_{[2]      34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)-(8). A “sex offense” is defined as a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another; a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor; a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, or Chapters 109A, 110, or 117 of title 18; a military offense specified by the Secretary of Defense; or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned offenses. Id. Notably, an offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense if the victim was an adult or “if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” Id. § 20911(5)(C). The latter conduct is often referred to as a “Romeo and Juliet” exception. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145, 149-51 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that offender who pleaded guilty to third degree lewd molestation in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(5) committed a sex offense and SORNA’s Romeo and Juliet exception under § 20911(5)(C) did not apply where offender was 52 months older than the victim, even though offender was 17 years old and victim was 13 years old).}

_{[3]      Because SORNA’s requirements are predicated on a conviction, offenders will not be required to comply with SORNA if their conviction is reversed, vacated, or set aside. National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, at 38,050 (July 2, 2008), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-07-02/pdf/E8-14656.pdf (hereinafter Final Guidelines). But see infra note 23 and accompanying text (outlining circumstances in which some jurisdictions will still require registration, even when an offender has been pardoned or an offender’s conviction has been vacated). For additional discussion concerning what constitutes a “conviction” under SORNA, see infra I.B.1.}

_{[4]      For additional discussion concerning tiering, see infra I.C.1.}

_{[5]      34 U.S.C. § 20911(1); United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2022) (“SORNA requires all ‘sex offender[s]’ to register.”); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.}

_{[6]      Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,050-38,052. Under SORNA, a “jurisdiction” means a state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, and a federally recognized Indian tribe, subject to the requirements of 
34 U.S.C. § 20929. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(10). See infra I.G regarding registration in Indian Country.}

_{[7]      See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 856 F. App’x 533, 533-34 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that requiring offender convicted of sexual abuse of a ward in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b), who pleaded guilty to performing oral sex on a federal inmate while employed as a supervisory cook in the prison where the victim was detained, to register as a sex offender was mandatory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) because an offense under § 2243(b) constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA and that the court did not err in failing to apply the SORNA Romeo and Juliet exception where the offender solemnly declared in court that she was in custodial authority of the prisoner); Harder v. United States, Nos. 21-cv-188; 14-cr-67, 2021 WL 3418958, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2021) (holding that offender’s Louisiana conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile is a “sex offense” under SORNA); People v. Rodriguez Orengo, No. CC-2022-0468, 2024 WL 1904889, at *1 (P.R. Apr. 19, 2024) (holding that an offender convicted of indecent exposure where the offender urinated on an adult victim’s garage, and where the offender did not engage in conduct constituting sexual abuse, is not required to register as a sex offender in Puerto Rico). But see United States v. Icker, 13 F.4th 321, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that offender convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law under 28 U.S.C. § 242 could not be required to register as a sex offender under SORNA because 18 U.S.C. § 242 is not an enumerated offense under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A) and it is not a criminal offense that “has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i), even though offender’s conduct involved sexual contact with and harassment of women, and noting that a discretionary imposition of SORNA on non-sex offenders is erroneous and the district court does not have authority to require an offender to register under SORNA if he has not been convicted of a “sex offense”); United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 711 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that, for sentencing purposes, sex offender’s federal failure to register conviction was not a “sex offense” under SORNA); United States v. Collins, 773 F.3d 25, 26 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that failure to register as a sex offender under SORNA is not a “sex offense” in sentencing case); United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that, in determining appropriate sentencing, an offender’s failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is not a “sex offense” under SORNA).}

_{Notably, additional federal criminal offenses not specifically enumerated by SORNA may still qualify as “sex offenses” requiring registration. See United States v. Lendof, No. 23-CR-666, 2025 WL 1951876, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025) (recognizing that SORNA’s definition of “criminal offense” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(6) includes federal offenses and holding that each of offender’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 is a “sex offense” within the meaning of SORNA, and thus requires registration under SORNA); United States v. Vanderhorst, 688 F. App’x 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that conviction for use of a facility in interstate commerce to carry on an unlawful activity, under 18 U.S.C. § 1592, required registration as a sex offender under SORNA even though it is not listed); United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 515-16 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that offender was convicted of a sex offense and was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA where he was convicted of interstate domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 2261 and the underlying crime of violence was aggravated sexual abuse); United States v. Nazerzadeh, 73 F.4th 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2023) (“SORNA’s language confirms ‘that Congress cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.’” (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))); United States v. Baptiste, 34 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (holding that the list of offenses enumerated by SORNA “is not the exclusive set of federal criminal offenses requiring sex offender registration,” and 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i) and (ii) “may include federal criminal violations in [its] definitions of sex offense”); United States v. Marrowbone, No. 24-CR-40106, 2025 WL 1951890, at *6 (D.S.D. July 16, 2025) (“This Court stands by its previous ruling and again concludes that assault with intent to commit rape [in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)] is a sex offense under [34 U.S.C.] § 20911(5)(A)(v).”); United States v. Marrowbone, No. 14-CR-30071, 2014 WL 6694781, at *4-5 (D.S.D. Nov. 26, 2014) (agreeing that 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(iii) “is not the exclusive list of the federal offenses that may be considered a sex offense” under SORNA and holding that assault with intent to commit rape under 18 U.S.C. § 113 is a sex offense for purposes of SORNA); United States v. Dailey, 941 F.3d 1183, 1193 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that offender’s violation of the Travel Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1592 qualified as “conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor” and required registration as a sex offender under SORNA); United States v. Lloyd, 809 F. App’x 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Dodge and holding that offender’s conviction for cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) was a “specified offense against a minor” under SORNA and offender was required to register as a sex offender); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that a federal criminal offense not enumerated in SORNA may still qualify as a sex offense for purposes of sex offender registration and finding that offender’s conviction for knowingly attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 was a “specified offense against a minor” under SORNA and, as a result, the offender committed a sex offense and was subject to SORNA’s registration requirements).}

_{[8]      For additional discussion concerning military registration, see infra I.B.5; see also United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “through a series of cross references, SORNA requires individuals who are convicted of certain sex offenses under the UCMJ—including forcible sodomy—to register as a sex offender”); United States v. Jones, 383 F. App’x 885, 889 (11th Cir. 2010) (outlining military offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice that require registration under SORNA).}

_{[9]      A foreign conviction is also a sex offense under SORNA if it was obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process.
Id. § 20911(5)(B); see Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,050 (recognizing that sex offense convictions under the laws of Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand require registration “on the same footing as domestic convictions” and stating that “[s]ex offense convictions under the laws of any foreign country are deemed to have been obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process if the U.S. State Department . . . has concluded that an independent judiciary generally [or vigorously] enforced the right to a fair trial in that country during the year in which the conviction occurred”). See, e.g., McCarty v. Roos, 998 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954 (D. Nev. 2014), aff’d}, _{689 F. App’x 576, 576-77 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that requiring offender convicted of a sex offense in Japan to register as a tier I sex offender under SORNA does not violate procedural due process where the Japanese government “was deemed to have generally respected the human rights of its citizens at the time of [offender’s] conviction,” it “generally provided an independent judiciary, a presumption of innocence, the right to cross-examination and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself,” and offender did not dispute he was convicted of a sex crime in Japan); In re Bd. of Exam’rs of Sex Offenders of N.Y. v. D’Agostino, 130 A.D.3d 1449, 1450 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that offender’s Cambodian conviction “met the statutory requirements of a registerable offense” and “had all of the essential elements of a sex offense” and therefore he was required to register as a sex offender in New York).}

_{[10]     “[A]n adult sex offender is ‘convicted’ for SORNA purposes if the sex offender remains subject to penal consequences based on the conviction, however it may be styled.” Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,050.}

_{[11]     A “withheld adjudication” or “deferred judgment” is a judgment where the defendant is placed on probation, the successful completion of which prevents entry of the underlying judgment of conviction. Deferred judgment, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). United States v. Bridges, 901 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681 (W.D. Va. 2012) (holding that offender’s nolo contendere plea and withheld adjudication in Florida for attempted sexual battery upon a child under 16 years old is a conviction for purposes of SORNA and offender had a duty to register as a sex offender), aff’d, 741 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Grant, No. 17-CR-236, 2018 WL 4516008, at *10 (N.D. Ga. July 4, 2018), adopted by, No. 17-CR-236, 2018 WL 4140870 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2018) (holding that offender’s “First Offender guilty plea” to child molestation in Georgia state court, where adjudication of guilt was withheld, is a “conviction” under SORNA); Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that offender, who pleaded guilty to sodomy and received a suspended imposition of sentence under state law, was required to register as a sex offender because his guilty plea constituted a “conviction” under SORNA).}

_{[12]     A plea of nolo contendere or no contest is a legal plea where the defendant does not contest or admit guilt. Nolo plea, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); see United States v. Borum, 567 F. Supp. 3d 751, 753 (N.D. Miss. 2021) (holding that offender’s Michigan conviction should be admissible in a federal failure to register prosecution where offender’s nolo contendere plea resulted in him registering as a sex offender in Michigan from January 2006 until approximately 2016, when he absconded and moved to Mississippi); United States v. Bridges, 741 F.3d 464, 470 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that offender who pleaded nolo contendere to a Florida attempted sexual battery charge where adjudication was withheld was convicted for purposes of 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1) because he was sentenced to probation, a penal consequence).}

_{[13]     United States v. Roberson, 752 F.3d 517, 524-25 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that offender convicted of indecent assault and battery of a child under 14 in Massachusetts who later had his conviction vacated was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA and could be prosecuted for failing to register where the charges were brought for conduct that occurred before his conviction was vacated).}

_{[14]     SORNA requires registration for juveniles convicted as adults as well as a defined class of older juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for committing particularly serious sex offenses. For additional discussion concerning juvenile registration, see infra I.B.6.} 

_{[15]     Woodruff v. State, 347 So. 3d 281, 289 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (holding that municipal court conviction for indecent exposure constitutes a “conviction” for purposes of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act); People v. Cardona, 986 N.E.2d 66, 75 (Ill. 2013) (noting that “there are several ways a person can acquire th[e] label [of sex offender], only one of which is criminal conviction of a triggering offense” and “[o]ther ways include being found not guilty of a triggering offense by reason of insanity, being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as result of committing a triggering offense, and . . . being the subject of a finding not resulting in acquittal at a discharge hearing”); but see State v. Frederick, 251 P.3d 48, 51-52 (Kan. 2011) (holding that offender was not required to register as a sex offender in Kansas where he had a prior juvenile adjudication for criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota because a juvenile adjudication is not a “conviction” under Kansas law); Walters v. Cooper, 739 S.E.2d 185, 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a prayer for judgment continued does not operate as a final conviction for purposes of sex offender registration under North Carolina law and the offender was not required to register despite pleading guilty to a “sexually violent offense”).}

_{[16]     For more information on the use of risk assessments, see infra II.C.}

_{[17]     Mayo v. People, 181 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that civil commitment procedure in Illinois constituted “conviction” for purposes of registering as a sex offender in Colorado).}

_{[18]     State v. Scott, 636 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Ark. 2022) (holding that offender acquitted of kidnapping and first-degree false imprisonment by reason of mental disease or defect was required to register as a sex offender); Cardona, 986 N.E.2d at 73-75 (upholding trial court’s certification of an incompetent defendant as a sex offender requiring registration where the defendant was acquitted of indecent solicitation of a child but was found “not not guilty” of unlawful restraint where the unlawful restraint was “sexually motivated”).} 

_{[19]     State v. Gauthier, 238 A.3d 675, 676 (Vt. 2020) (holding that, for the purposes of Vermont’s Sex Offender Registration Act, “a person who physically resides in the community on furlough is not incarcerated” and therefore is required to comply with the sex offender reporting requirements).}

