopardy since state law imposes no affirmative disability or restraint, and its purpose is remedial and regulatory rather than punitive); Steward v. Folz, 190 F. App’x 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding Indiana’s mandatory registration law did not constitute criminal punishment in violation of double jeopardy); United States v. Fisher, No. 21-1590, 2022 WL 468520 (8th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause where sex offender, who failed to update his address, had his supervised release revoked and was charged with failure to register and noting that “[i]t has long been the jurisprudence of this court that the same conduct can result in both a revocation of a defendant’s supervised release and a separate criminal conviction without raising double jeopardy concerns”); United States v. Lusby, 972 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that jeopardy never attached where the district court made a “purely legal determination” regarding defendant’s indictment for failing to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250); Terhune, 184 F. App’x at 624 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997)) (determining that California law requiring prisoner to register as sex offender did not violate Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses); State v. Chapman, 944 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 2020) (unpublished table decision) (holding that evidence was insufficient to prove sexual motivation requiring defendant’s registration as a sex offender where court relied on defendant’s Alford plea to child endangerment and a victim impact statement from the victim’s mother to find the defendant’s conduct was sexually motivated and that ordering defendant to register as a sex offender was not “punishment” to which double jeopardy could attach); State v. Larson, 980 N.W.2d 592, 598-99 (Minn. 2022) (holding that separate convictions under Minnesota law for failure to register involving the same assignment of corrections agent to offender violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because, for “double jeopardy purposes, the unit of prosecution for a violation of subdivision 3(a) is the assignment of a corrections agent” and offender can only be convicted of a single count); State v. Sparks, 657 S.E. 2d 655, 660-62 (N.C. 2008) (holding that a post-release hearing is not a criminal proceeding and therefore revocation of a sex offender’s probation, parole, or supervised release and imposition of accompanying sanctions does not violate double jeopardy); State v. Green, 230 P.3d 654, 656 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming dismissal of sex offender’s charge for failure to register, noting that Washington statute requiring sex offender to register “in person, every ninety days” was ambiguous regarding whether the unit of prosecution, for double jeopardy purposes, was “each 90-day period in which an offender with a fixed residence fails to register” or if an offender’s failure to register is treated as “an ongoing course of conduct,” and holding that the unit of prosecution would be construed as involving an ongoing course of conduct); State v. Durrett, 208 P.3d 1174, 1176-77 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for two counts of failure to register as a sex offender violated double jeopardy where the defendant’s failure to report weekly during two charged time periods constituted only a single criminal act or “one unit of prosecution”); but see State v. Valencia, 416 P.3d 1275, 1280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming offender’s conviction of failure to register and holding that offender’s conduct in failing to register as a sex offender within three days of move, and failing to report weekly as a transient offender approximately three months later, did not constitute the same criminal conduct and therefore did not violate double jeopardy).}

_{[217]      Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146, 150 (Va. 2013) (holding state’s reclassification of sex offender’s conviction was not an unconstitutional taking in violation of the state constitution). For additional discussion concerning Fifth Amendment challenges to state sex offender residency restrictions, see supra II.A.}

_{[218]      U.S. Const. amend. VI.} 

_{[219]      To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, an individual must show that his or her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that he or she was prejudiced by his or her counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692-94 (1984) (indicating that to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense); Scott v. Fox, No. 18-cv-2687 P, 2020 WL 3571476, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2020) (holding that “[b]ecause there is no clearly established Supreme Court opinion requiring that criminal defendants be informed, in a particular manner, that they will be subject to a lifelong registration requirement, the state superior court’s denial of [the offender’s] claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel] was not unreasonable or contrary to clearly established Supreme Court authority”).} 

_{[220]     To establish ineffective assistance during the plea bargain process, an individual must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the process would have been different. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); see Saylor v. Nagy, No. 20-1834, 2021 WL 5356030, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2021) (holding that offender’s trial counsel, who failed to advise offender that the consequences of his plea would include lifetime electronic monitoring and registration as a sex offender, did not provide constitutionally deficient representation where lifetime electronic monitoring and sex offender registration are more analogous to collateral consequences, and offender only needed to be aware of direct consequences of the plea); United States v. Cottle, 355 F. App’x 18, 21 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that court had no duty to inform offender that he would be required to register as a sex offender and therefore his guilty plea was valid); Mireles v. Bell, No. 06-13706, 2008 WL 126581, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2008) (noting that “[t]he classification, registration, and notification requirements of a sex offender statute are ‘more properly characterized as a collateral consequence of conviction,’” and “an attorney is not ineffective for failing to notify his client of all the collateral consequences of a plea” and therefore, offender’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to inform offender that he would be required to register as a sex offender); Rodriguez-Moreno v. State, No. 08-493-TC, 2011 WL 6980829, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2011) (holding that counsel’s failure to inform offender of the permanent sex offender registration requirement that went along with his guilty plea did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Washington v. United States, 74 M.J. 560, 561 (A.C.C.A. 2014) (holding that the requirement that a military judge advise an offender that he would be required to register as a sex offender before accepting his guilty plea is not retroactively applicable); United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115, 121 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (holding that, for purposes of determining whether a guilty plea was voluntary, sex offender registration was not a collateral consequence of the offender’s guilty plea to charge of kidnapping a minor and judge’s failure to inform offender that she would be required to register as a sex offender as a result of her plea resulted in “a substantial basis to question the providence of [the offender’s] guilty plea”); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that “the failure to advise a client that pleading guilty will require him to register as a sex offender is constitutionally deficient performance” and “mandating that criminal defendants facing the serious consequence of registration as a sex offender be properly informed of the same”); State v. Flowers, 249 P.3d 367, 372 (Idaho 2011) (holding that trial court’s failure to inform offender that he would be required to register as a sex offender if he pleaded guilty did not invalidate offender’s plea because the court is only required to inform an offender of the direct consequences of his plea and sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea); People v. Cowart, 28 N.E.3d 862, 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding that trial court’s failure to advise offender that he would be required to register as a sex offender if he pleaded guilty did not render offender’s plea unknowing or involuntary); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d 881, 892-93 (Ky. 2018) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to advise offender that sex offender registration would be required if he pleaded guilty to attempted kidnapping violated the offender’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 2016) (holding that because Minnesota’s sex offender registration statute is nonpunitive, defense counsel’s failure to advise the defendant regarding registration requirements prior to entry of a guilty plea did not violate defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution); Magyar v. State, 18 So. 3d 807, 811-12 (Miss. 2009) (holding that, since the requirement to register as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the court did not err in failing to advise offender of his duty to register before accepting guilty plea and citing case law addressing ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Gravino, 928 N.E.2d 1048, 1056 (N.Y. 2010) (addressing whether sex offender’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent as it relates to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the trial court failed to apprise offender of consequences of his guilty plea and noting that sex offender registration is a “collateral consequence”); People v. Nash, 48 A.D.3d 837, 837-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that sex offender registration is a collateral consequence and therefore failure to inform offender of the duty to register does not undermine the voluntariness of his or her guilty plea); State v. Trammell, 387 P.3d 220, 227 (N.M. 2016) (holding that defense counsel’s “advisement of a plea agreement’s SORNA registration requirement . . . is, and long has been, a prerequisite to effective assistance of counsel”); State v. Dornoff, 2020-Ohio-3909, No. WD-16-072, 2020 WL 4384223, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 31, 2020) (holding that the offender was not entitled to have his guilty plea vacated where the trial court failed to inform him of all sex offender registration requirements because the offender failed to establish that he would not have entered the guilty plea but for the trial court’s failure to fully advise him of all of the details of the sex offender classification scheme); Curtis v. Menard, No. 99-2-18 Wncv, 2022 Vt. Super. LEXIS 56, at *1-2 (Apr. 11, 2022) (holding that offender’s conviction, where he pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct with a 2-year-old, should not be vacated nor his plea withdrawn, even though the sentencing court failed to specifically ensure, before accepting his plea, that the offender was aware that he would be required to register as a sex offender because sex offender registration “is a collateral consequence of a relevant conviction, not a direct consequence,” it is not punitive, and “the sentencing court has no discretion to waive it”); State v. Dantzler, Nos. 2020AP1823-CR, 2020AP1824-CR, 2021 WL 8692893, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2021) (holding that, since sex offender registration requirements are a collateral consequence of a plea, the defendant’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to advise the defendant of his duty to register prior to entering a guilty plea). But see People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 895-895 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defense counsel was required to advise offender that he would be required to register as a sex offender if he pleaded guilty to the charge of child enticement and, therefore, his failure to do so amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel); Ex parte Weatherly, No. WR-61,215-10, 2023 WL 2000064, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2023) (per curiam) (holding that offender’s guilty plea to unlawful restraint of a child was involuntary where offender was never notified that he would have a duty to register as a sex offender); Ex parte Massey, No. WR-93,646-01, 2022 WL 1160822 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that offender’s plea was involuntary because neither trial counsel nor the trial court advised her about the requirement to register as a sex offender and the judgment specifically stated that the sex offender registration requirement did not apply to her).}

_{[221]      United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding defense counsel ineffective when counsel advised offender to plead guilty to failure to register as a sex offender even though the offender’s out-of-state indecency convictions did not require him to register as a sex offender under Texas law); Edmonds v. Pruett, No. 13cv1167, 2014 WL 4182664, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2014) (holding that sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and sex offender failed to allege ineffective assistance of counsel where his counsel incorrectly advised him that he would not be subject to sex offender registration if he entered into a guilty plea); People v. Armstrong, 50 N.E.3d 745, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (holding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he advised offender to plead guilty to failing to register as a sex offender when offender’s prior conviction of unlawful restraint did not subject him to sex offender registration); People v. Dodds, 7 N.E.3d 83, 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that counsel provided ineffective assistance where he misrepresented to offender that offender would only be required to register as a sex offender for 10 years rather than for life if he pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography); Ex parte Dauer, No. WR-88,114-01, 2018 WL 1406696, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2018) (per curiam) (finding that counsel’s failure to advise offender that his sex offender registration requirements had expired prior to his failure to register offense date constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Snider, 508 P.3d 1014, 1020-22 (Wash. 2022) (en banc) (holding that sex offender’s guilty plea was constitutionally valid where the court accurately described the “knowledge” element of the failure to register offense and, based on the totality of the circumstances, offender was “properly informed of the elements and nature of the crime when he pleaded guilty” and “his plea was therefore made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently”).}

_{[222]      Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 349 & n.5 (2013) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375-76 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)) (noting that “sex offender registration” is commonly viewed as a collateral consequence and the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys inform their clients of a conviction’s collateral consequences); United States v. Talkington, 73 M.J. 212, 217 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (holding that, notwithstanding Riley, sex offender registration is a collateral consequence for sentencing purposes); United States v. Molina, 68 M.J. 532, 535 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that it was proper to withdraw offender’s guilty plea where there was a mutual misunderstanding between the parties regarding the requirement to register as a sex offender under California law); State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1276 (Utah 2014) (holding that sex offender registration requirement “is a civil remedy and is properly categorized as a collateral consequence rather than a direct consequence of a defendant’s guilty plea because it is unrelated to the length or nature of the sentence” and because registration is a collateral consequence, sex offender’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated where offender’s counsel failed to advise him of the same).}