_{[20]     In re Kasckarow v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Sex Offenders of N.Y., 32 N.E.3d 927, 929 (N.Y. 2015) (holding that the offender’s nolo contendere plea and withheld adjudication in Florida was a conviction for purposes of New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act and triggered a registration requirement when the offender moved to New York).}

_{[21]     Price v. State, 43 So. 3d 854, 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that, even though sex offender pleaded nolo contendere and adjudication was withheld, he had been convicted of a sex offense for purposes of registering as a sex offender under Florida law); State v. Townsend, No. W2015-02415, 2017 WL 1380002, at *3, *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2017) (holding that offender had not been convicted of a sex offense requiring registration as a sex offender where he entered into plea of nolo contendere to sexual battery and was then placed on judicial diversion).}

_{[22]    An Alford plea is a guilty plea that enables a defendant to maintain his innocence. Alford plea, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (holding that courts could, consistent with the U.S. Constitution, accept a guilty plea even if a defendant was unwilling or unable to admit guilt, provided that the defendant was willing to accept punishment and the court found sufficient facts to support the plea); Brown v. Super. for Conn. Dep’t of State Police, No. 22-cv-01270, 2024 WL 1256004, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2024) (holding that offender who entered an Alford plea for conspiring to commit third-degree sexual assault in Connecticut state court was convicted for purposes of Connecticut law and was required to register as a sex offender); State v. Herndon, 742 S.E.2d 375, 379 (S.C. 2013) (“The primary thrust of the Alford decision is that a defendant may voluntarily and knowingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit he participated in the acts constituting the crime . . . [and the] Alford plea is, in essence, a guilty plea and carries with it the same penalties and punishments.”); see also State v. Pentland, 994 A.2d 147, 151-52 (Conn. 2010) (holding that offender who entered an Alford plea for reckless endangerment in the second degree and unlawful restraint in the second degree was required to register as a sex offender in Connecticut); Haffner v. Saulters, 77 S.W.3d 45, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that offender who entered an Alford plea to abuse of a child is required to register as a sex offender in Missouri); In re J.M., No. A-3020-23, 2025 WL 1431289, at *4-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 19, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that offender who entered into an Alford plea for two counts of communication with a minor for immoral purposes in Washington was required to register as a sex offender in New Jersey); Herndon, 742 S.E.2d at 380-81 (noting that “in South Carolina there is no significant distinction between a standard guilty plea and an Alford plea,” “an Alford plea is merely a guilty plea with the gloss of judicial grace allowing a defendant to enter a plea in her best interests,” “the defendant entering an Alford plea is still treated as guilty for the purposes of punishment, and simply put, is not owed anything merely because the State and the court have agreed to deviate from the standard guilty plea,” and holding that where offender, who was ordered to successfully complete sex abuse counseling as a condition of probation or face lifetime sex offender registration, failed to satisfy a condition of his probation, the court properly ordered him to register as a sex offender for life); Miller v. Gywn, No. E2017-00784, 2018 WL 2332050, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2018) (holding that offender convicted of sexually molesting his 11-year-old niece in Maryland, where conviction was based on Alford plea, was required to register as a sex offender in Tennessee).}

_{[23]    In re Edwards v. State Law Enf. Div., 720 S.E.2d 462, 467 (S.C. 2011) (recognizing that S.C. Code § 23-3-430, as amended in 2005, prohibits an offender, who has received a pardon for an offense in which he is required to register, from being removed from the sex offender registry, and holding that amendments to statute did not apply retroactively and therefore, offender pardoned of two “peeping Tom” convictions in 2004 was not required to register as a sex offender); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bernoudy, No. 13-13-00396-CV, 2014 WL 3542096, at *2 (Tex. App. July 17, 2014) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 62.002) (recognizing that, under § 62.002, an offender’s duty to register as a sex offender is not affected by a pardon unless the pardon is based on “subsequent proof of innocence”); but see Heath v. State, 983 A.2d 77, 81 (Del. 2009) (holding that offender who was granted an unconditional pardon for second-degree unlawful sexual contact no longer had a duty to register as a sex offender because “an unconditional pardon cannot be granted unless the Board [of Pardons] and Governor find no propensity for recidivism,” it “extinguishes the underlying premise for sex offenders’ registration obligations,” and it “restores all civil rights”); State v. Davis, 814 S.E.2d 701, 707 (Ga. 2018) (holding that offender who was pardoned of conviction for aggravated sodomy no longer had a duty to register as a sex offender under Georgia law).}

_{[24]    All. for Const. Sex Offense Laws, Inc. v. Bonta, No. C098492, 2024 WL 3197087, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2024) (unpublished decision) (holding that an offender, who had his felony conviction for violating Cal. Penal Code § 288.2 reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 17, is still required to register as a sex offender for life under California law);} <_{Davidson v. State, 320 So. 3d 1021, 1027-28 (La. 2021) (holding that offender must register as a sex offender and provide notification if he moves back to Louisiana even though his 2005 video voyeurism conviction was set aside and the prosecution was dismissed), aff’g, 308 So. 3d 325, 331 (La. Ct. App. 2020); Ferguson v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 278 So. 3d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 2019) (holding that offender was still required to register as a sex offender in Mississippi even though her misdemeanor conviction for disseminating sexually oriented material to a minor was expunged); Montoya v. Driggers, 320 P.3d 987, 991 (N.M. 2014) (holding that the offender’s conviction of second-degree criminal sexual penetration remained a valid basis for sex offender registration despite being vacated on double jeopardy grounds); Young v. Keel, 848 S.E.2d 67, 68-69 (S.C. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that offender must still register as a sex offender in South Carolina despite having his conviction for lewd act with a minor expunged); but see Maves v. State, 479 P.3d 399, 405 (Alaska 2021) (holding that, once sex offender’s Colorado conviction was set aside, it no longer constituted a “conviction” for purposes of requiring registration in Alaska); McCulley v. People, 463 P.3d 254, 261 (Colo. 2020) (finding that an offender who has successfully completed a deferred judgment no longer has a conviction for purposes of Colorado’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which bars an offender who has more than one conviction for unlawful sexual behavior from petitioning a court to discontinue the requirement to register as a sex offender, and is eligible to petition the court to discontinue registration), rev’g, 488 P.3d 360 (Colo. App. 2018).}

_{[25]    People v. Hamdon, 225 Cal. App. 4th 1065, 1073 (2014) (holding that offender was still required to register as a sex offender even though underlying conviction for misdemeanor sexual battery and misdemeanor infliction of harm on a child was set aside under a special statutory procedure); Witten v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Crim. Info. Ctr., 145 So. 3d 625, 629 (Miss. 2014) (holding that, where California conviction for oral copulation and rape of a person unconscious of the nature of the act was dismissed under a special statutory procedure after the offender’s successful completion of probation, offender was still required to register as a sex offender in Mississippi).}

_{[26]    People v. Van Leer, 239 A.D.3d 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025) (reversing order denying non-resident sex offender’s petition seeking a downward modification of his risk level classification from level three to level one where offender has lived in Massachusetts since approximately 1999 and Massachusetts reduced his risk level from level three to level one in March 2023); In re Doe v. O’Donnell, 86 A.D.3d 238, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that convicted sex offender must still register in New York even after he relocated from New York to Virginia).}

_{[27]    Lenard v. State, 652 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ark. 2022) (holding that offender convicted of fourth-degree sexual assault in Arkansas is required to register as a sex offender under the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act); People v. Carter, 260 N.E.3d 830, 837 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024) (holding that “home invasion based on criminal sexual assault is unquestionably a registerable sex offense” and offender is “indeed a sex offender subject to registration” under SORA where, although “home invasion is not a listed ‘sex offense’ such that registration is required for all home invasion convictions,” it “involves the commission of specific predicate offenses” and “[s]ex offenses, such as criminal sexual assault, are included among those predicates, and the only reason defendant does not stand convicted of that offense separately is because he committed it in another person’s home”); State v. Hayden, No. A23-1047, 2024 WL 3320589, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 8, 2024) (unpublished decision) (noting that “[b]ecause there [wa]s sufficient overlap in the time, location, persons involved, and basic facts of [offender’s] offenses, they arose from the same set of circumstances” and holding that offender convicted of furnishing alcohol to a minor is required to register as a predatory offender in Minnesota where the offense of conviction arose from the same set of circumstances as the charged but dismissed predatory offense of third-degree sexual conduct); People v. Corley, 234 A.D.3d 500, 500 (N.Y. 2025) (holding that offender’s federal conviction of possession of child pornography is a registerable sex offense in New York); People v. Wilson, 193 A.D.3d 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (mem.) (holding that offender convicted of unlawful surveillance under New York law is required to register as a sex offender in New York); State v. Fuller, 855 S.E.2d 260, 266 (N.C. 2021) (holding that offender convicted of peeping in North Carolina is required to register as a sex offender where court found that he was a “danger to the community”); State v. Merritt, 2021-Ohio-3681, No. 2021 CA 0042, 2021 WL 4786945, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2021) (holding that court erred in requiring offender to register as a sex offender where offender was convicted of public indecency in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.09(A)(2) and offense was not a “sexually oriented offense”); State v. Searles, 2020-Ohio-5608, Nos. C-190389, C-190395, C-190414, C-190415, 2020 WL 7238525, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2020) (holding that offender convicted of public indecency and voyeurism was required to register as a tier I sex offender under Ohio law based on his voyeurism conviction, but that his public indecency conviction did not trigger registration requirements); People v. Toro Vélez, 212 P.R. Dec. 919, 920 (P.R. 2023) (holding that offender convicted of lewd acts, where there is no element or specification that the victim is a minor, is required to register as a sex offender for life in Puerto Rico because Law 266-2004 does not exempt such offenders from registering); State v. Mower, No. 79735-2-I, 2020 WL 1917484 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2020) (holding that amendments made to Washington statute in 2015 to include state failure to register convictions as a “sex offense” applied and the court correctly counted offender’s prior failure to register convictions when it sentenced him as a third-time offender); State v. Conn, 879 S.E.2d 74, 79-81 (W. Va. 2022) (holding that offender who entered an Alford plea and was convicted of attempt to commit an assault during the commission of a felony, where the underlying felony is sexual assault in the third degree, is required to register as a sex offender in West Virginia), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1087 (2023); but see State v. Knapp, 503 P.3d 298 (Mont. 2022) (unpublished table decision) (holding that failure to register as a sexual offender under Montana law does not qualify as a “sexual offense”); State v. Heitkemper, No. DA 21-0467, 2022 Mont. LEXIS 731, at *1 (Aug. 9, 2022) (holding that offender’s conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code § 45-5-502(2)(c) does not require registration as a sex offender in Montana where § 45-5-502(2)(c) is not an enumerated “sexual offense” under § 46-23-502(9)(a)); State v. Alston, No. A-20-068, 2020 WL 3526761, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. June 30, 2020) (recognizing that sex trafficking is not a registerable offense under Nebraska’s SORA because it “is not one of the listed convictions triggering the registration requirements under SORA”); State v. Wilcox, 383 P.3d 549, 550-51 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that 2015 amendment to Washington law did not apply retroactively and therefore offender’s state conviction for failure to register as a sex offender did not qualify as a “sex offense”). Similar to SORNA, some jurisdictions’ definition of a “sex offense” excludes consensual sexual acts. See Hurtado v. State, 332 So. 3d 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (reversing postconviction court’s order denying sex offender’s motion to remove the requirement that he register as a sexual offender under Florida’s Romeo and Juliet statute where sex offender met all of the statutory requirements and the court did not explain its reasoning for denying the motion); Miller v. State, 17 So. 3d 778, 781-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (denying offender’s request to be removed from Florida’s sex offender registry and holding that, notwithstanding Florida’s Romeo and Juliet statute (for which the offender met all of the state statutory requirements), because the offender was convicted of an offense that did not involve a consensual act, he did not meet the federal requirements and therefore, it would conflict with federal law to remove him from the sex offender registry).}

_{[28]   Kidnapping offenses have been included since the first federal legislation regarding sex offender registration—the Wetterling Act—was passed. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (hereinafter Wetterling Act). Jurisdictions’ inclusion of kidnapping in their sex offender registration schemes have been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Thomas v. Taylor, No. 18-cv-238, 2022 WL 851725, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 22, 2022) (holding that offender convicted of kidnapping his own child is required to register as a sex offender in Mississippi even though SORNA only requires registration if an offender is convicted of non-parental kidnapping because SORNA “establishes a national baseline for sex offender registration and notification programs . . . [and] generally constitutes a set of minimum national standards and sets a floor, not a ceiling, for jurisdiction’s programs” and “Mississippi ‘[l]egislature’s expansion of the sex-offender registration laws [is] permissible and not violative of [sex offender’s] constitutional rights’”); Robinson v. Knutson, No. 23-CV-517, 2023 WL 6148550, *6-8 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 20, 2023) (holding that requiring offenders convicted of nonparental false imprisonment to register as sex offenders for life in Wisconsin does not violate substantive or procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment), appeal filed, No. 23-2979 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2023); Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 829-30 (Ga. 2010) (holding that requiring an offender convicted of nonparental false imprisonment to register as a sex offender in Georgia does not violate due process or constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d 881, 892 (Ky. 2018) (recognizing conviction of attempted kidnapping of a minor requires registration as a sex offender in Kentucky); Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 247, 256-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (citing the legislative history of the Wetterling Act to support registration for kidnapping and holding that requiring an offender convicted of kidnapping to register as a sex offender in Kentucky is constitutional); Doe (No. 339940) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 170 N.E.3d 1143, 1153 (Mass. 2021) (holding that “requiring sex offender registration for persons convicted of child kidnapping is reasonable because ‘kidnapping can be a precursor to sex offenses against children’” and “the law’s registration requirements for persons convicted of kidnapping a child . . . bear a reasonable, real, and substantial relation to the legislative objective of protecting vulnerable members of our communities, such as children, against recidivism by sex offenders”); Thomas v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 248 So. 3d 786, 790-91 (Miss. 2018) (holding that Mississippi’s inclusion of the offense of parental kidnapping as a sex offense requiring registration was permissible noting that SORNA is considered “the floor or minimum of what a state must require”); People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1154-55 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that offender convicted of nonparental kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment was required to register as a sex offender in New York, even though neither offense included a sexual component); People v. Lin, 206 N.Y.S.3d 504, 510 (Sup. Ct. 2024) (distinguishing Knox and Brown and holding that requiring offender convicted of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree unlawful imprisonment of a minor to register as a sex offender was not unconstitutional); State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 106 (Wis. 2010) (holding that requiring offenders convicted of nonparental false imprisonment to register as sex offenders in Wisconsin is constitutional). But see Doe v. Lee, 752 F. Supp. 3d 884, 903, 909-10 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (granting sex offender’s motion for preliminary injunction and holding that offender convicted of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201, where there was no sexual motivation or sexual component, has stated a plausible basis for relief with a significant likelihood of success that requiring her to register as a sex offender in Tennessee violates due process and ex post facto principles); People v. Lymon, No. 164685, 2024 WL 3573528, at *14, *17 (Mich. July 29, 2024) (“Lymon II”) (holding that requiring offenders convicted of unlawful imprisonment of a minor, enticement, and kidnapping (“non-sexual offenses”) where the offense has no sexual component to register as sex offenders constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Michigan Constitution); State v. Shepherd, 630 S.W.3d 896, 902-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that an offender who has been convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, where the offense was not sexually motivated, is not required to register as a sex offender under Missouri law); People v. Brown, 232 N.E.3d 1223, 1224 (N.Y. 2023) (distinguishing Knox and holding that applying New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act to offender convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree where there was no sexual motivation or sexual component “violates his due process rights by impinging on his liberty interest to be free of the improper designation and registration as a ‘sex offender’”).}

_{[29]    CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-280 (outlining Connecticut’s registry of offenders convicted of offenses committed with a deadly weapon); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(13) (defining “violent offense” for Montana’s violent offender registry); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-42-102 (outlining Utah’s white collar crime registry); see also In reM.A., 43 N.E.3d 86 (Ill. 2015) (discussing Illinois’ Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registry); State v. Brown, 399 P.3d 872 (Kan. 2017) (discussing Kansas’ drug offender registry); State v. Galloway, 50 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (discussing Ohio’s arson registry); Bivens v. State, 431 P.3d 985 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (addressing Oklahoma’s methamphetamine registry).}

_{[30]    SORNA includes a similar residual clause, which requires offenders convicted of “any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor” to register. 34 U.S.C. § 209011(7)(I); see United States v. Mixell, 806 F. App’x 180, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting “the SORNA residual clause does not impose any requirement that a defendant interact with a minor” and holding that Oregon offense of encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree constitutes a sex offense under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Vanderhorst, 668 F. App’x 185, 187 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that offender convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(3) is required to register as a sex offender under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Schofield, 802 F.3d 722, 731 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 qualifies as a “sex offense” under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Baptiste, 34 F. Supp. 3d 662, 682 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (holding that offender, who pleaded guilty to making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), was not required to register as a sex offender, even though he admitted to engaging in sexual contact with a minor, because § 1001 is “not a specified offense against a minor, nor is it a sex offense under SORNA”); United States v. Jensen, 278 F. App’x 548, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that Kentucky conviction of conspiracy to commit sexual abuse requires registration as a sex offender under Kentucky law); United States v. Dailey, 941 F.3d 1183, 1195 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that offender, convicted of transporting a minor across state lines for the purpose of having the minor engage in prostitution under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A), was required to register under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that conviction for importation of an alien for purposes of prostitution was a specified offense against a minor and required registration as a sex offender under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting the SORNA residual clause does not impose any requirement that a defendant interact with a minor and holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 is registerable under SORNA, even though it is not specifically listed); State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 942 (Haw. 2003) (holding that indecent exposure “does not constitute an offense that entails ‘criminal sexual conduct’” and offender convicted of indecent exposure was not required to register as a sex offender under Hawaii law); State v. Coman, 273 P.3d 701, 709 (Kan. 2012) (holding that a person who commits misdemeanor criminal sodomy is not required to register as a sex offender under Kansas law); In re K.B., 285 P.3d 389, 393 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (holding state must prove that an offender engaged in sexual contact “beyond a reasonable doubt” to qualify under its catch-all registration provision); State v. Duran, 967 A.2d 184, 197 (Md. 2009) (holding that, because “indecent exposure is not a crime that by its nature is a sexual offense,” offender convicted of indecent exposure was not required to register as a sex offender under Maryland law); People v. Haynes, 760 N.W.2d 283, 286-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that conviction of bestiality does not require registration as a sex offender under Michigan law); State v. Norman, 824 N.W.2d 739, 742-43 (Neb. 2013) (holding that offender, who was convicted of third-degree assault, was required to register as a sex offender under Nebraska’s catch-all registration provision where there was clear and convincing evidence that the offender engaged in sexual contact); Commonwealth v. Sampolski, 89 A.3d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (holding Pennsylvania offense of corruption of minors for a sexual offense did not constitute a “sex offense” under SORNA’s residual clause).}

_{[31]    People v. Rodriguez, No. F087217, 2025 WL 29012, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2025) (unpublished decision) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring offender convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) to register as a sex offender pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 290.006 where offender “was 22 years old, approximately eight years older than the 14-year-old victim” and the “trial court made the reasonable inference based on the record that [offender] had sexual intercourse with her for the purpose of sexual gratification”); People v. Contreras, 70 Cal. App. 5th 247, 254 (2021) (holding that, under Cal. Penal Code § 290.006, the trial court has discretion to require sex offender registration if the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification); People v. Glazier, 205 N.E.3d 79, 81, n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022) (recognizing that offender convicted of murder, where there was no evidence that the murder was sexually motivated, could not be required to register as a sex offender under Illinois law); State v. Miller, 4 N.W.3d 29 (Iowa 2024) (holding that offender convicted of harassment of the first degree in Iowa, after he posted a video of himself having intercourse with his girlfriend on a pornography website without her consent, did not commit the offense for the purpose of sexual gratification and was not required to register as a sex offender in Iowa); State v. Chapman, 944 N.W.2d 864, 874 (Iowa 2020) (holding that evidence was insufficient to prove sexual motivation requiring defendant’s registration as a sex offender where court relied on defendant’s Alford plea to child endangerment and a victim impact statement from the victim’s mother to find the defendant’s conduct was sexually motivated); State v. Busch, 955 N.W.2d 240, 240 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a determination that offender’s actions were sexually motivated and that, notwithstanding Chapman, the minutes of testimony could be considered for purposes of sex offender registration); People v. Shelton-Randolph, No. 360679, 2023 WL 2054964, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2023) (unpublished decision) (per curiam) (holding that offender convicted of second-degree murder is required to register as a tier I sex offender under Michigan law where the weight of the evidence demonstrates that a sexual offense occurred); Iseman v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 710 S.W.3d 539, 546-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025) (holding that offender convicted of felony harassment is required to register as a sex offender under Missouri law where the facts underlying the conviction were sexual in nature), modifying and superseding, No. WD 87117, 2025 WL 541844 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025); State v. Strawn, 19 N.W.3d 761, 768 (Neb. 2025) (holding that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B), which requires individuals convicted of certain offenses that are not necessarily sexual in nature to register as sex offenders under the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act if a court finds that evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact was present in the record, “which shall include consideration of the factual basis for a plea-based conviction and information contained in the presentence report,” “does not condition a registration obligation on evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact being found in both the factual basis and the [presentence report]”); State v. Wilson, 947 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Neb. 2020) (noting that Nebraska law concerning sex offender registration requirements “may also apply to individuals that plead guilty to or are convicted of other offenses” that are not inherently sexual); State v. Ratumaimuri, 911 N.W.2d 270, 892 (Neb. 2018) (noting Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act’s requirements “may also apply to individuals that plead guilty to or are convicted of offenses that are not inherently sexual” where the court has found that there is evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact); but see People v. Buyund, 205 A.D.3d 729, 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022) (holding that requiring offender convicted of burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony to register as a sex offender was unlawful).}