_{[223]      Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).}

_{[224]      Notably, Sixth Amendment rights only attach to offenses, not enhancements. United States v. Beck, 957 F.3d 440, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2378, 2384 (2019) (stating that, “under our Constitution, when ‘a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it’ that finding must be made by a jury of the defendant’s peers beyond a reasonable doubt” and holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which required a five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for certain sex offenses committed by offenders on supervised release, violated the right to jury trial guaranteed under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111, 114 (2013) (concluding that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and noting that “any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the underlying misdemeanor charges which required offender to register as a sex offender upon conviction were “petty” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and therefore, a jury trial was not required); State v. Trujillo, 462 P.3d 550, 561-62 (Ariz. 2020) (concluding that Arizona’s sex offender registration statutes are civil regulatory statutes, not criminal penalties, and therefore Apprendi does not apply); Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 543-44 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc) (holding that, because of the seriousness of the consequences of being designated a sex offender, when there is a special allegation of sexual motivation in a misdemeanor case, a jury trial must be afforded); People v. Picklesimer, 226 P.3d 348, 358 (Cal. 2010) (holding that because sex offender registration is not punishment, Apprendi does not require jury findings to support registration order); People v. Schaffer, 53 Cal. App. 5th 500, 509-13 (2020) (holding that sex offender does not have a right to have a jury determine whether he violated his parole for failure to wear his GPS device and that the reasoning of Haymond does not apply); People v. Presley, 156 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1035 (2007) (holding, based on Smith v. Doe, that the public notification and residency requirements under California’s sex offender registration laws do not constitute punishment that would require jury findings under the Sixth Amendment); People v. Rowland, 207 P.3d 890, 892-93 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding that community notification requirements for offender designated as a sexually violent predator (SVP) did not constitute punishment and therefore Apprendi did not preclude the court from finding that an offender is an SVP); Fallen v. United States, 290 A.3d 486, 499 (D.C. 2023) (holding that sex offender charged with misdemeanor sex offenses was entitled to a jury trial because “when viewed together with the 180-day maximum period of incarceration and up to five years of probation for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, sex offender registration overcomes the presumption that [sex offender] was charged with a petty offense and triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury”); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991) (holding that Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act does not constitute punishment); Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661, 667-68 (Ky. 2010) (holding that “SORA is a remedial measure with a rational connection to the nonpunitive goal of protection of public safety”); Wallman v. State, No. 1116, 2023 WL 195247, at *8 (Md. Jan. 17, 2023) (holding that Rogers does not apply where the victims’ ages were established during the adjudicatory phase through an agreed statement of facts and requiring an offender convicted of possession of child pornography to register as a tier I sex offender does not constitute an illegal sentence); Rogers v. State, 226 A.3d 261, 285, 288 (Md. 2020) (holding that anything needed to be shown in order to classify an offender in a particular tier must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and noting that “[sex offender] registration has developed in the direction of being punitive”); Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 235 (Md. 2002), superseded by statute as recognized in In re Nick H., 123 A.3d 229, 241 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (holding that Maryland Sex Offender Registration Act in effect at the time was not punishment for Apprendi purposes); Werlich v. Schnell, 958 N.W.2d 354, 370-71 (Minn. 2021) (holding that Minnesota sex offender registration and notification requirements are not punitive); State v. Meredith, No. A06-2234, 2008 WL 942616, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2008) (unpublished decision) (holding Minnesota statute requiring registration as a sex offender was not punitive and therefore Apprendi did not apply); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn. 1999), superseded by statute as recognized in Werlich v. Schnell, 958 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. 2021) (holding that the Minnesota predatory offender registration statute was not punitive, but regulatory); State v. Bowers, 167 N.E.3d 947, 952 (Ohio 2020) (holding that the trial court’s finding that sex offender used force in the commission of rape in sentencing the offender violated the Sixth Amendment); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011) (holding that Ohio’s sex offender registration requirements are punitive); State v. Conley, 2016-Ohio-5310, No. 27869, 2016 WL 4211252, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016) (recognizing that Ohio’s sex offender registration requirements are punitive); Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972, 992-93 (Pa. 2020) (holding that Pennsylvania’s registration, notification, and reporting requirements that are applicable to sexually violent predators do not constitute criminal punishment, and therefore the procedure for designating sexual offenders as sexually violent predators does not violate Apprendi or Alleyne); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 15-CR-0001570-2016 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Aug. 22, 2022) (holding that Revised Subchapter H of Pennsylvania’s SORNA constitutes criminal punishment and violates Apprendi and Alleyne), rev’d, No. 97 MAP 2022, 2024 WL 2789201 (Pa. May 31, 2024) (holding that Subchapter H of Pennsylvania’s SORNA does not constitute criminal punishment). For additional discussion concerning challenges by offenders concerning their right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, see supra notes 218 to 222 and accompanying text.} 

_{[225]      U.S. Const. amend. VIII.}

_{[226]      United States v. Diaz, 967 F.3d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1424 (2021) (affirming conviction for failure to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and holding that sex offender registration and notification requirements are not punitive and therefore SORNA does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174 (3d Cir. 2022) (holding that requiring offender to live in prison while being falsely identified as a sex offender does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Farmer v. Harman, No. 18-CV-02216, 2021 WL 2222720, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2021) (holding that Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry does not constitute punishment and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 946 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that Virginia’s sex offender registration and notification laws are regulatory and not punitive, and therefore do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment); Groys v. City of Richardson, No. 20-cv-03202, 2021 WL 3852186, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2021) (holding that City of Richardson’s ordinance prohibiting sex offenders who appear on the Texas sex offender registry from living within 2,000 feet of any premises where children commonly gather is not punitive and therefore cannot violate the Eighth Amendment); Rollin v. Off. of Comm’r of Ky. Dep’t of Corr., No. 22-5519, 2023 WL 4112081 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (holding that requiring an offender convicted of distribution of obscene matter to register as a sex offender does not constitute punishment and “therefore does not implicate the Eighth Amendment” and, even though the court failed to include the registration requirement in the judgment, offender was still obligated to register under Kentucky law); Kitterman v. City of Belleville, 66 F.4th 1084, 1092 (7th Cir. 2023) (holding that requiring offender to register as a sex offender for life did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA) does not impose “punishment,” and, because CSORA is not punitive, it does not violate the Eighth Amendment), rev’g Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017); Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1352 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that requiring a sex offender to obtain driver’s license which indicates he is a sex offender does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1051-52 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that CSORA is not punitive and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though sex offender asserts that CSORA has made it hard for him to hold a job or find housing and that he has been shamed and harassed for being on the registry); In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311, 325 (Cal. 2004) (holding that registration as a sex offender under California law is not punishment, but a legitimate, nonpunitive regulatory measure and does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions); People v. Castellanos, 982 P.2d 211, 217-18 (Cal. 1999) (holding that California’s sex offender registration was not punishment for purposes of prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Nichols, 176 Cal. App. 4th 428, 437 (2009) (holding that an indeterminate life sentence imposed on sex offender for failing to register under California’s three-strikes law did not violate the Eighth Amendment); State v. Joslin, 175 P.3d 764, 775 (Idaho 2007) (holding that the requirement that sexual offenders register does not constitute punishment and does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the state or federal constitutions); State v. Kinney, 417 P.3d 989, 994-96 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018) (holding that Idaho’s Sex Offender Registration Act is not punitive and requiring offender to register as a sex offender did not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Huntoon, 965 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (reiterating that offender’s placement on the sex offender registry is not punitive and, therefore, cannot be deemed as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); State v. Petersen-Beard,377 P.3d 1127, 1129 (Kan. 2016) (holding that Kansas Offender Registration Act’s lifetime registration requirements for adult offenders are not punitive and therefore do not violate state or federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Mossman, 281 P.3d 153, 171 (Kan. 2012) (holding that imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision for sex offender does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); People v. Humphrey, No. 362770, 2024 WL 2228374, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. May 16, 2024) (per curiam) (holding that requiring offender convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct to register as a sex offender is not cruel or unusual and does not violate the Michigan or U.S. Constitutions, and noting that, unlike in Lymon, the offense involved a sexual component); People v. Evans, No. 353139, 2022 WL 1195296, at *10-11 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2022) (holding that, although sex offender registration constitutes punishment as noted in Betts, requiring offender to register as a sex offender for life does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it “is not unjustifiably disproportionate as applied to the facts of defendant’s offense,” “it is unclear whether his exploitive behavior would have ceased if the victim did not disclose the incidents,” and “being placed on the sex offender registry for life may serve as a deterrent against recidivating”); People v. Jarrell, 1 N.W.3d 359, 372 (Mich. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that SORA’s lifetime registration requirement is neither cruel nor unusual and is not unjustifiably disproportionate under the circumstances of this case where offender was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct because he sexually penetrated the victim without consent and under circumstances involving the commission of unlawful imprisonment and acknowledging that Lymon did not apply); People v. Ringle, No. 352693, 2021 WL 5405753, at *2-5 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that lifetime electronic monitoring and requiring offender to register as a sex offender for life is not cruel and unusual punishment facially or as applied to him under the Michigan Constitution or the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); State v. Conley, 2016-Ohio-5310, No. 27869, 2016 WL 4211252, at *3-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016) (concluding that Ohio’s tier I sex offender registration requirements do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Commonwealth v. Prieto, 206 A.3d 529, 536 (Pa. 2019) (concluding that the 15-year registration requirement for tier I sex offenders under Revised Subchapter H of Pennsylvania’s SORNA “constitutes neither an illegal sentence nor cruel and unusual punishment”); In re C.G., 955 N.W.2d 443, 457 (Wis. App. Ct. 2021) (holding that sex offender registration does not constitute punishment and therefore, the offender’s registration requirement under Wisconsin law does not violate the Eighth Amendment), aff’d, 976 N.W.2d 318 (Wis. 2022); but see Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that offender’s “three-strikes” sentence based on a failure to register conviction is cruel and unusual punishment); Bradshaw v. State, 671 S.E.2d 485, 492 (Ga. 2008) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment for a second conviction of failure to register is cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Lymon, 993 N.W.2d 24, 47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that requiring an offender convicted of unlawful imprisonment, a crime that lacks a sexual component and that is not sexual in nature, to register as a sex offender under Michigan’s SORA constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution), appeal granted, 983 N.W.2d 82 (Mich. Jan. 11, 2023); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 15-CR-0001570-2016 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Aug. 22, 2022) (holding that Revised Subchapter H of Pennsylvania’s SORNA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions), rev’d, No. 97 MAP 2022, 2024 WL 2789201 (Pa. May 31, 2024) (holding that Revised Subchapter H of Pennsylvania’s SORNA does not constitute criminal punishment).}  

_{[227]      U.S. Const. amend. X.}

_{[228]      Thomas v. Blocker, No. 21-1943, 2022 WL 2870151 (3d Cir. July 21, 2022) (holding that federal SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment where “[i]n exchange for federal funding, Pennsylvania willingly chose to comply with federal SORNA”); Kennedy v. Allera, 612 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that SORNA does not commandeer Maryland in violation of the Tenth Amendment noting that “while SORNA imposes a duty on the sex offender to register, it nowhere imposes a requirement on the State to accept such registration”); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment because, while it “orders sex offenders traveling interstate to register and keep their registration current, SORNA does not require the States to comply with its directives,” but instead “allows jurisdictions to decide whether to implement its provisions or lose 10 percent of their federal funding otherwise allocated for criminal justice assistance” and further noting that “[o]f course the Tenth Amendment does not forbid conditioning of federal funding on a state’s implementation of a federal program”); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 607-08 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that, because SORNA relies on Congress’ spending power, Congress “has not commandeered Tennessee, nor compelled the state to comply with [SORNA’s] requirements,” and instead, “has simply placed conditions on the receipt of federal funds” and therefore SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Smith, 504 F. App’x 519, 520 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), (holding that SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment because, although it requires sex offenders who are traveling interstate to register and keep their registration current, it does not require states to comply with its directives), aff’g 655 F.3d 839 (2011); United States v. Richardson, 754 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle); United States v. Neel, 641 F. App’x 782, 793 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1128 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment); Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 768 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that requiring offender to register as a sex offender under SORNA, even though he completed his involvement with the criminal justice system before SORNA became effective, did not violate federalism).}

_{[229]      U.S. Const. amend. XIV.}

_{[230]      Id. § 1.}

_{[231]      Procedural due process provides that a State “may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005).}

_{[232]      Substantive due process protects fundamental rights “that are so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Id. To establish a substantive due process violation, an individual must demonstrate that a fundamental right was violated and that the conduct shocks the conscience. King v. McCraw, 559 F. App’x 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that Texas Sex Offender Registration Act’s registration requirements do not violate substantive due process because “the restrictions [do not] rise to the level of shocking the conscience”).} 

_{[233]      Woe v. Spitzer, 571 F. Supp. 2d 382, 388-89 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that offender did not have a protected liberty interest in the right to a 10-year registration period and, as a result, the amendment to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act extending the registration period from 10 years to 20 years for level 1 sex offenders did not violate offender’s substantive due process rights); Blocker, 2022 WL 2870151 (holding that Pennsylvania’s requirement that offenders register as sex offenders without first being provided a hearing does not violate offenders’ due process rights because they have already been afforded due process since federal SORNA’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone and an offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest the same); Farmer v. Harman, No. 18-CV-02216, 2021 WL 2222720, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2021) (holding that sex offender convicted of rape in Pennsylvania who is required to register for life received all the due process that is required under the Fourteenth Amendment); Desper v. Clarke, 1 F.4th 236, 247 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that there is no clearly established constitutional right to visitation in prison and therefore, prison regulation prohibiting inmates, who are required to register as sex offenders, from having in-person visitation with minors, does not violate procedural due process); Groys v. City of Richardson, No. 20-cv-03202, 2021 WL 3852186, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2021) (holding that City of Richardson’s ordinance prohibiting sex offenders who appear on the Texas sex offender registry from living within 2,000 feet of any premises where children commonly gather does not violate sex offender’s substantive or procedural due process rights because offender does not have a fundamental right to live wherever he wants); Murphy v. Rychlowski, 868 F.3d 561, 566-68 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that requiring offender, who was convicted of rape by force in California, to register in Wisconsin did not violate offender’s right to due process where his registration status in California “was established after a procedurally safeguarded proceeding (in criminal proceedings)” and Wisconsin’s post-registration process provided offender with an avenue to challenge his registration requirement); Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that California’s requirement that sexually violent predators register in person every 90 days did not violate substantive due process); Juvenile Male III, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that individuals who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from sex offender registration requirements); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that Alaska’s sex offender registration law does not violate procedural or substantive due process and noting that “persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from . . . registration and notification requirements”); Doe v. Wasden, 558 F. Supp. 3d 892, 910, 916-17 (D. Idaho 2021) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining Idaho from requiring the plaintiffs from registering as sex offenders in Idaho, and holding that the plaintiffs, who have been convicted of Idaho’s crime against nature offense, are likely to prevail on their claim that Idaho is violating their right to substantive due process where there is no legitimate interest in requiring them to register as sex offenders for engaging in private, consensual acts), appeal dismissed, No. 21-35826, 2022 WL 19333636 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022); Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174, 1185 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that Colorado’s sex offender registration and notification system, the purpose of which is to give members of the public the opportunity to protect themselves and their children from sex offenses, is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and does not violate substantive due process), rev’g Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017); Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345-46 (holding that the Florida Sex Offender Act is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in protecting the public from sexual abuse and therefore does not violate sex offenders’ substantive due process rights); Doe v. Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 136 (Alaska 2019) (holding that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) violates due process because it imposes registration requirements on all offenders convicted of designated offenses without affording them a hearing at which they might show that they are not dangerous and, without invalidating the entire statute, remedying the deficiency by requiring an individualized risk-assessment hearing); Doe v. Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 409-11 (Alaska 2004) (holding that ASORA as applied to a sex offender whose conviction was set aside prior to its enactment violates the offender’s due process rights under the Alaska Constitution); State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630, 644 (Conn. 2008) (holding that the trial court did not violate offender’s right to procedural due process where it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to ordering offender to register as a sex offender); People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 995 (Ill. 2018) (holding Illinois statute, which prohibits certain sex offenders from knowingly entering or being present in public parks, does not violate due process under the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions); Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 247, 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that Kentucky’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which required offender convicted of kidnapping a minor to register as a sex offender for life, did not violate federal procedural or substantive due process rights); Doe (No. 216697) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 170 N.E.3d 359 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that offender’s substantive due process rights were not violated where he was required to register as a tier I offender in Massachusetts resulting from an Ohio conviction from 25 years ago because he did not have a fundamental privacy or liberty interest involved and although his risk of reoffense and dangerousness to the public was low, it was not nonexistent); People v. Temelkoski, 905 N.W.2d 593, 594 (Mich. 2018) (holding that retroactive application of Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act which defined the defendant’s youthful training as a conviction and required him to register as a sex offender violated his constitutional right to due process); Powell v. Keel, 860 S.E.2d 344, 348 (S.C. 2021) (holding that lifetime registration under South Carolina law, without the opportunity for judicial review to assess an offender’s risk of reoffending, is unconstitutional and violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment); McCabe v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 508, 512 (Va. 2007) (holding that offender’s “right to be free from lifetime quarterly reregistration as a sex offender does not qualify as a liberty interest specially protected by the Due Process Clause for purposes of a substantive due process claim”).} 

_{[234]     Pierre v. Vasquez, No. 20-51032, 2022 WL 68970, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022) (holding that the district court erred in finding no standing based on its conclusion that offender, who was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2241 and was required to register as a sex offender in Texas as an “extrajurisdictional registrant,” alleged no injury because “the reputational damage to [offender] from being required to register as a sex offender constitutes injury”), remanded to, No. 20-CV-224, 2022 WL 3219421, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2022) (holding that “[b]y failing to give [offender] a formal hearing or opportunity to rebut Defendants’ determination that [he] was an extrajurisdictional registrant [based on offender’s conviction of attempted interstate transportation of individual for prostitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2421], Defendants violated [offender’s] procedural-due-process right—a right that exists to protect [offender’s] liberty interest in being free from sex-offender classification absent a sex offense conviction”); Menges v. Knudsen, 538 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1116 (D. Mont. 2021) (holding that the inclusion of offender in Montana’s sex offender registry for his 1994 conviction under Idaho’s crimes against nature statute is unconstitutional and violates his right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to privacy under the Montana Constitution and further noting that “having consensual intimate sexual contact with a person of the same-sex does not render someone a public safety threat to the community. It does not increase the risk that [Montana’s] children or other vulnerable groups will be victimized, and law enforcement has no valid interest in keeping track of such persons whereabouts. And, while it can be undoubtedly said that Montana’s sexual offender registration statutes generally serve compelling governmental interests, they are not narrowly tailored to serve those interests to the extent they pull [the offender] within their grasp”), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 21-35370, 2023 WL 2301431 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 2023); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1056 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that CSORA does not violate offender’s substantive due process rights because sex offender registration laws do not implicate fundamental rights and CSORA is rationally related to a legitimate government interest nor does CSORA violate offender’s right to privacy because he does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information that must be provided to the sex offender registry); Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that sex offender registration requirements under Missouri’s Sex Offender Registration Act and SORNA do not violate substantive due process).} 

_{[235]     Fowlkes v. Parker, No. 08-CV-1198, 2010 WL 5490739, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010) (holding that New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act “provides an elaborate procedural scheme for making and challenging sex offender designation levels” and “the availability of these procedural safeguards satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process requirements”), adopted by 2011 WL 13726 (N.D.N.Y Jan. 4, 2011); Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 953 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that classifying offender convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child as a tier III sex offender does not violate substantive due process); Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 401-02 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that offender had a liberty interest in being free from registration requirements where he had not been convicted of a sex offense and was “owed procedural due process before sex offender conditions may attach”); Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that requiring a person to register as a sex offender triggers the protections of procedural due process); Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that classification of offender as a sex offender and requiring him to participate in treatment for sex offenders, where offender was not convicted of a sex offense, violated procedural due process); Anthony A. v. Comm’r of Corr., 260 A.3d 1199, 1218 (Conn. 2021) (holding that classification of sex offender, where offender was not provided an opportunity to call witnesses, was not given adequate notice of the information to be relied on in the decision making, and did not have an impartial decision-maker, violated the offender’s due process rights); Crump v. State, 285 A.3d 125 (Del. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (holding that retroactive application of Delaware’s sex offender registration laws does not violate due process under the Delaware Constitution because Delaware law “does not ‘provide a basis for finding a broad liberty interest protectable from State-directed disclosure of information arising from criminal prosecutions’ and . . . the procedural protections provided in the criminal proceeding itself were therefore sufficient to satisfy due process”); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1064 (Del. 2001) (holding that assignment of sex offender to a statutorily mandated risk assessment tier does not violate due process); Mehringer v. State, 152 N.E.3d 667, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that offender’s due process rights were not violated when he was deemed a sexually violent predator by operation of law); Doe (No. 7546) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 168 N.E.3d 1100, 1104-06 (Mass. 2021) (holding that the board’s final classification of an incarcerated offender, that occurs at a time that is not reasonably close to the actual date of the offender’s discharge, violates due process); Doe (No. 380316) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 41 N.E.3d 1058, 1072-73 (Mass. 2015) (holding that sex offender risk classifications must be established by clear and convincing evidence to avoid violating procedural due process); Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146, 151 (Va. 2013) (holding that reclassification of offender’s conviction as a sexually violent offense for purposes of sex offender registration did not violate offender’s right to procedural due process).}  