_{[32]    See, e.g., State v. Yeoman, 236 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Idaho 2010) (upholding Idaho statute that requires individuals convicted of an out-of-state sex offense that is substantially similar to a registerable sex offense in Idaho and who were required to register as sex offenders in another jurisdiction to register in Idaho); Peters v. Quakenbush, 260 N.E.3d 919, 923-24, 928 (Ind. 2025) (holding that Indiana’s “other-jurisdiction” statute, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), which requires any person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction to register in Indiana for the period required by the jurisdiction or as required under Indiana law, whichever is longer, “compels registration for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations regardless of the source of those obligations” but the statute applies only to people who presently have a duty to register in another jurisdiction and because offender “is not currently required to register in Florida,” the jurisdiction statute does not apply to him); State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2016) (recognizing that “it is not [offender’s] crime that triggers his obligation to register as a sex offender in Indiana; rather, it is [the other state’s] registry requirement that does so’”); State v. Baker, 258 N.E.3d 248, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (unpublished table decision) (reversing trial court’s order granting offender’s petition for relief from sex offender registration and holding that offender convicted of child solicitation in Indiana in October 2010, who moved to Tennessee where he is required to register as a sex offender until he applies for removal, and to Kentucky, where he is required to register for 20 years, and then moved back to Indiana, is required to register pursuant to Indiana’s “other-jurisdiction” provision, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), which requires any person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction to register in Indiana for the period required by the jurisdiction or as required under Indiana law, whichever is longer). But see Marroquin v. Reagle, 228 N.E.3d 1149, 1150-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) does not apply “when the requirement to register in another jurisdiction is based entirely on the existence of an Indiana conviction–that is, when there is no ‘independent requirement’ to register in another jurisdiction” and offender who moved back to Indiana from Virginia, where he was required to register due to an Indiana conviction for Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor was not required to register because his underlying Indiana conviction did not otherwise require registration), abrogated by, Peters v. Quakenbush, 260 N.E.3d 919 (Ind. 2025); Skaggs v. Neb. State Patrol, 804 N.W.2d 611, 615-16 (Neb. 2011) (holding that offender who was convicted of a sex offense in California and was required to register in both California and Florida, was also required to register as a sex offender in Nebraska); People v. Sherlock, No. 51, 2025 WL 1400065, at *2-3 (N.Y. May 15, 2025) (holding that offender convicted of possession of child pornography in violation of federal law is not required to register as a sexually violent offender pursuant to New York’s foreign registration clause, N.Y. Exec. Law § 168-a(3)(b), which requires offenders convicted of a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender to register in New York, “because the federal government does not maintain a sex offender registry of the sort that states are required to operate by federal mandate,” SORNA’s definition of “jurisdiction” “contains no requirement that federally-convicted sex offenders register with the federal government,” and although the offense fell within New York’s definition of “sex offense,” it does not qualify as a “sexually violent offense”); People v. Brightman, 230 A.D.3d 1527, 1530-31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024) (vacating order designating offender convicted of the felony offense of importuning in Ohio as a sexually violent offender in New York pursuant to New York’s foreign registration clause, N.Y. Exec. Law § 168-a(3)(b), where “the underlying out-of-state felony offense of importuning, which arose from [offender’s] conduct of soliciting via a telecommunication device another individual who was 13 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age to engage in sexual conduct with him when he was 23 years old was nonviolent in nature,” “the offense of importuning under Ohio law appears comparable to the New York felony of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree [in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22],” and New York law classifies a violation of § 235.22 as a “sex offense” rather than a “sexually violent offense”).}

_{[33]    For additional discussion concerning prosecutions for failure to register, see infra I.J.} 

_{[34]    Under the categorical approach, the court must consider only the elements of the crime, “while ignoring the particular facts of the case.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 503-04 (2016) (reiterating that in applying the categorical approach, a court must consider only the elements of the offense and stating that a state crime cannot qualify as a predicate offense if its elements are broader than those of the listed federal offense); Baxter v. Kennedy, 136 F.4th 70, 78 (4th Cir. 2025) (noting that “the categorical approach looks at the elements of the underlying statute in the abstract”); see, e.g., Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 978 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 2020) (applying the categorical approach and holding that New Jersey offense of criminal sexual contact is a categorical match to the federal generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor); United States v. Montgomery, 966 F.3d 335, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2020) (comparing state offenses to conduct required under 18 U.S.C. § 2242); Schofield, 802 F.3d at 731 (holding that attempted transfer of obscene material to a minor falls within the residual clause of SORNA, irrespective of whether the categorical or noncategorical approach is applied); Baptiste, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (holding that court should apply categorical approach to determine whether the offense of making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Buddi, No. 24-CR-00018, 2024 WL 4304791, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2024) (indicating that in applying the categorical approach, “‘if the crime of conviction . . . covers any more conduct’ than the federal offense, the two crimes are not comparable under SORNA” and in making such a determination, “the Court must ‘focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute’”), appeal filed, No. 24-5953 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2024); United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019) (indicating that under categorical approach, “the actual facts underlying the defendant’s conviction don’t matter” and instead, “the court compares the elements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for conviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense” and “[i]f the elements of the predicate offense are the same (or narrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match”); Harder v. United States, Nos. 21-cv-188; 14-cr-67, 2021 WL 3418958, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2021) (holding that Louisiana offense of indecent behavior with a juvenile is a “sex offense” under SORNA because there is “a categorical match between the SORNA definition of sex offense and the Louisiana statute”); Peterson v. United States, No. 22-55490, 2024 WL 5087916, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2024) (applying categorical approach and holding that the offense of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under 14 in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) constitutes a sex offense under SORNA’s residual clause), cert. denied, No. 24-6797 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2025); Syed v. Barr, 969 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying categorical approach and holding that Cal. Penal Code § 288.3(a), attempting to contact a child with intent to commit an offense, predicated on the crime of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child, is “a categorical crime involving moral turpitude” under federal law); United States v. Vineyard, 945 F.3d 1164, 1170 (11th Cir. 2019) (applying categorical approach to determine whether defendant’s Tennessee sexual battery conviction was qualifying sex offense under sexual contact provision of SORNA); United States v. Torchia, No. 20-CR-00464, 2021 WL 2169484, at *8 (May 7, 2021) (applying categorical approach and holding that juvenile offender adjudicated delinquent of sexual contact with another person under Minn. Stat. § 609.343(1)(a) was not a sex offender for purposes of SORNA and had no duty to register where Minnesota offense is not comparable to aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)), adopted by, No. 20-CR-00464, 2021 WL 2166863 (N.D. Ga. May 27, 2021); Duran, 967 A.2d at 197 (looking at the elements of the offense to determine whether offender convicted of indecent exposure was required to register as a sex offender under Maryland’s catchall registration provision); Doe (No. 151564) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 925 N.E.2d 533, 538 (Mass. 2010) (holding that a “like violation” under Massachusetts law is “a conviction in another jurisdiction of an offense of which the elements are the same or nearly the same as an offense requiring registration in Massachusetts” and holding that court may not consider facts underlying the conviction); State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119, 123 (Minn. 2020) (holding that an “out-of-state conviction would be a violation of a Minnesota offense requiring registration if proving the elements of the out-of-state offense would necessarily prove a violation of that Minnesota law. But if the elements of the out-of-state offense could be proven without proving a violation of Minnesota law, then the out-of-state conviction would not be a violation of a Minnesota offense requiring registration”); State v. Dumont, No. A20-0094, 2021 WL 317973, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that offender’s out-of-state conviction for corruption of a minor does not require registration as a sex offender in Minnesota where “the elements of the out-of-state offense” and “the elements of the Minnesota offense” do not match); People v. Morgan, 213 A.D.3d 1244, 1245 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023) (holding that, under the essential elements test, the Pennsylvania offense of indecent assault and the New York offense of sexual abuse in the second degree cover the same conduct and, because sexual abuse in the second degree is not an enumerated sexually violent offense, offender should not have been designated a sexually violent offender); Sampolski, 89 A.3d at 1290 (applying categorical approach and holding that Pennsylvania offense of corruption of minors for a sexual offense does not constitute a “sex offense” under SORNA’s residual clause).} 

_{[35]    The modified categorical approach is only applicable to divisible statutes—statutes that comprise multiple, alternative versions of the crime—and under the modified categorical approach, a court “looks to a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505-06 (holding that the modified categorical approach only applies where a statute presents alternative elements and not means of committing the offense); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (holding the modified categorical approach is only applicable to statutes that are divisible and when applied, allows courts to consult a limited class of documents); Baxter v. Kennedy, 136 F.4th 70, 77 n.8 (4th Cir. 2025) (recognizing that some statutes “have a so-called ‘divisible’ structure, listing elements in the alternative (e.g., requiring A, B, and either C or D or E). In such cases, courts use the ‘modified’ categorical approach and look to a limited set of record documents in addition to the elements of the underlying statute to ascertain which of the alternative elements were charged or pleaded to. . . . And still other times, after looking at the elements of the underlying statute, a court is invited to ‘picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in “the ordinary case,”’ which may involve imagined conduct not strictly entailed by any element”); United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 512 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that the “modified categorical approach is almost identical [to the categorical approach], but it applies only to divisible statutes—those containing alternative elements—and it entails a brief ‘detour’” and “[b]efore looking for a categorical match, [the court] consider[s] a limited number of trial documents, including the indictment and jury instructions, to determine which alternative element formed the basis of the conviction” and then “the traditional elements-based approach resumes”); see, e.g., United States v. Marrowbone, No. 24-CR-40106, 2025 WL 1951890, at *6 (D.S.D. July 16, 2025) (“Utilizing the guidance set out in Mathis, this Court concludes that [18 U.S.C.] § 113(a) sets forth elements in the alternative thereby defining two different crimes—assault with intent to commit murder and assault with intent to commit rape. Thus, this Court may use the modified categorical approach to determine which of the alternative elements formed the basis of [offender’s] conviction. . . . Using the modified categorical approach, this Court previously concluded that assault with intent to commit rape was a sex offense.”); United States v. Marrowbone, No. 14-CR-30071, 2014 WL 6694781, at *3 (D.S.D. Nov. 26, 2014) (applying modified categorical approach to determine whether offense qualified as a “sex offense” and noting that the court “may consider a limited scope of facts beyond the statute to determine what elements must have been proven to secure conviction”); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1136 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying the modified categorical approach to the North Carolina indecent liberties with a child statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-202.1(a), and noting that because it “provides alternative ways in which it can be violated, it is divisible”). But see United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “[w]here the statute defines the offense broadly rather than alternatively, the statute is not divisible, and the modified categorical approach simply ‘has no role to play’”).}

_{[36]    The circumstance-specific approach “focuses on the facts—not the elements—of a prior conviction” and courts applying the circumstance-specific approach look to “‘the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion’ to determine whether the prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under the federal statute at issue.” United States v. Thayer, 40 F.4th 797, 800 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Elder, 900 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009))). See Mixell, 806 F. App’x at 183-84 (applying circumstance-specific approach in determining that Oregon offense of encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Vanderhorst, 688 F. App’x 185, 187 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (relying on Price in applying circumstance-specific approach and holding that sex offender convicted for use of a facility in interstate commerce to carry on an unlawful activity, under 18 U.S.C. § 1592, required registration as a sex offender); United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 708 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the circumstance-specific approach is the appropriate standard to use in determining whether an offense qualifies as a sex offense under SORNA’s residual clause and offender’s conviction for the common law offense of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature in South Carolina where the offender forced his 11-year-old daughter to perform oral sex on him is a sex offense under SORNA); Schofield, 802 F.3d at 731 (holding that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 qualifies as a “sex offense” under SORNA’s residual clause irrespective of whether the categorical approach or noncategorical approach is applied); United States v. Burgee, 988 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding that the court properly used the circumstance-specific approach to determine that offender’s prior state-court conviction in South Dakota for sexual exploitation of a minor constituted “conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor” under SORNA and that offender failed to register as a sex offender under SORNA), aff’g, No. 18-CR-30164, 2019 WL 1332858 (D.S.D. Mar. 25, 2019); Byun, 539 F.3d at 993-94 (noting that the circumstance-specific approach should be applied when determining the age of a victim and that “the underlying facts of a defendant’s offense are pertinent in determining whether she has committed a ‘specified offense against a minor’ and is thus a sex offender” and holding that importation of an alien for purposes of prostitution in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328 is a “sex offense” under SORNA); United States v. Salazar, Nos. 10-cr-60121, 20-cv-01438, 2021 WL 2366086, at *5 (D. Or. June 9, 2021) (holding that, in applying the noncategorical approach, offender’s 1989 Florida conviction for handling and fondling a child under 16 constitutes a sex offense under SORNA’s residual clause, and therefore, offender was required to register as a sex offender); Doe v. Frisz, 643 S.W.3d 358, 362-64 (Mo. 2022) (en banc) (recognizing that Missouri courts “have applied a non-categorical approach when determining whether an offense included conduct that by its nature was a sex offense against a minor” and holding that offender convicted of four counts of endangering the welfare of a child was not required to register as a sex offender because the state “cannot use allegations and charges from offenses for which the state did not obtain convictions to show the offenses for which [offender] actually was convicted were sexual in nature” or victim impact statements as they “are unsworn statements and, by design, allow victims to put before the court facts and circumstances that are not necessarily elements of the charges on which sentence is to be pronounced and regarding which the defendant has not pleaded or been found guilty”); State v. Hall, 294 P.3d 1235, 1242 (N.M. 2013) (applying circumstance-specific approach in determining whether offender convicted of California offense of annoying or molesting a child was required to register in New Mexico and holding that when “determin[ing] whether a foreign sex offense is equivalent to a New Mexico sex offense for purposes of SORNA, and where the two offenses when compared do not share the exact same elements, a court must look beyond the elements of the offense and consider whether the defendant’s actual conduct, had it occurred in New Mexico, would have constituted a registerable offense”).}