_{[236]     Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003) (holding that Connecticut law, requiring that registration information about all sex offenders, not just those that are currently dangerous, must be publicly disclosed, without providing offenders with a “predeprivation hearing” to determine their level of dangerousness, does not violate due process because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the state’s statutory scheme and “no liberty interest was implicated because the . . . . [sex offender] statute turned ‘on an offender’s conviction alone’”); Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d at 131 (holding that publication of sex offender information under ASORA is justified by a compelling state interest); State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255, 1268 (Haw. 2001) (holding that, on state constitutional grounds, public notification provisions of statute that provided neither notice nor opportunity to be heard prior to notification was violative of due process); Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 6 N.E.3d 530, 544 (Mass. 2014) (holding that retroactive application of amendments to Massachusetts’ law, which requires internet publication of registry information for level 2 sex offenders, violated due process under the state constitution).}

_{[237]     Doe (No. 339940) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 170 N.E.3d 1143, 1154 (Mass. 2021) (holding that Massachusetts’ sex offender law, which required offender convicted of kidnapping a child to register as a sex offender, was constitutional and did not violate due process, even though the offender’s offense did not have a sexual component); but seeMeredith v. Stein, 355 F. Supp. 3d 355, 165-66 (E.D.N.C. 2018), superseded by statute, N.C. Stat. § 14-208.6, as recognized in Grabarczyk v. Stein, No. 21-CV-94, 2021 WL 5810501 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (holding that North Carolina’s process of determining whether out-of-state offenses are “substantially similar” to reportable convictions in North Carolina violates an offender’s procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); People v. Malloy, 228 A.D.3d 1284, 1290 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024) (holding that requiring offender convicted of a non-violent out-of-state felony sex offense to register as a sexually violent offender in New York under New York’s foreign registration clause, which requires offenders convicted of a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender to register in New York, violates the Fourteenth Amendment as applied).}  

_{[238]     Kreilein v. Horth, 854 F. App’x 733, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that offender is barred from seeking damages for being labeled as a sex offender because the lawsuit is against the state and he did not allege that any of the defendants were personally involved in any due-process violations and, since he is currently incarcerated and is not expected to be released until 2025 he is not currently subject to any registration requirement and there is no ongoing conduct to enjoin); Fletcher v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-cv-00267, 2020 WL 7082690, at *7 (D. Idaho Dec. 3, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-35128, 2023 WL 3018288 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (holding that there is no liberty interest involved in being required to attend sex offender treatment or in being informally referred to as a sex offender and “the sex offender ‘label’ is not a formal, [stigmatizing] classification” and it is “merely an internal designation used to facilitate an individual’s treatment and supervision and, thus, does not give rise to a protected liberty interest”); ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining legislative amendments in A.B. 579, where legislation imposes registration and notification requirements based solely on the fact of conviction, to sex offender registration did not violate the Due Process Clause); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that prison inmates have a liberty interest at stake in the determination of their status as sex offenders); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that an “inmate who has never been convicted of a sex crime is entitled to due process before the state declares him to be a sex offender”); Blanke v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 467 P.3d 850, 857-58 (Utah 2020) (holding that the Utah Parole Board did not violate offender’s due process rights under the Utah Constitution where it found that the offender, who was convicted of attempted child kidnapping, a registerable offense, was a sex offender and conditioned his parole on sex offender treatment without using the procedures set forth in Neese and noting that “[d]ue process does not require those procedures when an inmate has been convicted of—or, in a procedural setting like a sentencing hearing, has admitted to—a crime that requires him to register as a sex [offender]”); Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 416 P.3d 663, 674 (Utah 2017) (holding that the Utah Parole Board violated the state’s Due Process Clause where it denied an offender parole based on its determination that the offender, who was never convicted of a sex offense, was a sex offender).}

_{[239]    Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643-44 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that Minnesota registration statute is nonpunitive in nature and therefore does not implicate the presumption of innocence, which is “only implicated by a statute that is punitive or criminal in nature,” and does not violate substantive due process); id. (holding that Minnesota statute requiring offender, who was not convicted of a predatory offense, to register as a predatory offender, did not violate due process even though offender alleged injury to his reputation); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 971 A.2d 975, 981-82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (holding that Maryland statute which “conclusively presumes that anyone convicted of a sex offense is dangerous” is permissible and requiring offender convicted of rape, a sexually violent offense, to register as a sex offender for life and verify registration every six months did not violate due process); Spencer v. State Police Dir., No. 352539, 2020 WL 6814649, at *7-8 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2020) (per curiam) (holding that the lack of an individualized assessment of each particular sex offender’s actual dangerousness does not make Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act unconstitutional); State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935, 948 (Utah 2008) (holding that Utah’s registration statute requiring publication of “target” information, which could include, among other things, a description of the offender’s preferred victim demographics, implies that the offender is currently dangerous and violates procedural due process unless the Department of Correction provides the offender with a hearing).} 

_{In Massachusetts and Alaska, before an offender will be required to register as a sex offender, a hearing must be held. At the due process hearing, the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board must find that the offender poses a danger to the community before requiring registration. 803 Mass. Code Regs. 1.06; see also Doe (No. 972) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512, 513 (Mass. 1998) (holding that the board must hold an evidentiary hearing to prove the appropriateness of an offender’s risk classification before requiring the offender to register as a sex offender), overruled by Doe (No. 380316) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 41 N.E.3d 1058 (Mass. 2015). Similarly, in Alaska, an individualized risk-assessment hearing must be held to determine the offender’s dangerousness and to comport with due process. Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d at 136 (requiring the court hold an individualized-risk assessment hearing before imposing sex offender registration requirements on offenders).} 

_{[240]      For additional discussion regarding conditions of supervised release, see infra III.C.5.}

_{[241]      U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.}

_{[242]     Farmer v. Harman, No. 18-CV-02216, 2021 WL 2222720, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2021) (holding that requiring sex offender, who was convicted of rape, a tier III offense, to register for life in Pennsylvania did not violate equal protection and the offender has not been deprived equal protection just because other sex offenders “who have been convicted of lesser offenses have been removed from the registry whereas [he] has not”); Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that Pennsylvania law “subjecting out-of-state sex offenders to community notification without providing equivalent procedural safeguards as were given to in-state sex offenders was not rationally related to the interest of protecting citizens from sexually violent predators” and subjecting a sex offender, who was convicted in New Jersey but serving probation in Pennsylvania, to community notification, violates Equal Protection where Pennsylvania offenders are only subject to community notification if they are designated as “sexually violent predators”); Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1006 (E.D. La. 2012) (holding that Louisiana’s sex offender registration law, requiring individuals convicted of violating state crime against nature by solicitation statute to register as sex offenders, violated equal protection where offenders convicted of violating solicitation of prostitution statute, where both offenses had the same elements, were not required to register as sex offenders); Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.4th 647 (7th Cir. 2023) (holding that requiring pre-SORA sex offenders who have a duty to register in another jurisdiction to register in Indiana is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in seeking to register as many sex offenders as possible, “[r]equiring offenders who are already subject to the burdens of registration elsewhere rationally promotes public safety through the maintenance of a sex-offender registry that is as complete as the Indiana Constitution permits” and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Doe v. Wasden, 558 F. Supp. 3d 892, 915-17 (D. Idaho 2021) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining Idaho from requiring the plaintiffs to register as sex offenders in Idaho, and holding that the plaintiff, who was convicted of Idaho’s crime against nature offense, is likely to prevail on his claim that Idaho is violating his right to equal protection of the law because there is no rational basis for “requiring a male who engages in consensual sex with another male to register as a sex offender, where the State does not require a similarly situated male who has consensual sex with a female to register as a sex offender”), appeal dismissed, No. 21-35826, 2022 WL 19333636 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022); Menges v. Knudsen, 538 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1116 (D. Mont. 2021) (holding that, because offender’s underlying criminal conviction was not for having sexual contact with a minor, but for having sexual contact with another male, the statute infringes on his liberty interest and inclusion in Montana’s sex offender registry for his 1994 conviction under Idaho’s crimes against nature statute is unconstitutional, violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the defendants were permanently enjoined from requiring offender to register as a sex offender under Montana’s Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 21-35370, 2023 WL 2301431 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 2023); Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that Oklahoma law, requiring an aggravated sex offender to obtain a driver’s license that indicates he is a sex offender, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because he was not similarly situated to ordinary sex offenders and he was not being treated differently than other aggravated sex offenders); Johnson v. Dep’t of Just., 341 P.3d 1075, 1083 (Cal. 2015) (holding that California’s mandatory sex offender registration requirement does not violate equal protection); State v. Dickerson, 97 A.3d 15, 23-24 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (finding that a rational basis exists for Connecticut’s different registration requirements for violent and nonviolent offenders and holding that Connecticut’s sex offender registration laws do not violate equal protection); Oulman v. Setter, No. A13-2389, 2014 WL 3801870, at *1, *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2014) (holding that Minnesota law, which “honors the registration laws of other states by requiring offenders who relocate to Minnesota to register [in Minnesota] under the terms imposed by the vacated state,” did not violate equal protection by requiring an offender, who was convicted in Colorado and required to register as a predatory offender for life in Colorado, to register for life in Minnesota, even though the offender would have only been required to register for 10 years in Minnesota had he committed, and been convicted of, the offense in Minnesota); Hendricks v. Jones ex rel. State, 349 P.3d 531, 534 (Okla. 2013) (holding that applying Oklahoma’s sex offender registration and notification laws to sex offenders “now residing in Oklahoma who were convicted in another jurisdiction prior to SORA’s enactment but not applying the same requirements to a person convicted in Oklahoma of a similar offense prior to SORA’s enactment, violates a person’s equal protection guarantees”); Watson-Buisson v. Commonwealth, No. 200955, 2021 WL 4628456, at *2-3 (Va. Oct. 7, 2021) (holding that sex offender’s classification as a “sexually violent offender” in Virginia, where he was convicted of “computer-aided solicitation of a minor” in Louisiana, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the Louisiana crime is comparable to the Virginia crime of taking indecent liberties with a child and the offender was not treated differently than a Virginia defendant who is convicted of a similar crime in Virginia), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1161 (2022).} 

_{[243]      In re Gadlin, 477 P.3d 594, 596 (Cal. 2020) (holding that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation regulations, which prohibit nonviolent sex offenders from seeking early parole consideration, violate the California Constitution).} 

_{[244]      Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 587-88 (Pa. 2020) (remanding to determine whether presumption that sex offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sex offenses requiring lifetime registration violates offenders’ due process right to reputation under Pennsylvania Constitution);  Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 15-CR-0001570-2016 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Aug. 22, 2022) (holding that Pennsylvania SORNA’s irrebuttable presumption that sex offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sex offenses requiring lifetime registration violates an individual’s due process right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution), rev’d, No. 97 MAP 2022, 2024 WL 2789201 (Pa. May 31, 2024) (holding that offender failed to meet his burden to establish that Pennsylvania SORNA’s irrebuttable presumption that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffense is unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 258 A.3d 1147, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (holding that the sexually violent predator designation under Pennsylvania law does not violate an offender’s right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution because the hearing procedure comports with due process and Subchapter I is narrowly tailored to a compelling state purpose of protecting the public from those who have been found to be dangerously mentally ill).}

_{[245]      Commonwealth v. Nieman, 84 A.3d 603, 605 (Pa. 2013) (holding that legislation amending state’s sex offender registration and notification laws violated the “single subject” rule of the state constitution and striking the same).}