_{[37]    For instance, in determining whether an offense is “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact” under 34 U.S.C. 
§ 20911(5)(A)(i), some courts will utilize the categorical approach or, if the statute is divisible, the modified categorical approach. See, e.g., United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 514, 516 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying the modified categorical approach to divisible statute and holding that offender, who was convicted of interstate domestic violence where the underlying crime of violence constituted aggravated sexual abuse, was convicted of a “sex offense” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i) and was required to register under SORNA); United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that the definition of “sex offense” in § 20911(5)(A)(i) focuses on the elements of the predicate offense and “strongly suggests that a categorical approach applies to (5)(A)(i)”); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)(holding that the categorical approach applies to “the threshold definition of the term ‘sex offense’ in [§ 20911(5)(A)(i)] requires a categorical approach—an inquiry limited to the elements of the offense” and reiterating that “the basic definition of ‘sex offense’ [under SORNA] . . . requires a categorical, elements-based inquiry”); United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that the categorical approach should be used when determining whether an offense constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA); United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the categorical approach is applicable when determining whether an offense is a sex offense under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i)); United States v. Vineyard, 945 F.3d 1164, 1170 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that a categorical approach must be applied to determine whether a conviction “has an element involving . . . sexual contact with another” and qualifies as a sex offense under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i)). Whereas, in determining whether an offense constitutes “a specified offense against a minor” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii) or is “conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor” under SORNA’s residual clause,  34 U.S.C. § 209111(7)(I), some courts apply the circumstance-specific or noncategorical approach. See, e.g., Price, 777 F.3d at 710 (applying the noncategorical approach to the SORNA residual clause when the offender was convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and holding that the circumstance-specific or non-categorical approach applies when determining whether an offense constitutes a sex offense under SORNA, within the meaning of 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii), as expanded by 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I)); United States v. Thayer, 40 F.4th 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding that the circumstance-specific approach should be applied when determining whether an offense is a “sex offense” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii), through 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I), SORNA’s residual clause); United States v. Hill, 820 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the circumstance-specific approach in determining whether an offense constitutes a “specified offense against a minor,” which includes “conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor”); Byun, 539 F.3d at 992 (applying the noncategorical approach to the SORNA residual clause to determine whether the victim was a minor); Dailey, 941 F.3d at 1195 (finding that the text and structure of SORNA’s residual clause makes clear that it requires a noncategorical approach to determine whether the conviction was for a sex offense against minor); United States v. Salazar, 2021 WL 2366086, at *4 (holding that the noncategorical approach must be applied to determine whether offender’s conviction requires registration under SORNA’s residual clause); Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1356 (holding that “courts may employ a noncategorical approach to examine the underlying facts of a defendant’s offense, to determine whether a defendant has committed a ‘specified offense against a minor’ and is thus a ‘sex offender’ subject to SORNA’s registration requirement” under the residual clause). Finally, in determining whether an offender’s conduct fell under the Romeo and Juliet exception under SORNA, courts typically apply the circumstance-specific approach. See United States v. Parson, No. 14-234, 2015 WL 1208563, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 17, 2015) (applying the circumstance-specific approach to examine the facts underlying sex offender’s statutory rape conviction to pinpoint the age differential and determine whether the Romeo and Juliet exception under SORNA is applicable and holding that Georgia statutory rape offense where offender was 18 and the victim was 12 is a sex offense under SORNA); Thayer, 40 F.4th at 808 (holding that the circumstance-specific approach should be applied when determining whether an offender’s conduct fell under the Romeo and Juliet exception under SORNA); United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that “the exception in [§20911](5)(C) calls for an examination of the specific facts of the offense conduct”).}

_{[38]    Cox v. United States, 325 A.3d 360, 376 (D.C. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that offender’s Wisconsin offense of third-degree sexual assault involved the use or threatened use of force and is substantially similar to the offense of first-degree sexual abuse in the District of Columbia, requiring lifetime registration in the District of Columbia); Skehan v. Idaho State Police, 541 P.3d 679, 688-89 (Idaho 2024) (holding that the Idaho Bureau of Criminal Identification did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by considering court documents and police reports underlying offender’s Oregon conviction in determining that the elements of the Oregon offense of sexual abuse in the third degree is substantially similar to the elements of the Idaho offense of lewd conduct with a minor and that offender convicted of Oregon offense is required to register as a sex offender in Idaho); State v. Glodowski, 463 P.3d 405, 411-12 (Idaho 2020) (affirming conviction for failing to update registration information in Idaho where prior conviction under a Wisconsin statute was “substantially equivalent” to Idaho statute); Doe v. State, 352 P.3d 500, 504-05 (Idaho 2015) (finding that conviction under Washington statute for “communication with [a] minor for immoral purposes” was “substantially equivalent” to Idaho statute); Spencer v. State, 153 N.E.3d 289, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that offender did not meet the statutory definition of a “sexually violent predator” (SVP) as it existed in 2016 when he moved to Indiana because, although his Florida conviction for fondling a young girl is substantially equivalent to level 4 felony child molesting under Indiana law, he committed the crime before July 1, 2014, and therefore does not meet the statutory definition of an SVP); City of Shawnee v. Adem, 494 P.3d 134, 138 (Kan. 2021) (affirming court of appeals’ decision, holding that sexual battery under the Shawnee Municipal Code is an offense that is comparable to sexual battery under Kan. Stat. § 21-5505(a), which requires registration under the Kansas Offender Registration Act, and requiring offender to register as a sex offender); State v. Day, No. 2024 KA 0503, 2025 WL 1490841, at *6 n.2 (La. Ct. App. May 23, 2025) (recognizing that offender’s prior felony conviction of lewd and lascivious battery on a victim younger than 16 years of age in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a)(2) is a sex offense under La. Rev. Stat. § 15:541); Doe (No. 527402) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 253 N.E.3d 607 (Mass. App. Ct. 2025) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the Arizona offense of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405, is a “like violation” to the Massachusetts offense of attempted indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13B, and offender convicted of the Arizona offense of attempted sexual conduct with a minor is required to register as a sex offender in Massachusetts); Doe (No. 527680) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 253 N.E.3d 602 (Mass. App. Ct. 2025) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the New York offense of forcible touching, N.Y. Penal Law § 130.52, is a “like violation” to the Massachusetts offense of indecent assault and battery, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 13H, and offender convicted of the New York offense of forcible touching is required to register as a sex offender in Massachusetts notwithstanding the fact that offender was not required to register as a sex offender in New York); Doe (No. 151564), 925 N.E.2d at 539-40 (holding that Maine conviction for unlawful sexual contact was a “like conviction” when compared to the Massachusetts crime of indecent assault and battery on a child under 14 and required registration as a sex offender in Massachusetts); Doe v. Dep’t of Safety, No. 2020-0243, 2021 WL 861787, at *2-3 (N.H. Feb. 25, 2021) (holding that offender’s New York conviction for forcible touching was reasonably equivalent to a New Hampshire conviction for sexual assault and he was required to register as a sex offender in New Hampshire); State v. Orr, 304 P.3d 449, 449 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that an out-of-state offense is equivalent to a sex offense in New Mexico if the offender’s actual conduct supporting his or her out-of-state conviction would have constituted one of the sex offenses enumerated by New Mexico law); In re McIlwain, 873 S.E.2d 58, 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that the Texas statute criminalizing possession or promotion of lewd visual material depicting a child is substantially similar to the North Carolina statute criminalizing second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and offender is required to register as a sex offender in North Carolina); Hall v. State, 2021-Ohio-3363, No. C-200308, 2021 WL 4343461, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2021) (holding that the Kentucky offense of sodomy in the second degree is substantially equivalent to the Ohio offense of gross sexual imposition); Lozada v. S.C. L. Enf’t Div., 719 S.E.2d 258, 261 (S.C. 2011) (holding that Pennsylvania conviction for unlawful restraint was sufficiently similar to conviction in South Carolina for kidnapping requiring registration as a sex offender in South Carolina); In re K.H., 609 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex. App. 2020) (affirming trial court’s judgment ordering offender to be civilly committed under Texas law where offender’s Oregon convictions for sexual abuse required proof that he touched the genitals of a child with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person and, the elements of the offense “display a high degree of likeness to the elements of the Texas offense of indecency with a child by contact,” such that “the offenses are substantially similar for purposes of Chapter 841”); Fritts v. State, No. 11-18-00359-CR, 2020 WL 7038553, at *5-6 (Tex. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (unpublished decision) (holding that offender was properly convicted of failing to register as a sex offender under Texas law where the offender was convicted of a sex offense in Ohio that was substantially similar to a Texas offense); Watson-Buisson v. Commonwealth, No. 200955, 2021 WL 4628456, at *3 (Va. Oct. 7, 2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that Louisiana offense of computer-aided solicitation of a minor is comparable to Virginia offense of taking indecent liberties with a child); State v. Gwaltney, 908 S.E.2d 192, 197-98 (W. Va. 2024) (granting writ of prohibition and holding that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers by dismissing an indictment charging offender with second or subsequent failure to register as a sex offender based on its conclusion that a factual basis for the indictment did not exist where the court found that offender could only be required to register pursuant to W.V. Code § 15-12-9(c), which requires any person moving to West Virginia who is required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction to register in West Virginia, and because offender was no longer required to register as a sex offender in Ohio, he had no duty to register as a sex offender in West Virginia, and the State argued that offender was required to register pursuant to W.V. Code § 15-12-2(b), which requires anyone convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction that has the same essential elements as a registerable West Virginia offense to register as a sex offender), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1161 (2022). But see Montgomery, 966 F.3d at 338 (holding that offender’s New Jersey conviction for second-degree sexual assault is not comparable to or more severe than federal aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse and does not support a finding that he is a tier III sex offender under SORNA); Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 425 P.3d 115, 122-23 (Alaska 2018) (holding that Washington statute prohibiting communicating with a minor for immoral purposes and California statute prohibiting annoying or molesting a child under 18 were not similar to Alaska offense of second-degree attempted sexual abuse of a minor and therefore offender was not required to register as a sex offender in Alaska); Doe (No. 346132) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 11 N.E.3d 153, 158 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that federal conviction for kidnapping of a minor was not a “like conviction” comparable to aggravated rape in Massachusetts and therefore offender was not required to register as a sex offender in Massachusetts); Hall, 294 P.3d at 1242 (holding that offense of annoying or molesting a child in California is not equivalent to a New Mexico offense and offender convicted of the same had no duty to register as a sex offender in New Mexico); State v. Winn, 435 P.3d 1247, 1252 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that Colorado offense of third-degree sexual assault is not equivalent to a New Mexico offense and offender did not have a duty to register as a sex offender in New Mexico); People v. Malloy, 228 A.D.3d 1284, 1285 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024) (recognizing that offense of aggravated sexual battery in Kansas does not contain all of the essential elements of a registerable New York sex offense or sexually violent offense); People v. Diaz, 150 A.D.3d 60, 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (holding that Virginia conviction for first-degree murder of a minor, without any sexual conduct or motivation, did not require registration as a sex offender in New York); Ex parte Harbin, 297 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that California conviction for annoying or molesting a child is not substantially similar to a Texas offense requiring registration and therefore, offender had no duty to register as a sex offender in Texas); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Seamens, No. 03-20-00432-CV, 2021 WL 3743824, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2021) (holding that offender’s Kansas conviction is not substantially similar to the Texas offense of indecency with a child by contact requiring registration as a sex offender “because the two statutes’ elements do not ‘display a high degree of likeness’ and instead ‘involve . . . similarity in merely ‘a general sense’”); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Anonymous Adult Tex. Resident, 382 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that the elements of offender’s Massachusetts conviction for indecent assault and battery on a person over 14 years old were not substantially similar to the Texas offense of sexual assault and therefore offender was not required to register as a sex offender in Texas).}