_{[246]      5 U.S.C. § 553. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are generally required to follow certain rules in promulgating rules, including procedural requirements. However, under the APA’s “good cause” exception, an agency can bypass the notice and comment requirement “if the agency for good cause finds” that compliance would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Id.}

_{[247]      See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,8894 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3), available at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-02-28/pdf/E7-3063.pdf (hereinafter Interim Retroactivity Rule). In 2010, the Attorney General issued a final rule addressing the applicability of SORNA. Final Retroactivity Rule, supra note 145.}

_{[248]      United States v. Ross, 848 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the interim rule declaring SORNA applicable to pre-enactment offenders was invalid where Attorney General failed to establish good cause to bypass the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment procedures); United States v. Mingo, 964 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming conviction for failure to register under SORNA holding that SORNA’s delegation to the Secretary of Defense does not violate the nondelegation doctrine and the Secretary did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act in designating military sex offenses as sex offenses under SORNA where the designation fell within the military affairs exception); United States v. Dean, No. 08-CR-67, 2020 WL 3073340, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2020) (recognizing the existence of a circuit split on whether the Attorney General had good cause to excuse the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements, agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, and finding that the Attorney General had good cause to bypass the notice and comment requirements of the APA to provide for the public safety regarding the interim rule applying SORNA to offenders who committed sex offenses prior to its passage); United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the Attorney General did not show cause for waiving the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment requirements in promulgating the interim rule governing retroactivity of SORNA’s registration requirements); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Attorney General had good cause to bypass the notice and comment period and recognizing there “was a need for legal certainty about SORNA’s ‘retroactive’ application to sex offenders convicted before SORNA and a concern for public safety that these offenders be registered in accordance with SORNA as quickly as possible”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974 (2010); United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that, although the Attorney General failed to follow the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements, such error was harmless); United States v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302, 312 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that Attorney General’s failure to follow the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment provisions was not harmless error); United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding Attorney General lacked good cause for waiving the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment requirements in issuing interim rule); United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Attorney General had good cause to bypass the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment procedures and promulgate rule making SORNA retroactive).}  

_{[249]      Grant-Davis v. Felker, No. 19-cv-3468, 2021 WL 4055162 (D.S.C. July 15, 2021) (citing Al-Wahhab v. Commonwealth, No. 18-CV-00197, 2018 WL 3614212, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 27, 2018)) (noting that sex offender status does not qualify as a disability under the ADA).}

_{[250]      See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431, 439 (Iowa 2008) (affirming conviction of child endangerment where mother of two children cohabitated with a known sex offender).}

_{[251]      See 13 Del. Code Ann. § 724A.}

_{[252]      18 U.S.C. § 4248 (providing mechanism for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons); see e.g., United States v. Hunt, 21 F.4th 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2021) (addressing sex offender’s motion for unconditional discharge from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act).}

_{[253]      See Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that the possibility of civil commitment for life as a sexually dangerous person is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty); United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act is a collateral consequence); United States v. Hollins, 70 F.4th 1258, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that the possibility of civil commitment under state or federal law and possible Arizona-specific geographic restrictions and community notification requirements were “collateral consequences” of sex offender’s guilty plea); State v. LeMere, 879 N.W.2d 580, 598 (Wis. 2016) (noting that civil commitment under Wisconsin Sexually Violent Person Commitments statute is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea resulting in conviction of a sexually violent offense).}

_{[254]      Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997) (holding that Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act which establishes procedures for civil commitment is not punishment and therefore is nonpunitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Tilley v. United States, 238 A.3d 961, 977 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that the District of Columbia’s Sexual Psychopath Act violates substantive due process and is unconstitutional on its face and a civil commitment statute “must require the court find that the [person] is afflicted with a mental illness, mental abnormality, or mental disorder that makes it seriously difficult for the person to control (i.e., refrain from) his or her dangerous behavior”); Daywitt v. Harpstead, No. 20-CV-1743, 2021 WL 2210521, at *4 (D. Minn. June 1, 2021) (holding that the plaintiffs have “brought colorable claims that the [Minnesota Sex Offender Program’s] policies [restricting civilly committed offenders’ ability to use technology and access the internet] violate the First Amendment”); In re Civil Commitment of W.W., 246 A.3d 219, 227 (N.J. 2021) (holding that, in assessing the continuing need for the involuntary commitment of a convicted sexually violent offender, the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act requires the state produce psychiatric testimony in support of commitment); In re P.D., 236 A.3d 885, 888 (N.J. 2020) (holding that “a person subject to [a Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)] civil commitment hearing is entitled to limited discovery focusing on the elements of the State’s burden of proof” and adopting a new court rule enumerating the categories of documents subject to discovery in an SVPA proceeding and setting forth the requirements for the reports of the state’s experts); In re Civil Commitment of W.X.C., 8 A.3d 174, 183 (N.J. 2010) (holding that civil commitment of sexually violent predators pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state constitutions); In re K.H., 609 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex. App. 2020) (affirming trial court’s judgment ordering offender to be civilly committed under Texas law where offender’s Oregon convictions for sexual abuse required proof that he touched the genitals of a child with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person and, the elements of the offense “display a high degree of likeness to the elements of the Texas offense of indecency with a child by contact,” such that “the offenses are substantially similar for purposes of Chapter 841”).} 

_{[255]      United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010) (holding that federal statute allowing a district court to order civil commitment of a sexually dangerous federal prisoner, beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released, is constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause); Steele, 365 F.3d at 17 (holding that failure to inform sex offender, before he pleaded guilty, of the possibility that he could be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person did not affect the validity of his plea); Youngs, 687 F.3d at 61 (holding that court’s acceptance of offender’s guilty plea, without advising him of the civil commitment implications of the Adam Walsh Act, did not violate due process); United States v. Vandivere, 88 F.4th 481, 493 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding that “in an Adam Walsh Act discharge hearing, the detainee bears the burden of proof to show his recovery [and that he is no longer sexually dangerous] by a preponderance of the evidence” and requiring a civilly committed sex offender to bear the burden of proving that he is no longer sexually dangerous at his civil commitment discharge hearing does not violate due process), petition for cert. filed, No. 23-7418 (U.S. May 8, 2024); LeMere, 879 N.W.2d at 598 (holding that defense counsel’s failure to inform offender, who was charged with a sexually violent offense, about the possibility of civil commitment under Wisconsin law before he pleaded guilty did not violate the Sixth Amendment and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).}

_{[256]      United States v. Alexander, No. 21-11237, 2022 WL 3134226, at *1-3 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that requiring offender convicted of production of child pornography to register as a sex offender under SORNA as a condition of supervised release “does not constitute a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum because it does not violate the statutory limitations on supervised release conditions set forth in § 3583(d)”); United States v. Smith, 852 F. App’x 780, 786-87 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that imposition of lifetime supervised release on offender convicted of a child pornography offense, which included a condition that he register as a sex offender, was not substantively or procedural unreasonable and noting that it “has previously upheld lifetime terms of supervised release in child pornography cases”); United States v. Massey, No. 05-37, 2021 WL 1267798, at *6, *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2021) (holding that offender’s conditions of supervised release could not be modified to require registration as a sex offender where the elements of the sex offense were not explained to the offender and, therefore, he was not fully aware of the ramifications of his guilty plea); United States v. Lee, No. 21-5060, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 35976, at *6-7, *11 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021) (holding that imposition of the term of lifetime supervised release on sex offender, including conditions requiring sex offender submit to searches by his probation officer and requiring sex offender participate in cognitive behavior therapy, were reasonable); United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that it was not punitive and did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws to require offender, who was convicted of possession of firearm by a felon, to register as a sex offender as a condition of supervised release, where offender had a prior Ohio adjudication of delinquency for gross sexual imposition); United States v. Gifford, 991 F.3d 944, 947-48 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court did not impose an unreasonable sentence and finding that, although it erred in imposing a life term of supervised release for offender’s § 2260A conviction, because the error did not affect offender’s substantial rights—offender would still be subject to a life term of supervised release for his § 2251 conviction, even if the term imposed for violation of § 2260A was eliminated—there was no prejudice from the court’s error); United States v. Moore, 449 F. App’x 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that condition of supervised release requiring registration as a sex offender under SORNA when, at the time of sentencing, the defendant’s registration period had already expired, was invalid); United States v. Hahn, 551 F. 3d 977, 986 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that requiring offender convicted of fraud to register as a sex offender as a condition of probation was proper where offender had a prior state conviction for a sex offense); Melnick v. Camper, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1049 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that Colorado’s Sex Offender Registration Act’s requirements requiring offender register as a sex offender and participate in a sex offender treatment program are valid conditions of parole); United States v. Sewell, 712 F. App’x 917, 919-20 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that condition of supervised release requiring offender to register as a sex offender under SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Stutzman, No. DA 20-0167, 2021 Mont. LEXIS 337, at *1-2 (Apr. 13, 2021) (holding that court’s judgment designating sex offender, who was convicted of failure to register as a sexual offender under Montana law, as a level 2 sexual offender was improper because sex offender’s failure to register conviction is not a “sexual offense”); Ex parte Evans, 338 S.W.3d 545, 552-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that requiring an offender to register as a sex offender as a condition of parole, where the underlying convictions are not sexual in nature, violates due process); State v. Deel, 788 S.E.2d 741, 748 (W. Va. 2016) (reversing sentencing order subjecting offender, who was convicted of multiple sex offenses, to 20 years of supervised release and holding that “[a]ny retroactive application of [West Virginia’s] supervised release statute to an individual who committed any of the enumerated sex offenses prior to the effective date of the supervised release statute violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws” under the West Virginia and federal constitutions).} 

_{[257]     United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 72-74 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that condition of supervised release completely banning offender from using the internet was overly broad where the offender, who was convicted of knowingly engaging in sexual contact with a female under the age of 12, did not use the internet to commit the underlying offense); United States v. Morse, No. 21-3110-cr, 2023 WL 1458832, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2023) (holding that conditions of supervised release prohibiting sex offender from using or possessing a computer without obtaining prior authorization and restricting access to the internet and certain websites are reasonable where offender committed sexual offenses against minors, used the internet to meet women who had minor children, and has failed on multiple occasions to comply with requirements intended to prevent him from having unauthorized contact with minors); United States v. Leone, 813 F. App’x 665, 669 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding it permissible to place conditions on sex offender’s use or possession of any computer or internet capable device (i.e., requiring the offender participate in a monitoring program or obtain advance permission) where he had a history of accessing child pornography over the internet); United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that conditions of supervised release amounting to virtual ban on internet access and the prohibition on viewing or possessing adult pornography were substantively unreasonable); United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that condition of supervised release prohibiting offender from accessing the internet without permission of his probation officer was improper where offender was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography but did not have a history of using the internet to contact children); United States v. Ellis, 984 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that while § 3583(d) permits a complete ban on pornography, the district court must adequately explain its findings and the record must support such a finding and holding that special conditions of release banning an offender convicted of possession of child pornography, where there was no evidence linking the offender’s offense or criminal history to unlawful use of the internet, from internet access and from possessing any pornography were not reasonably related to the offender’s conviction or supervised release violations and were impermissibly overbroad); United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 421-22 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that special internet condition prohibiting sex offender from accessing the internet without prior approval from the offender’s probation officer was not overbroad and “clearly meets the statutory requirements of § 3583(d), as there is both a connection to ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant’ and a need ‘to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,’” especially here, where the offender used the internet to find his victim, communicate with her for months, and coerce her to create and send him sexually explicit images); United States v. Hidalgo, No. 23-60123, 2023 WL 5973070, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2023) (per curiam) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in imposing special conditions, including a condition prohibiting the offender from possessing material depicting sexually explicit conduct, a condition limiting his use of the internet, and a condition prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with children under 18, on sex offender); United States v. Becerra, 835 F. App’x 751, 758 (5th Cir. 2021) (vacating special conditions of supervised release banning offender convicted of multiple child pornography offenses from using the internet, computers, and other electronic devices for 10 years holding that the restrictions were not narrowly tailored by scope or duration and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings); United States v. Hidalgo, No. 21-60208, 2021 WL 4597198, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 2021) (per curiam) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in imposing special conditions, including a condition prohibiting the offender from possessing material depicting sexually explicit conduct, a condition limiting his use of the internet, and a condition prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with children under 18, on sex offender); United States v. Goodpasture, No. 21-1264, 2021 WL 4859699, at *2-3 (7th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (holding that the district court did not adequately justify placing restrictions on sex offender’s computer and internet use where it only relied on his previous conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, his designation as a “sexually dangerous person,” his failure to attend sex offender treatment, and recommendations from his sex offender evaluation); United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that condition of supervised release completely banning offender, who was convicted of possession of child pornography, from accessing the internet was overbroad and imposed a greater deprivation on the offender’s liberty than necessary where offender “had not used any of the computer systems at his place of work in committing his crimes”); United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 621-22 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding that condition of supervised release prohibiting offender, who was convicted of receipt of child pornography, from accessing the internet was improper where the court failed to engage in an individualized inquiry and did not make sufficient findings on the record); United States v. Wiedower, 634 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that court abused its discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release restricting offender’s access to the internet and banning him from online gaming, where “the record only shows that [the offender] used his computer to receive and access child pornography”); United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that condition of supervised release prohibiting sex offender from possession or use of a computer with access to the internet without written approval did not violate the First Amendment); United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 976-77 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that court did not err in imposing special condition of supervised release on offender, who was convicted of an offense involving electronic communications sent to a minor, which restricted his use of a computer, because the condition was tailored to the offender’s offense, it did not extend beyond his term of supervised release, and the offender could obtain approval to use a computer in connection with employment and further noting that a district court may “‘impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens’ during supervised release”); United States v. Washington, 763 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that district court did not plainly err in imposing condition of supervised release that prohibited sex offender, who was convicted of possession of child pornography and had admitted to using the internet to view and share child pornography, from using a computer without court approval); Dalton v. State, 477 P.3d 650, 656 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the probation condition prohibiting sex offender from contacting his victims, which included his 12-year-old stepdaughter and his wife, without written permission, must be narrowly construed to avoid infringement of his constitutional right to familial association and, further, that his wife, rather than the probation officer, should have the power to determine whether and to what extent to allow contact and that, even though there was a nexus between the offender’s offense and the internet, his probation condition requiring he obtain approval from his probation officer before accessing the internet “unduly restricts [his] liberty”); People v. Landis, 497 P.3d 39, 42-44 (Colo. App. 2021) (holding that probation conditions restricting offender, who was convicted of attempted sexual assault on a child, from using the internet and social media are reasonably related to the offender’s rehabilitation and the purposes of probation and did not violate the offender’s right to free speech under the state and federal constitutions); Belair v. State, 263 A.3d 127 (Del. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that condition of supervised release prohibiting offender, who was convicted of sexual solicitation of a child, from possessing any electronic equipment that has the ability to access the internet did not violate the First Amendment and Packingham was inapplicable because not only did the offender acknowledge using the internet to sexually solicit a child, but the internet condition only applies to him during his term of probation); Rutledge v. State, 861 S.E.2d 793, 297-98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that neither of the offender’s conditions of probation, which prohibit the offender from possessing any sexually oriented materials and requires the offender to obtain prior written approval before using the internet, violate the offender’s rights to free speech under the First Amendment and the state constitution); People v. Chiovari, No. 5-22-0383, 2023 WL 2301579 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 1, 2023) (vacating condition of sex offender’s mandatory supervised release prohibiting him from using or accessing social networking websites where there was nothing in the record to show offender used social networking websites to seek out victims and and holding that the statutory provision is overbroad and facially unconstitutional and “‘unnecessarily sweeps within its purview those who never used the Internet—much less social media—to commit their offenses and who show no propensity to do so, as well as those whose Internet activities can be supervised and monitored by less restrictive means’”); Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 721-22 (Iowa 2021) (holding that terms and conditions of parole agreement, including requirement to complete sex offender treatment and refrain from using the internet or social media without approval, are collateral consequences and do not need to be disclosed at the time of the initial guilty plea); State v. Hotchkiss, 474 P.3d 1273, 1278 (Mont. 2020) (holding that conditions of supervised release, which completely prohibit sex offender from accessing the internet and from possessing certain electronic devices, without prior approval, were overbroad, because they went beyond what is reasonably related to the offender’s criminal history and his underlying offense and failed to take into consideration the many legitimate purposes for using the internet); State v. King, 950 N.W.2d 891, 909 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that condition of supervised release restricting offender, who was convicted of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime and child enticement, from accessing the internet did not violate his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association).}  

_{[258]      United States v. Benoit, 975 F.3d 20, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release on sex offender, who was convicted of transporting and possessing child pornography, prohibiting him from interacting with children or going places where he knew children could be without probation approval, even though offender had not committed any “contact” offenses); Montoya v. Jeffreys, 565 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (denying the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge to the personnel who make and review parent-child contact decisions; denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment; granting IDOC’s motion for summary judgment as to IDOC’s requirements “that chaperones and guardians do not deny or refute, or allow parolees to deny or refute, the details of their convictions and . . . that parolees regularly attend therapy” but denying the remainder of IDOC’s motion (regarding the 35-day presumptive ban, the insufficient duration of therapy requirement, the polygraph requirement, the requirement that offenders’ comply with all mandatory supervised release conditions, and regarding the lack of a neutral decisionmaker)); United States v. Hutson, 59 F.4th 965, 967 (8th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (holding that special condition of supervised release prohibiting sex offender from having contact with minor children without prior written consent did not prohibit him from visiting with his stepchildren and was not an unconstitutional restriction on his ability to associate with his family); People v. Langley, No. C093397, 2021 WL 5577928, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that, while there is a compelling state interest in preventing recidivism, the term “access to” contained in sex offender’s probation condition, which prohibited him from having access to children’s clothing, toys, games, or similar material related to children’s interests, is overbroad and the condition should be modified to read: “Defendant is not to possess or have children’s clothing, toys or games, or other material related to children’s interests”); Commonwealth v. Harding, 158 N.E.3d 1, 7 (Mass. 2020)  (holding that sex offender’s condition of probation, which prohibits him from working, volunteering, or residing with children under 16 years old, did not prohibit him from performing home improvement work in a home where a young child resided, noting that working with children is different from working in the presence of children).}

_{[259]     United States v. Bilyou, No. 20-3675, 2021 WL 5121135, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2021) (holding that the condition of supervised release prohibiting sex offender from accessing pornography “is sufficiently narrowly tailored and involves no greater deprivation of liberty that is reasonably necessary to serve the legitimate needs of sentencing” and was not unlawful because it was “fluid,” would only remain in place until the offender was evaluated by a treatment provider and that it provided the possibility of reevaluation over the course of the offender’s supervised release); United States v. Ochoa, 932 F.3d 866, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that condition of supervised release prohibiting offender’s access to material depicting sexually explicit conduct involving adults was permissible where offender was convicted of possession of child pornography).}

_{[260]     United States v. Voyles, No. 21-5634, 2022 WL 3585637 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2022) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sex-offender conditions, including requirement to attend a sex offender therapy program and to submit to polygraph testing, on offender convicted of theft of government property after he impersonated a veteran where offender wrote a sexually explicit note revealing his desire to commit several sex offenses against children because “[t]here was no evidence to rebut the dangerous message conveyed by the note,” the “narrowly tailored sex-offender conditions were reasonably related to protecting the public from future criminal activity,” and the court was not precluded from imposing sex offender special conditions of supervised release “even though the crime was not a sex-related offense or committed in a sexual nature”); Wiedower, 634 F.3d at 494 (affirming special condition of supervised release requiring offender attend sex offender treatment where there was demonstrable evidence of the offender’s addiction to pornography); United States v. Johnson, 697 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that condition of supervised release requiring the offender to undergo a sexual offender assessment was reasonable where the offender had two prior convictions of serious and violent sexual offenses).}

_{[261]     United States v. Rogers, 988 F.3d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that “a court can impose mandatory periodic polygraph examinations in connection with sex offender treatment programs as a condition of supervised release, where the condition prohibits basing any revocation in any way on the defendant’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege” and holding that the special condition of the offender’s supervised release requiring he submit to periodic random polygraph examinations did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination); Leone, 813 F. App’x at 670 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing condition of supervised release requiring offender, who had a history of accessing child pornography over the internet, to submit to two polygraphs per year); United States v. Hohag, 893 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing conditions of supervised release requiring the defendant to participate in a sex-offense assessment and to submit to polygraph testing in conjunction with the sex offender specific assessment because the conditions were not particularly burdensome and they related to the defendant’s crime of conviction, failure to register); United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that condition of supervised release requiring offender submit to polygraph testing did not violate the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Boykin, No. 22-10327, 2022 WL 1558894, at *4 (11th Cir. May 17, 2022) (per curiam) (holding imposition of polygraph testing as a special condition of supervised release where offender was convicted of failing to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 was reasonable).}

_{[262]      United States v. Russell, 45 F.4th 436, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing two years of GPS monitoring as a condition of sex offender’s supervised release, the GPS monitoring condition “is not a ‘greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to deter [offender], protect the public, and provide [offender] correctional treatment” where it was related to enforcing other conditions of his supervised release, it is directly related to deterring him and protecting the public, it is related to “a jurisdictional component—travel—of [offender’s] underlying offense,” and it is related to his child-sex crime in Maryland); United States v. Johnson, 773 F.3d 905, 908-09 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing GPS monitoring as a condition of supervised release where offender was previously convicted of possession of child pornography and his record of repeatedly violating his supervised-release conditions); Commonwealth v. Crayton, 185 N.E.3d 942 (Mass. App. Ct. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the special condition of probation prohibiting sex offender from entry into public libraries for three years and requiring GPS monitoring to enforce that condition is reasonably related to the goal of protecting the public, especially “[g]iven the history underlying the defendant’s current and past convictions, and the evidence that he has used a public library to view and download child pornography, and that minors observed that child pornography while in the library”); State v. Smith, 488 P.3d 531, 546 (Mont. 2021) (holding that the condition of sex offender’s sentence requiring GPS supervision for the remainder of his life is constitutional because the “statute’s requirement for lifetime supervision accords with a stated purpose of Montana’s sentencing policies to ‘protect the public’ and to ‘punish each offender commensurate with the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense and to hold an offender accountable”); H.R. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 231 A.3d 617, 620 (N.J. 2020) (holding in an as-applied challenge that GPS monitoring of a tier III sex offender on parole supervision for life was constitutional because the search (GPS monitoring) falls within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement).}