_{[39]    See Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 69,856, at 69,859 (Dec. 8, 2021) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.1-72.8), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-08/pdf/2021-26420.pdf (hereinafter SORNA Rule); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937-38 (2011) (“Juvenile Male II”) (noting that “the duty to register under SORNA is not a consequence—collateral or otherwise—of the District Court’s special conditions of supervision” and “[t]he statutory duty to register [under SORNA] is . . . an obligation that exists ‘independent’ of those conditions”); United States v. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that “[i]t would be illogical for SORNA to operate to make state registrations more uniform, while at the same time allowing individual states to determine which sex offenders have a duty to register when they leave that state” and holding that the “triggering event for the duty to register [under SORNA] is a sex offense conviction, not a state sentence requiring registration”); Thomas v. Blocker, No. 21-1943, 2022 WL 2870151, at *4 (3d Cir. July 21, 2022) (holding that sex offenders’ duty to register under SORNA is independent of Pennsylvania law); United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 86 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a sex offender’s duty to register under SORNA is not dependent upon his duty to register under state law); Kennedy v. Allera, 612 F.3d 261, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that SORNA imposes obligations on a sex offender that are independent of state law and holding that sex offender had an independent duty to register under SORNA and he was not relieved of that duty just because he initially was unable to register in Maryland because Maryland law did not require registration); id. at 263, 268 (“Maryland law creates a sex offender registry in which [offender] can register even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that Maryland law does not of its own force require him to register” and “because SORNA lawfully imposes, as a matter of federal law, registration obligations directly on sex offenders, such as [offender], . . . [he] is not relieved of that duty by any restriction in Maryland law or by Maryland’s failure to implement SORNA.”); United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “SORNA sets federal registration requirements that are independent of state law”); Willman v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 972 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding a sex offender’s obligations under SORNA are independent of any duties under state law and “SORNA bind[s] all individuals ‘convicted’ of sex offenses, not just those with corresponding state obligations”); United States v. Paul, 718 F. App’x 360, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that “SORNA imposes [registration] duties on all sex offenders, irrespective of what they may be obliged to do under state law), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019); United States v. Meadows, 772 F. App’x 368, 369 (7th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that federal law may require registration even if Indiana law does not); Ross v. Carter, No. 20-cv-00876, 2022 WL 1459375, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2022) (holding that Indiana’s application of federal SORNA to sex offender, who was convicted of a sex offense in Indiana, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Ex Post Facto Clause, and offender is required to register under SORNA even though he was convicted in state court rather than federal court and “[t]he fact that he was required to register for only ten years under Indiana law does not relieve him of a more onerous federal requirement”); United States v. First in Trouble, No. 24-2290, 2025 WL 1466781, at *1 (8th Cir. May 22, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that the court should not vacate offender’s sentence and remand to the district court to correct a mistake where offender was improperly classified as a tier III sex offender at sentencing for his failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 because offender’s “tier classification at sentencing does not determine his registration requirements” under SORNA, “because [he] is a lifetime registrant in South Dakota, his duty to register in other states ‘is not contingent upon the validity’ of his tier classification at sentencing,” and “[c]orrecting any error here ‘cannot save this case from mootness’”); United States v. Billiot, 785 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir. 2015) (“SORNA imposes an independent federal obligation for sex offenders to register that does not depend on, or incorporate, a state-law registration requirement.”); United States v. Saari, No. CR 05-31, 2024 WL 4133024, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 10, 2024) (granting sex offender’s motion to terminate his registration requirements under SORNA but recognizing that, although such relief was not requested, the court could not terminate the offender’s duty to register under Montana law as “those requirements are imposed by the State of Montana based on the existence of his federal conviction,” Montana’s registration requirement “is independent from any federal obligation governed by this Court,” the offender “must petition the state court for relief from the registration requirements imposed by Montana law” and “[u]ntil he successfully does so, he must continue to register as a sex offender with the State of Montana”); United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Juvenile Male III”) (holding that SORNA’s “requirement that the defendants register as sex offenders is independent from any requirement under state law”); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that “SORNA imposes a federal obligation on all sex offenders to register in each jurisdiction where he resides, works, and goes to school”), abrogated on other grounds by, Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104 (2016), and overruled on other grounds by, Koch v. Village of Hartland, 43 F.4th 747 (7th Cir. 2022); Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (recognizing that SORNA may require an offender to register as a sex offender even if Indiana law does not and that he “may have a federal duty to register under [SORNA] if he engages in interstate travel, and could be subject to prosecution . . . under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, if he fails to do so”); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 94 A.3d 791, 807 (Md. 2014) (holding that a sex offender has an independent duty to register under SORNA while also recognizing that the state is not required to register the offender if registration of the offender would be contrary to state law); see also Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 166-67 (Mo. 2012), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. St. Louis Cnty. Police, 659 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2023) (holding that offender, who was required to register as a sex offender under federal SORNA based on a conviction entered prior to the effective date of Missouri’s sex offender registration laws, still has a duty to register under Missouri law and because the offender “has been required to register pursuant to SORNA, . . . [he] presently is required to register pursuant to SORA”); Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (“SORNA imposes an independent obligation requiring [offenders] to register as sex offenders in Missouri” and the “independent registration requirement under SORNA operates irrespective of any allegedly retrospective state law that has been enacted and may be subject to the article I, section 13 ban on the enactment of retrospective state laws”); Doe v. Lee, 296 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding offender has an independent duty to register as a sex offender in Missouri under SORNA and the “obligation operates irrespective of any allegedly retrospective state law”).}

_{[40]    Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 452, 454 (2010) (noting that “federal sex-offender registration laws have, from their inception, expressly relied on state-level enforcement,” that “[i]n enacting SORNA, Congress preserved this basic allocation of enforcement responsibilities,” and that SORNA serves to “strengthen state enforcement of registration requirements”).}

_{[41]    Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 94 A.3d at 808-10 (quoting Kennedy, 612 F.3d at 269) (holding that “Marylanders . . . enjoy ‘greater protection under the prohibition on ex post facto laws’ of the Maryland Declaration of Rights” and where sex offenders “would only be required to register in Maryland,” but the retroactive application of the Maryland registry is unconstitutional, they cannot be required to register in Maryland and noting that “so long as [the sex offenders] are in Maryland, they cannot be required to register as sex offenders in Maryland, notwithstanding the registration requirements imposed directly on individuals by SORNA”); see SORNA Rule, supra note 39, at 69,859 (noting that “SORNA’s requirements exist independently of state law”). However, offenders are not “exempt from SORNA’s registration requirements merely because the jurisdiction in which [they are] required to register has not yet implemented SORNA.” United States v. Brown, 586 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting sex offender’s argument that SORNA did not apply to him because Alabama had not yet implemented it); see also infra I.J.7 and accompanying notes.}

_{[42]    34 U.S.C. § 20913(d); Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,046 and 38,063; 28 C.F.R. § 72.3; see Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 1,630, at 1,639 (Jan. 11, 2011), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-01-11/pdf/2011-505.pdf (hereinafter Supplemental Guidelines) (“SORNA’s requirements apply to all sex offenders, regardless of when they were convicted.”); Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-02-28/pdf/E7-3063.pdf; Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,849 (Dec. 29, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-12-29/pdf/2010-32719.pdf (noting that “applying SORNA’s requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions, including sex offenders required to register on the basis of juvenile delinquency adjudications, appropriately effectuates Congress’s purposes in enacting SORNA”); SORNA Rule, supra note 39, at 69,856 (noting that 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 “is necessary to implement Congress’s intent that SORNA apply to all sex offenders, regardless of when they were convicted”); see also United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that SORNA’s registration requirements apply to sex offenders convicted before its passage); United States v. Dumont, 555 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir.) (alterations omitted) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 72.3) (“The requirements of SORNA apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of [SORNA].”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 66 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by, Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010). Contra Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 445 (2012) (“Reynolds I”) (holding that without affirmative action by the Attorney General, pre-act offenders would not be obligated to register under SORNA and requiring the Attorney General to apply SORNA to all pre-act offenders as soon as feasible; concluding that SORNA’s requirement would not apply retroactively to offenders whose offenses occurred prior to enactment until so directed by the Attorney General).}

_{[43]    Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,046 and 38,063. SORNA requires jurisdictions register offenders whose “predicate convictions predate the enactment of SORNA or the implementation of SORNA in the jurisdiction’s program” when the offenders are (1) incarcerated or under supervision, either for the predicate sex offense or for some other crime; (2) they are already registered or subject to a pre-existing sex offender registration requirement under the jurisdiction’s law; or (3) they reenter the jurisdiction’s justice system because of conviction for some other crime (irrespective of whether it is a sex offense). Id. at 38,046; see also Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 42, at 1,639; Stow v. Montgomery, 601 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Ark. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that sex offender who was convicted of a sex offense in Colorado was required to register as a sex offender in Arkansas, even though his Colorado conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act); Hickerson v. United States, 287 A.3d 237, 239-40 (D.C. 2023) (holding that offender who was convicted of sodomy prior to enactment of the District of Columbia’s Sex Offender Registration Act but who came under supervision in 2016 for committing a non-sex offense was required to register as a sex offender in the District of Columbia); People v. Klinesmith, No. 340938, 2025 WL 1561402, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. June 2, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that offender convicted of attempted criminal sexual conduct in 1983 and subsequently convicted of the felony offenses of operating while intoxicated and possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine) in 2017, where the judgment required offender to register under the “recapture” provision of the Michigan Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), which requires registration for “[a]n individual who was previously convicted of a listed offense for which he or she was not required to register . . . but who is convicted of any other felony on or after July 1, 2011,” who was resentenced for the 2017 conviction in February 2020 and the judgment did not include a SORA registration requirement, “cannot be obligated to register under SORA” because “the court did not follow the appropriate procedures to require him to register under SORA, the court did not place the registration requirement on the judgment of sentence, [offender] never registered as a sex offender under SORA, [offender] was discharged from his sentence nearly three years ago, the order of probation was revoked and no longer has any legal effect, and the time to amend the judgment of sentence has long expired”); Commonwealth v. Mchirella, 319 A.3d 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (unpublished decision) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to convict sex offender of failing to register under Pennsylvania law where offender pleaded guilty to rape in 1989, prior to enactment of any of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Laws; offender was incarcerated for the duration of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law I and II; and offender was released when Megan’s Law III was in effect because, although Megan’s Law III was ultimately held unconstitutional, it could still be considered a “former sexual offender registration law” for the purpose of requiring individuals to register under Pennsylvania law).}

_{[44]    Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,061. “Habitually lives” includes places where the sex offender lives with some regularity, i.e., in any place in which the offender lives for at least 30 days. Id. at 38,062. For additional information, see SMART’s SORNA Implementation Documents: Determination of Residence, Homeless Offenders and Transient Workers.}

_{[45]    See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-909(a)(5) (requiring homeless sex offenders appear in person every 30 days to update their registration); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.011(a) (requiring transient sex offenders update registration at least every 30 days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178F (requiring homeless sex offenders verify their registration information every 30 days).}

_{[46]     See Lamberty v. State, 108 A.3d 1225 (Del. 2015) (unpublished table decision) (holding that Delaware statute requiring tier II homeless sex offenders to register every 30 days was constitutional and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Rodriguez v. State, 108 A.3d 438, 446-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (holding that additional registration requirement retroactively imposed on homeless offender, requiring him to register weekly, did not violate Maryland’s constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and is necessary to properly monitor homeless sex offenders); State v. Smith, 19 Wash. App. 2d 1048 (2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that Washington’s sex offender registration statutes do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions and noting that “the weekly reporting requirement arising from [the offender’s] homelessness has had a tremendously negative impact on [his] life and capacity to rehabilitate” but was not an ex post facto violation); State v. Boyd, 408 P.3d 362, 369 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that sex offender registration requirement that transient sex offenders check in weekly was not punitive and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions); State v. Enquist, 256 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that requirement for transient sex offenders to check-in weekly did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions); State v. Crofton, 144 Wash. App. 1047 (2008) (unpublished decision) (holding that Washington statute requiring homeless sex offenders to report weekly, in person, does not violate the Ex Post Facto and Equal Protection Clauses of the Washington and U.S. Constitutions). But see Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d 676, 679 (Ga. 2008) (holding that statutory requirement of registering a change of residence was unconstitutionally vague as applied to homeless or transient sex offenders who possess no street or route address for their residence where it failed to give homeless sex offenders without a residence address with fair notice of how they can comply with the statute’s requirement as required by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution).}

_{[47]    United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-59, 2009 WL 2984201, at *4-5 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2009) (holding that sex offender who repeatedly uses a “mail drop” address as his legal address and makes repeated representations that the address is his permanent address “resides” at that location for the purposes of a federal prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender); Johnson v. City of Chicago, No. 12-cv-08594, 2016 WL 5720388, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016) (denying City of Chicago’s motion for summary judgment and allowing homeless sex offender’s procedural due process claim to proceed where there was genuine issue of material fact concerning the city’s alleged policy of refusing to register sex offenders who lacked a fixed address); Beley v. City of Chicago, No. 12 C 9714, 2015 WL 8153377, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2015), Def.’s summary judgment granted, No. 12-cv-9714, 2017 WL 770964 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017) (highlighting litigation brought by homeless sex offenders against the City of Chicago concerning the city’s alleged policy of refusing to register sex offenders who lacked a fixed address); Saiger v. City of Chicago, 37 F. Supp. 3d 979, 985 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (allowing homeless sex offender’s procedural due process claim to proceed against City of Chicago where offender successfully alleged that city engaged in policy of refusing to register sex offenders who lacked a fixed address); Derfus v. City of Chicago, No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2015) (granting City of Chicago’s motion for summary judgment and holding that the homeless sex offenders were never prevented from registering with the city and they failed to establish that the city had a policy of refusing to register homeless sex offenders); United States v. Lyte, No. 21-10316, 2023 WL 3477842, at *1-2 (9th Cir. May 16, 2023) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support offender’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 where offender failed to register in Arizona and it was proved that he “habitually lived in the states where he was sent to work: he very rarely returned to his listed residence [in Michigan], he lived and worked in the various job sites for up to months at a time, and [he] conceded he essentially lived on the road”); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 847 F. App’x 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that offender, who was homeless both before and after incarceration, has a duty to update his registration information upon release from prison where the prison became offender’s “residence” for purposes of SORNA and, although he was not required to update his registration while in prison, he was required to do so upon release); State v. Burbey, 403 P.3d 145, 147-48 (Ariz. 2017) (holding that sex offenders who become homeless are not required to register a new residence or address within the otherwise required 72-hour period under Arizona law because “a transient person would have neither an address nor a residence to report”); People v. Deluca, 228 Cal. App. 4th 1263, 1265-67 (2014) (affirming conviction of failure to register under California law and holding that the emergency winter shelter where homeless sex offender was staying constituted a “residence” even though the shelter had limited hours, it was taken down each night and each morning, no mail could be received, and cots were assigned on a first-come, first-served basis); People v. Allman, 321 P.3d 557, 565 (Colo. App. 2012) (affirming conviction for failure to register under Colorado law and holding that sex offender’s car, which he used as a residence when working away from home during the week, was a “residence” for purposes of Colorado sex offender registration statute); State v. Edwards, 87 A.3d 1144, 1148-49 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that court’s implicit conclusion that homelessness always equals a change of address was in error and noting that sex offender who had been evicted, but continued to live in his truck at the same location, did not have a change of residence address and therefore, could not be prosecuted for failure to update the same in violation of Connecticut law); Lester v. State, 889 S.E.2d 159, 161-62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support offender’s conviction of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of Georgia law where he failed to provide law enforcement with his new sleeping location within 72 hours of becoming homeless); People v. Sweigart, 183 N.E.3d 231, 244-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021) (reversing failure to register conviction and holding that state failed to prove offender was homeless and had a duty to register as a sex offender); People v. Wlecke, 6 N.E.3d 745, 754-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that homeless sex offender who reported to register within three days of being released from a correctional facility, but lacked proper identification and was turned away from registering could not be convicted for failure to register); Branch v. State, 917 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that homeless sex offender was successfully prosecuted for failure to register under Indiana law when he failed to inform law enforcement that he had left his primary residence, a homeless shelter); Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming conviction for failure to register and holding that sex offender, who had been kicked out of his home by his wife and was staying with friends, was not “homeless” and was required to update his registration every time he moved); State v. Ballard, 566 P.3d 1092, 1095, 1102 (Kan. 2025) (reversing judgment, remanding to the trial court for potential retrial, and holding that the court committed clear error by failing to instruct the jury on the Kansas Offender Registration Act’s (KORA) definitions of “transient,” “residence,” and “reside” where the KORA definitions differ significantly from other legal and common definitions; that “[u]nder these circumstances, . . . [the court] is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it received the tools to understand KORA’s definitions of transience, residence, and reside rather than being left to rely on common meanings of those words that differ significantly from how KORA defines them”; and “the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would allow a properly instructed and rational jury to find [offender] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”); Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 135-36 (Ky. 2009) (holding that homeless sex offender was required to report a change of residence when he was asked to leave homeless shelter and Kentucky’s failure to register statute was not unconstitutionally vague); Commonwealth v. McClamy, 178 N.E.3d 901 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (affirming sex offender’s conviction for failing to register under Massachusetts law where law enforcement located offender at an apartment a day after he verified his registration information and registered his current address as “homeless” and offender repeatedly told the officer he lived at the apartment, he had clothes and other personal property at the address, he did laundry at the apartment, and answered the front door to visitors); Commonwealth v. Bolling, 893 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding evidence was insufficient to support conviction for failure to register where homeless offender spent three nonconsecutive nights with a friend where Massachusetts law defines a “secondary address” as a place where an offender resides for a period of four or more days); State v. Samples, 198 P.3d 803, 807 (Mont. 2008) (affirming homeless sex offender’s conviction for failure to register under state law and holding that, when offender left homeless shelter, he changed his residence and was required to report the same to law enforcement); McRae v. State, 131 Nev. 1320 (2015) (unpublished table decision) (affirming conviction for failure to register under Nevada law and holding that homeless sex offender was required to notify law enforcement of his change of address after he was evicted); People v. Potter, 228 N.Y.S.3d 418, 419-20 (Genesee Cnty. Ct. 2025) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender and holding that N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-f(4), which requires sex offenders register no later than 10 days after any change of address, internet identifiers, or status of enrollment, attendance, employment, or residence at any institution of higher education, is not void for vagueness and level 2 sex offender who failed to update his registration information after becoming homeless could be prosecuted for failing to register as a sex offender); People v. Allen, 182 N.Y.S.3d 112, 117-18 (App. Div. 2023) (holding that New York statute requiring level 3 sex offenders to verify their address in person within 90 days is void for vagueness when “applied to homeless sex offenders who, like defendant here, possess no address for their residence” and deprives the offender of due process under the New York and U.S. Constitutions because the statute “contains no objective standard or guidelines that would put homeless sex offenders without an address on notice of what conduct is required of them,” but recognizing that “[i]t does not exempt homeless sex offenders who are able to provide an address such as a shelter at which they are staying”); State v. Deshaw, 478 P.3d 591, 594-95 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it found sex offender guilty of failure to report as a sex offender because it relied on a determination that offender spent significant time at the pond and not on a determination that he had “moved out” from his residence behind Walmart and noting that the trial court did not convict the offender based on his failure to report within 10 days of moving out of his current residence from behind Walmart, but, instead, it convicted him based on his failure to register the pond as a second residence); Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201, 1207-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that sex offender had a duty to report a change of residence when he was unable to rent a room at the address where he reported he would be living upon release from prison and that there is no exception to registration requirements for homeless offenders); Nikolaev v. State, 474 S.W.3d 711, 713-14 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that sex offender, who worked as a truck driver and had frequent and prolonged absences from his registered residence, could not be convicted of failure to register under Texas law because he never stopped using his home as his primary residence); Breeden v. State, No. 05-06-00862-CR, 2008 WL 787934, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Mar. 26, 2008) (holding that sex offender, who moved out of a motel room into a vehicle parked in the motel parking lot, was required to report a change of address and his failure to do so was a sufficient basis for a prosecution of failure to register under Texas law); State v. Zergman, No. 59935-1-II, 2025 WL 1640184, at *5, *9 (Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2025) (unpublished decision) (holding that Wash. Rev. Stat. § 9A.44.130(6)(b) requires transient sex offenders to report in person weekly with the sheriff’s office, “regardless of whether the Sheriff requests records for verification,” and the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain offender’s conviction for failure to register in violation of Wash. Rev. Stat. § 9A.44.130(6)(b) where offender reported staying with several residents, but the residents testified that offender had never resided with them); State v. Savage, 951 N.W.2d 838, 851-53 (Wis. 2020) (holding that homeless sex offender’s inability to provide address at which he would be residing was not a defense to Wisconsin offense of failure to register); State v. Dinkins, 810 N.W.2d 787, 799 (Wis. 2012) (holding that homeless sex offender cannot be convicted of failure to register in violation of Wisconsin law where he fails to report the address where he will be residing when he is unable to provide that information because he has nowhere to live and cannot secure housing).}

_{[48]    34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(iv); see United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 399 (2013) (holding that offender convicted of the military offense of carnal knowledge was subject to SORNA’s registration requirements); United States v. Mingo, 964 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that delegation to Secretary of Defense of which particular military offenses should qualify as “sex offenses” under SORNA did not violate the nondelegation doctrine and offender convicted of rape in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 920 was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA); United States v. Coppock, 765 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 394) (noting “Kebodeaux establishes, therefore, that Congress has some degree of authority to apply SORNA to federal sex offenders based on violations of the UCMJ, and to punish violations of SORNA with criminal penalties under § 2250(a)”); Guerrero v. Blakely, No. 12-CV-1072, 2014 WL 4686482, at *14-15 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2014) (recognizing that the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act “takes pains to provide almost no limitations on what qualifies as a sex conviction and expressly incorporates military convictions” and exceeds federal SORNA requirements). See infra I.D for additional information regarding where sex offenders are required to register.}

_{[49]    See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 1325.07, at 40 (2024), www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132507p.pdf. Although the U.S. Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security, their proceedings are also governed by this instruction. Id. at 6; see also Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 393-94, 399 (holding that offenders who are convicted by military tribunals of a registerable sex offense must register with any jurisdiction where they live, work, or go to school); Respondek v. State, No. 1685, 2021 WL 4496195, at *13-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 1, 2021) (holding that former lieutenant in the Navy, who was convicted of possession of child pornography in violation of Article 134 of the UCMJ, is required to register as a sex offender under Maryland law and federal SORNA).}