_{[263]      18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a), 3583(d), 4209; see also Admin. Offs. of the U.S. Cts. Prob. & Pretrial Servs. Off., Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions (2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/overview_of_probation_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf.}

_{[264]      United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2384-85 (2019) (holding in an as-applied challenge that application of § 3583(k)’s mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment based on judicial factfinding rather than a jury verdict is unconstitutional and violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial); but see United States v. Shakespeare, 32 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding that Haymond is not applicable and application of § 3583(k) to the revocation of sex offender’s supervised release is not unconstitutional where offender pleaded guilty to one count of abusive sexual contact with a minor in violation of his supervised release and admitted to committing the crime).}

_{[265]      Balentine v. Tremblay, 554 F. App’x 58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that offender failed to make a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of defamation because he failed to satisfy the “stigma plus” test which requires a stigmatizing statement and a deprivation of a tangible interest where offender was properly classified as a sex offender and posted on the sex offender registry website and “‘reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests’ is not ‘sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause’”).}

_{[266]      15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.}

_{[267]      Meyer v. Nat’l Tenant Network Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1101-03 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act where they were incorrectly reported by a credit bureau as having prior sex offense convictions, the defendants failed to provide all information in their credit report file after one of the plaintiff’s credit reports inaccurately reported three criminal sex offense records, and where the defendant relied on an inaccurate consumer report which identified one of the plaintiffs as a violent sex offender); but see Erickson v. First Advantage Background Servs., Corp., 981 F.3d 1246, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act where the report was factually accurate—it stated that a registered sex offender in Pennsylvania shared the plaintiff’s first and last name; it did not wrongfully attribute the record to the plaintiff—it explained that the matching record was located based on a name-only search; and it was not misleading—a reasonable user of the report would not be misled by the report to such an extent that it would take any adverse action against the plaintiff).}

_{[268]      18 U.S.C. § 922(g). This prohibition applies to any individual who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and includes certain sex offenders.} 

_{[269]     See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(7); D.C. Code § 7-2502.03; Ky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.040; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:95.1(C); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.2; see also Stoddart v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. Cir. 108 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that registered sex offender in Virginia, who is classified as a tier III sex offender and is required to register for life, was not entitled to have his right to possess a firearm restored).}

_{[270]      Federal prisoners who claim that their conviction or sentence is contrary to the U.S. Constitution or the laws of the United States may seek habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.} 

_{[271]      28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).}

_{[272]      An individual must be “in custody” under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time the petition is filed. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989).}

_{[273]      Alaska v. Wright, 141 S. Ct. 1467, 1468 (2021) (per curiam) (holding that offender’s state conviction, which served as the predicate for a federal failure to register conviction, did not render the offender “in custody” for purposes of seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, where the offender had already finished serving his sentence for the state conviction and noting a “habeas petitioner does not remain ‘in custody’ under a conviction ‘after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted” and even though his state conviction served as a predicate for his federal conviction, it did not render him “‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ under § 2254(a)”); Johnson v. Ashe, 421 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342-43 (D. Mass. 2006) (addressing Massachusetts sex offender registration laws and holding that “compulsory registration as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of conviction that does not meet the ‘in custody’ requirement” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that sex offender who completed his sentence and had his medical license revoked was not “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief); White v. LaClair, No. 19-CV-1283, 2021 WL 200857, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2021) (holding that offender is not “in custody” merely because he is subject to New York’s sex offender registration requirements and New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act “is a remedial statute” and its “registration and risk-level determinations are nonpenal consequences that result from the fact of conviction for certain crimes”); Davis v. Nassau Cnty., 524 F. Supp. 2d 182, 187-89 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (addressing New York and Oklahoma sex offender laws and concluding that the burdens and requirements of sex offender laws are merely collateral consequences of a conviction and they do not cause a registered sex offender to be “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Preik v. Dist. Att’y of Allegheny Cnty., No. 10-1612, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100417, at *33-35 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011 (holding that petitioner did not satisfy “in custody” requirement “simply because he was subject to the requirements of a sex offender registration law” and noting “at least three Pennsylvania courts have concluded that Pennsylvania sex offender requirements are insufficient to establish that a petitioner is in custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus review”); Coleman v. Arpaio, No. 09-6308, 2010 WL 1707031, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2010) (collecting cases holding that the requirements of sex offenders imposed by state statutes does not satisfy the custody requirement of federal habeas review and holding that “the requirement to register ensuing from the New Jersey sex offender statute is merely a collateral consequence to [the offender’s] conviction” and therefore does not satisfy the “in custody” requirement for purposes of habeas corpus review); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that sex offender registration requirements do not place sex offenders “in custody” for purposes of filing federal habeas corpus petitions); Lempar v. Lumpkin, No. 20-50664, 2021 WL 5409266, at *1 (5th Cir. June 8, 2021) (holding that an offender’s “obligation to register as a sex offender does not render him ‘in custody’ for purposes of a § 2254 challenge”); Johnson v. Davis, 697 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2017) (“The fact that [the offender] is required to register as a sex offender as a result of his 1976 convictions does not mean that he is ‘in custody’ within the meaning of § 2254.”); Corridore v. Washington, 71 F.4th 491, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2023) (holding that offender subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime sex offender registration in Michigan was not “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Denoma v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 20-cv-00227, 2021 WL 1185481, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2021) (holding that an offender’s status as a registered sex offender under Ohio law does not satisfy the “in custody” requirement for purposes of seeking federal habeas corpus relief); Dennard v. Haviland, No. 17CV1773, 2019 WL 8326452, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2019) (holding that offender’s designation as a sexual predator is a collateral consequence of his conviction and does not satisfy the “in custody” requirement for federal habeas corpus relief); Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 743-44 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that Ohio sex offender and registration laws which required offender to register as a sex offender for life did not render the offender “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas relief); Ali v. Carlton, No. 04-398, 2005 WL 1118066, at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. April 25, 2005) (concluding that the burdens and requirements of sex offender laws are merely collateral consequences of a conviction and they do not cause a registered sex offender to be “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521-23 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that Ohio’s sexual-predator statute is a civil regulation and its classification, registration, and community notification provisions “are more analogous to collateral consequences” and therefore offender was not “in custody” for purposes of habeas relief and noting that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has held that the classification of a defendant as a sexual predator is a collateral disability resulting from a conviction and, thus, does not satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement of federal habeas corpus”); Thomas v. Morgan, 109 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (indicating that “the classification of a sex offender as a sexual predator is a collateral disability from a conviction and thus does not satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement of federal habeas corpus”); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Wisconsin’s sex offender law “imposes minimal restrictions on a registrant’s physical liberty of movement” and that “courts have rejected uniformly the argument that a challenge to a sentence of registration under a sexual offender statute is cognizable in habeas”); De La Hunt v. Villmer, No. 16-CV-2171, 2021 WL 4523095, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2021) (noting that district courts in the Eighth Circuit agree that “[c]ivil commitment as a sexually violent predator and related consequences to classification are collateral consequences rather than severe restraints on liberty” and holding sex offender registration requirement is insufficient to satisfy the “in custody” requirement for habeas corpus relief); Holmes v. Nebraska, No. 21CV159, 2021 WL 3663885, at *1 (D. Neb. July 9, 2021) (holding that “registration as a sex offender, and the potential for future incarceration for failure to do so, does not satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement for habeas relief,” and that offender has not suffered restriction on his freedom of movement merely because he had to register as a sex offender); Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 08 CV 1896, 2010 WL 2680333, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (holding that habeas petition was barred because although petitioner remained incarcerated for other crimes, he had already served his sentence for sexual abuse at the time he filed his habeas petition, and noting that “petitioner’s potential civil commitment under . . . [Missouri law] and mandatory registration as a sex offender do not establish the ‘in custody’ requirement”); Hansen v. Marr, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1100 (D. Neb. 2009) (“Where sex offender registration statutes are remedial, rather than punitive, ‘the registration requirements resemble more closely those collateral consequences of a conviction that do not impose a severe restriction on an individual’s freedom of movement’ and do ‘not satisfy the “in custody” requirements.’”); Wright v. State, 47 F.4th 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that sex offender convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in Alaska is not “in custody” pursuant to the judgment of a state court under § 2254(a) even though he is required to register in Tennessee as a result of his Alaska conviction); Munoz v. Smith, 17 F.4th 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that Nevada’s lifetime supervision conditions, including payment of a monthly fee, electronic monitoring, and residency approval requirements, are not “custodial” to render sex offender “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief); id. at 1243 (citing Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013)) (noting that Maciel found that “California’s sex offender registration and tracking requirements, though burdensome, could be regarded as collateral consequences of conviction, not ‘custodial’ requirements”); Rider v. Frierson, No. 19-cv-01831, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8300, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 14, 2021) (holding that offenders’ claims challenging the constitutionality of Nevada’s sex offender registration requirements are not cognizable in a habeas action because “[s]ex offender registration requirements do not constitute custody within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute”); Caires v. Iramina, No. 08-110, 2008 WL 2421640, at *3 (D. Haw. June 16, 2008) (holding that requirement that offender register as a sex offender under Hawaii law does not render the offender “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that offender, who is required to register as a sex offender under California law, is not “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Oregon’s sex offender registration statute does not place sex offender “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that offender who had completed sentence but was required to register as sex offender under Washington law was not “in custody” for purposes of habeas relief and that Washington’s law was “regulatory and not punitive”); Clark v. Oklahoma, 789 F. App’x 680, 682, 684 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that habeas court properly denied offender’s petition for certificate to appeal court’s decision dismissing habeas petition because requirement under Oklahoma law that offender register as sex offender resulting from an Oklahoma conviction did not satisfy condition of federal statute that offender, who was incarcerated in Texas as result of Texas conviction, must be in custody for conviction being challenged when habeas petition is filed); Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693-94 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that, even though Oklahoma has found its sex offender registration and notification system “punitive,” “Oklahoma’s sex-offender registration conditions are collateral consequences of [the offender’s] conviction, and not a continuation of punishment,” therefore offender required to register as a sex offender in Oklahoma does not render him “in custody” for purposes of a habeas corpus petition); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[J]oin[ing] the circuits uniformly holding that the requirement to register under state sex-offender registration statutes does not satisfy § 2254’s condition that the petitioner be ‘in custody’ at the time he files a habeas petition”); Frazier v. People, No. 08-02427, 2010 WL 2844080, at *3, *5 (D. Colo. July 16, 2010) (holding that, although Colorado’s sex offender registration statute places burdens on sex offenders that are not shared by the general public, the registration requirements are collateral consequences of a conviction and fail to satisfy the “in custody” requirement for purposes of habeas corpus relief); Clements v. Florida, 59 F.4th 1204, 1215-17 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding that sex offender convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct and required to register as a sex offender in Florida was not “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief and Florida’s sex offender registration and reporting requirements did not substantially limit offender’s actions or movement); Ridley v. Caldwell, No. 21-13504, 2022 WL 2800203 (11th Cir. July 18, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that “[b]ecause registration in Georgia is a collateral consequence of [offender’s] battery conviction rather than part of his punishment, his presence on the registry does not render him ‘in custody’” for habeas corpus purposes); Goguen v. Comm’r of Corr., 267 A.3d 831, 845, 847 (Conn. 2021) (recognizing that the Connecticut sex offender registration requirements are remedial and not punitive in nature and an offender’s requirement to register as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of his conviction and “[c]ollateral consequences of a conviction generally are not sufficient to satisfy the condition that a habeas petitioner must be in custody”); but see Piasecki v. Ct. of Common Pleas, Buck Cnty., Pa., 917 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that offender’s registration requirements under Pennsylvania law “were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody” for purposes of habeas corpus relief where offender was required to register in person with law enforcement every three months for life and to appear in person any time the offender planned to leave home for more than seven days, travel internationally, change his residence or employment, enroll as a student, add or change a phone number, change ownership of a car, or add or change any email address or online designation); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that sex offender is “‘in custody’ for the purposes of challenging an earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender registration law because the earlier rape conviction ‘is a necessary predicate’ to the failure to register charge”).}  

_{[274]      42 U.S.C. § 13663; 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.553(a)(2), 982.553(c), 960.204(a)(4). See, e.g., Bostic v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 162 A.3d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addressing sex offenders and federally assisted housing and holding that D.C. Housing Authority permissibly terminated the plaintiff from a housing-voucher program where he was required to register for life as a convicted sex offender); Grant-Davis v. Hendrix, No. 22-cv-1872, 2023 WL 4758751, at *1, *3 (D.S.C. July 26, 2023) (holding that it was unnecessary for the court to “interfere with the deference afforded to local housing authorities” where sex offender required to register for life in South Carolina was denied admission to public housing); Henley v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, No. 12-2687, 2013 WL 1856061, at *6 (E.D. La. May 1, 2013) (permitting termination of a beneficiary’s federal assistance based only on the fact that the address displayed on the jurisdiction’s public sex offender registry website for the individual was in a federally subsidized housing development). But see Miller v. McCormick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 296, 310-11 (D. Me. 2009) (holding that 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(c), the regulation that prohibits admission of lifetime sex offender registrants to the Section 8 program, does not authorize a state public housing authority to terminate a program participant’s benefits, even if the participant is a lifetime sex offender registrant, where the participant has already been lawfully admitted to the program); cf.U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., State Registered Lifetime Sex Offenders in Federally Assisted Housing, Notice PIH 2012-28/H 2012-11 (June 11, 2012), www.hud.gov/sites/documents/12-28PIHN12-11HSGN.PDF (noting that sex offenders subject to a lifetime registration requirement who are wrongfully admitted to Section 8 housing are subject to termination procedures). Additionally, a person may be prosecuted for perjury if they have lied on an application for Section 8 housing about a lifetime registered sex offender living in the residence. Johnson v. California, No. EDCV 10-716-DOC, 2011 WL 3962119, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2011) (holding that an individual, who lied on an application for Section 8 housing about a lifetime registered sex offender living in the residence, could be prosecuted for perjury).} 

_{[275]      See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-465 (prohibiting anyone required to register as a sex offender in South Carolina from living in campus student housing at a public institution of higher learning supported in whole or in part by the state).}

_{[276]      Adam Walsh Act, supra note 1, § 402; 8 U.S.C. § 21154(a)(1); see also Joynes v. Wilkinson, No. 21-11501, 2022 WL 3098079, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2022) (holding that the Adam Walsh Act “has the broad purpose of protecting the public in general—as opposed to only children—from sex offenders and offenders against children,” which is “indisputably a legitimate governmental interest” and it is “rationally related to the goal of protecting the public from sex offenders and offenders against children” and does not violate equal protection); Bakran v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 894 F.3d 557, 564 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the Adam Walsh Act, which restricts a convicted sex offender’s ability to sponsor his spouse’s immigration petition, does not infringe on his fundamental right to marry); Struniak v. Lynch, 159 F. Supp. 3d 643, 657 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting that the Adam Walsh Act restricts a person convicted of a specified offense against a minor from filing a petition to sponsor a fiancé(e) or family member unless the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security determines that the offender poses no risk to the person on whose behalf the petition is filed); Suhail v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 15-cv-12595, 2015 WL 7016340, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2015) (outlining Adam Walsh Act provision); In re Aceijas-Quiroz, 26 I. & N. Dec. 294, 295-96 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing Adam Walsh Act’s provision “barring a United States citizen who has been convicted of a ‘specified offense against a minor’ from having a family-based visa petition approved unless the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . determines that the citizen poses ‘no risk’ to the alien beneficiary”); In re Introcaso, 26 I. & N. Dec. 304, 306 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing provision under Adam Walsh Act prohibiting offender convicted of a “specified offense against a minor” from filing a visa petition for his wife).} 

_{[277]      8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); see also Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 978 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the BIA correctly concluded that offender, who was convicted of criminal sexual contact under New Jersey law, was removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and a crime involving moral turpitude because criminal sexual contact constitutes both a crime involving moral turpitude and an aggravated felony); Moreno v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 887 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding a conviction for possession of child pornography under Pennsylvania law is a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of immigration and deportation); Maya Alvarado v. Wilkinson, 847 F. App’x 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that California conviction for possession of child pornography qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of removal and noting that although it has previously held that “not all sex-based crimes involving minors are [crimes involving moral turpitude],” the crime of possession of child pornography “harms a child’s reputation and well-being” and it has “long recognized that victims of child pornography continue to suffer long into the future”); Syed v. Barr, 969 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that Cal. Penal Code § 288.3(a), attempting to contact a child with intent to commit an offense, predicated on the crime of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child, qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of removal of an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)).}

_{[278]      Notably, there is currently a circuit split as to whether a conviction for a state offense of failure to register as a sex offender constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude for the purposes of immigration and deportation. See, e.g., Totimeh v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 666 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that Minnesota offense of failure to register as a sex offender does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of immigration and deportation);Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885, 888-89 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that Virginia offense of sexual battery is a crime involving moral turpitude but Virginia offense of failing to register as a sex offender is not a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of immigration and deportation); Bushra v. Holder, 529 F. App’x 659, 660-61 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that conviction for failure to register under Michigan law is a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of immigration and deportation); Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732, 738 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that Minnesota’s offense of failure to register as a sex offender is a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of immigration and deportation); Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that offense of failure to register as a sex offender under Nevada law is not a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of immigration and deportation), overruled on other grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (2009); Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that misdemeanor offense of failure to register as a sex offender under Colorado law is not a crime involving moral turpitude).} 

_{[279]      Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that the possible penalty of deportation, when combined with a maximum period of incarceration of six months, for conviction of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475, 479-89 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (addressing some of the difficulties that may arise when a U.S. citizen, convicted of a sex offense and required to register, attempts to renounce their citizenship); United States v. Gayle, 996 F. Supp. 2d 42, 54-55 (D. Conn. 2014) (holding that a naturalized U.S. citizen, who concealed and misrepresented the fact that he committed sexual abuse against his niece, a minor, during the naturalization process, can be denaturalized and have his citizenship revoked); United States v. Estrada, 349 F. Supp. 3d 830, 838 (D. Ariz. 2018) (revoking citizenship of naturalized U.S. citizen where individual illegally procured citizenship by lying on his application and by failing to disclose that he committed crimes involving moral turpitude where he engaged in sexual intercourse and oral sexual contact with his daughter, a minor under the age of 14); People v. Duarte, No. H048568, 2022 WL 1468316, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2022) (unpublished decision) (affirming denial of offender’s motion to withdraw 2002 guilty plea for statutory rape and holding that offender understood the immigration consequences of his plea at the time it was made, his “lack of awareness that the Supreme Court in 2017 would define sexual abuse of a minor under the [Immigration and Nationality Act] to implicate a violation of [California law] does not constitute error,” and he failed to show prejudice because it was “not reasonably probable that [he] would have risked going to trial on readily provable charges carrying prison exposure and mandatory sex offender registration, had he known that a guilty plea . . . would pose an impediment to naturalization 15 years later” and “even if [he] had known in 2002 that his conviction would pose an impediment to naturalization 15 years later, it is not reasonably probable that he would have rejected the plea bargain”); Barrie v. United States, 279 A.3d 858 (D.C. 2022) (holding that “a remand is necessary for the court to determine, after an evidentiary hearing, what advice [sex offender’s] counsel gave him and, if counsel did not correctly convey information about the likelihood of deportation [where offender pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual abuse and kidnapping], to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that [offender] would have gone to trial, rather than entered a guilty plea, if he had received the correct immigration-consequence advice”).} 

_{[280]     18 U.S.C. § 2260A. Section 2260A applies to individuals who are required to register as sex offenders “by Federal or other law.” Id.; see also United States v. Walizer, 600 F. App’x 546, 546-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (noting that 18 U.S.C § 2260A includes offenders required to register pursuant to state sex offender registry laws).}  

_{While several courts have held that § 2260A constitutes a sentencing enhancement, at least one court has held otherwise. Compare United States v. Hardeman, 704 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2260A is a recidivism enhancement statute), withUnited States v. Beck, 957 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2260A creates a substantive offense rather than a sentencing enhancement, noting that “if a provision includes an aggravating-circumstance element, it is an offense, even if it also includes a prior-conviction element,” and recognizing the importance of the distinction between the two because the right to a jury trial only attaches to offenses, not enhancements).}

_{[281]     Walizer, 600 F. App’x at 546-47 (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 2260A and noting that application of the statute depends on an offender’s registration status as it actually existed at the time the offender committed the predicate offense; that the statute “is triggered when a defendant ‘commits’ a predicate felony,” it does not require a defendant to have previously been convicted of the predicate offense, and “a defendant may be prosecuted under § 2260A at the same time he stands trial for the predicate felony”).} 

_{[282]      Walizer, 600 F. App’x at 546-47 (holding that violation of § 2260A does not require a minor’s actual involvement in the underlying offense); United States v. LaSane, No. 21-10088, 2021 WL 4958689, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (per curiam) (holding that a conviction under § 2260A, when predicated on a violation of § 2422(b), only requires finding that the offender committed a felony offense under § 2422(b) and that the offender was required to register as a sex offender at the time he committed the felony; involvement of an actual minor is not required); United States v. Slaughter, 708 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that, when a conviction under § 2260A is predicated on a violation of § 2422(b), the involvement of an actual minor is not required).} 

_{[283]     See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 255 F. Supp. 3d 221, 233 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that § 2260A is equivalent to a recidivist enhancement statute and retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Hardeman, 704 F.3d at 1268 (holding that retroactive application of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, a recidivism statute, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). For a more detailed discussion concerning challenges based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, see supra III.A.8.}