_{[50]    United States v. Brown, 774 F. App’x 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying categorical approach and holding that sexual assault under Article 120 of the UCMJ is comparable to the federal offense of sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2242 and therefore constitutes a “sex offense” under SORNA and offender was required to register as a tier III sex offender); United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 575-77 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying modified categorical approach and holding that offender convicted of forcible sodomy in violation of Article 125 of the UCMJ under 10 U.S.C. § 925, where the statute prohibited sodomy in all forms, is required to register as a tier III offender under SORNA and noting that “a judge may examine a limited set of additional materials—such as the charging instrument in this case—to determine the portion of 10 U.S.C. § 925 to which the defendant pleaded guilty”); United States v. Coulson, 86 F.4th 1189, 1193, 1195-96 (8th Cir. 2023) (holding that offender convicted of forcible pandering in violation of UCMJ Article 120c(b) is required to register as a tier I sex offender under SORNA and that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis); Billingsley v. State, 115 So. 3d 192, 198 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that “convictions in ‘federal court’ . . . include convictions in military courts” and a person convicted of a qualifying offense in a U.S. military court is required to register as a sex offender in Alabama); Doe (No. 34186) v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 23 N.E.3d 938, 945 (Mass. 2015) (finding that conviction of former U.S. Air Force captain for violation of Article 134, where offender knowingly transported and received child pornography and transported for purposes of sale or distribution obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy pictures, constituted a “like conviction” under Massachusetts law requiring registration as a sex offender); A.L. v. Pa. State Police, 274 A.3d 1228, 1240 (Pa. 2022) (recognizing use of the modified categorical approach was appropriate because the military offense is divisible and holding that sexual assault under the UCMJ is not comparable to sexual assault under Pennsylvania law); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Brown, No. 07-20-00169-CV, 2021 WL 4192165, at *4 (Tex. App. Sept. 15, 2021) (holding that a conviction for indecent acts with children under Article 134 of the UCMJ is not “substantially similar” to the Texas offense of indecency with a child and therefore, the defendant did not have a duty to register as a sex offender under Texas law).}

_{[51]    34 U.S.C. § 20931. In 2015, the Military Sex Offender Reporting Act of 2015 was passed as part of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, requiring that DoD provide information to NSOR and NSOPW on any sex offender who is released from a military corrections facility or is adjudged by courts-martial. MSORA, supra note 1.} 

_{[52]    Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,064 (“There is no separate federal registration program for sex offenders required to register under SORNA who are released from federal or military custody. Rather, such sex offenders are integrated into the sex offender registration programs of the states and other (non-federal) jurisdictions following their release.”).}

_{[53]    In 2014, the Inspector General of the DoD issued a report regarding DoD’s compliance with SORNA. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT NO. DODIG-2014-103: EVALUATION OF DOD COMPLIANCE WITH THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT (2014), 
https://media.defense.gov/2014/Aug/29/2001713392/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2014-103.pdf; see also MSORA, supra note 1.} 

_{[54]    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 523, 126 Stat. 1723 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 504 note) (“An individual may not be provided a waiver for commissioning or enlistment in the Armed Forces if the individual has been convicted under Federal or State law of a felony offense of [rape, sexual abuse, sexual assault, incest, or any other sexual offense].”); Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction Criteria, 32 C.F.R. § 66.6(b)(8)(iii) (2021).}

_{[55]    U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 135-178, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE: ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS sec. 11-4 (June 6, 2025), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43322-AR_135-178-000-WEB-1.pdf (hereinafter ARMY REG. 135-178); U.S. DEP'T of ARMY, REG. 635-200, PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS: ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS secs. 14-5, 14-12 (June 28, 2021), 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40058-AR_635-200-001-WEB-3.pdf(hereinafter ARMY REG. 635-200); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS INSTR. 1752.1C, NAVY SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAM 2-26, 4-14 (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel%20Support/01-700%20Morale,%20Community%20and%20Religious%20Services/1752.1C.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, COMMANDER, NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND INSTR. 1752.1A, POLICY FOR SEX OFFENDER TRACKING, ASSIGNMENT, AND INSTALLATION ACCESS RESTRICTIONS 4 (Mar. 18, 2024), available at
https://ffr.cnic.navy.mil/Portals/76/Navy%20Housing/Headquarters/Policy/CNICINST%201752.1A%2018%20Mar%202024.pdf?ver=GingEfFSW9e1PYNIiow2-g%3D%3D (hereinafter INSTR. 1752.1A).}

_{[56]    ARMY REG. 135-178, supra note 55; ARMY REG. 635-200, supra note 55.}

_{[57]    INSTR. 1752.1A at 3-5, supra note 55.}

_{[58]    U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 5525.20: REGISTERED SEX OFFENDER (RSO) MANAGEMENT IN DOD (2023), www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/552520p.pdf.}

_{[59]    U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 190-45, MILITARY POLICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORTING  para. 2-7 (Sept. 27, 2016), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6734_r190_45_Web_FINAL.pdf (outlining the responsibilities of convicted sex offenders who reside or are employed on an Army installation, Provost Marshals, and Directors of Emergency Services).}

_{[60]    32 C.F.R. § 635.6 (2016) (addressing the registration of sex offenders on Army installations); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUSTICE §§ 24-1 to 24-4 (Jan. 8, 2025), https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/trialjudiciary.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/Sites/trialjudiciary.nsf/0304FA3EB1E2D01885258CC400606EFE/Attachments/AR%2027-10%2C%20Military%20Justice%2C%20eff%208%20Jan%202025%2C%20rev%208%20May%202025.pdf (addressing registration of military sexual offenders). Military law enforcement is also directed to establish memoranda of understanding with state and local sex offender registration officials to establish or improve the flow of information regarding sex offenders. 32 C.F.R. § 635.20 (2015).} 

_{[61]    A “federal enclave” includes territory or land that a state has ceded to the United States and includes military bases, national parks, federally administered highways, and federal Indian reservations. Enclave, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). The U.S. Government has exclusive authority and jurisdiction over federal enclaves. Id.; see U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 17; see also 40 U.S.C. § 3112 (addressing federal jurisdiction over federal enclaves).} 

_{[62]    If a military member commits a sexual offense on a military base, under the “federal enclave doctrine,” the military member potentially may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the state in which the enclave is located. Respondek v. State, No. 1685, 2021 WL 4496195, at *13 n.12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 1, 2021) (discussing federal enclave doctrine). A similar issue arises regarding offenders located within national parks or other federally held lands that are considered a “federal enclave.”}

_{[63]    When a juvenile has been convicted of a sex offense in juvenile court, it is typically referred to as an “adjudication of delinquency” or the juvenile is said to have been “adjudicated delinquent.”}

_{[64]    34 U.S.C. § 20911(8).} 

_{[65]    Id.; Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,050. A “sexual act” means any degree of genital or anal penetration, and any oral-genital or oral-anal contact. 18 U.S.C. § 2246. For additional information, see Juvenile Sex Offender Registration Under SORNA and SMART's SORNA Implementation Documents: Juvenile Registration and Notification Requirements Under SORNA.}

_{[66]    In 2016, the Department of Justice published the Supplemental Guidelines for Juvenile Registration Under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which provided additional guidance regarding the substantial implementation of the juvenile registration requirement by eligible jurisdictions, in the Federal Register. Supplemental Guidelines for Juvenile Registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,552, at 50,552 (Aug. 1, 2016), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-08-01/pdf/2016-18106.pdf (hereinafter Supplemental Juvenile Guidelines). The Supplemental Juvenile Guidelines provided the SMART Office with the ability to consider additional factors in determining whether a jurisdiction has substantially implemented SORNA’s juvenile registration provisions, including the following:}

         _{(i)      Policies and practices to prosecute as adults juveniles who commit serious sex offenses; 
         (ii)     Policies and practices to register juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious sex offenses; and 
         (iii)    Other policies and practices to identify, track, monitor or manage juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious sex offenses who are in the community 
                   and to ensure that the records of their identities and sex offenses are available as needed for public safety purposes.}

_Id. 

_{[67]    United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that an individual who was adjudicated delinquent in Ohio for gross sexual imposition, a SORNA-registerable offense, could be required to register as a sex offender as a mandatory condition of probation for a subsequent, unrelated federal conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon); A.W. by and through Doe v. Nebraska, 865 F.3d 1014, 1020 (8th Cir. 2017) (determining whether an individual is required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction depends on whether the registration requirement in that other jurisdiction is based on the individual’s being a “sex offender” as that term is defined by Nebraska law and holding that Nebraska’s sex offender registration laws did not apply to juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent in Minnesota for first-degree criminal sexual conduct because the juvenile did not fall within the definition of “sex offender” because in Nebraska, “sex offender” means someone convicted of a sex crime and does not include juveniles adjudicated delinquent); Doe v. Peterson, No. 18CV422, 2018 WL 5255179, at *6 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2018) (holding that requiring juvenile, who was adjudicated delinquent of second-degree sexual abuse in Iowa and who was required to register as a sex offender in Iowa, to register in Nebraska did not violate offender’s right to travel or deny him of equal protection even though juveniles adjudicated delinquent in Nebraska are not required to register as sex offenders in Nebraska); United States v. McGee, No. 12-cr-00052, 2025 WL 1215212, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (holding that Cal. Penal Code § 290.008(a) applies to juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent and committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) because “CYA essentially became the Division of Juvenile Justice”; that the tolling provision found in Cal. Penal Code § 290 applies even where the registration requirement arises from § 290.008; and offender has a duty to register as a sex offender); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 851 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that, although a youthful offender adjudication is not considered a criminal conviction under Alabama law, it is treated as a conviction under SORNA, “provided that it involved conduct ‘comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse’”); In re T.O., 84 Cal. App. 5th 252, 265 (2022) (holding that the juvenile court lacked authority to impose sex offender registration requirements upon juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing rape of a child under 14 where juvenile’s disposition did not include commitment to California’s Department of Juvenile Justice since statute only mandates sex offender registration for juveniles adjudicated delinquent of a qualifying sex offense where they have been discharged or paroled from the department); Clark v. State, 957 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 2008) (unpublished table decision) (holding that lifetime registration requirement for juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing attempted rape in the second degree and unlawful sexual contact in the second degree was proper and did not conflict with the statutory requirement requiring that the best interests of the child be considered); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Ky. 2016) (holding that juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing third-degree criminal sexual conduct against a 13-year-old in Michigan was required to register in Kentucky and could be convicted of failure to register, even though juveniles adjudicated delinquent in Kentucky are not required to register as sex offenders in Kentucky), superseded by statute, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(6)(b), as recognized in, State v. Clemens, 915 N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 2018); In re MJB, No. 364707, 2024 WL 1131022, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that juvenile adjudicated delinquent of third-degree criminal sexual conduct is not “convicted” for purposes of Michigan’s SORA where the records in the juvenile offender’s case are not open to the general public and, because the definition of “convicted” only refers to orders of disposition that are open to the general public and only individuals “convicted” of a registerable sex offense are required to register as sex offenders, the trial court erred when it ordered juvenile offender to register as a sex offender); In re J.C.L., No. A21-1018, 2022 WL 1210405, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2022) (unpublished decision) (holding that the court did not err in requiring juvenile, who was adjudicated delinquent of dissemination of pornographic work involving a minor, to comply with Minnesota’s predatory-offender-registration statute, which requires a person to register as a sex offender if convicted or adjudicated delinquent of an enumerated offense, because juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of an offense enumerated for predatory registration, and therefore was “statutorily required to register as a predatory offender”); State v. Clemens, 915 N.W.2d 550, 559 (Neb. 2018) (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(6)(b)) (holding that Nebraska sex offender registration statute “require[s] registration in Nebraska where an individual is required to register in another village, town, city, state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of whether the registration in the other jurisdiction is based on a juvenile adjudication” and noting that Kentucky statute at issue in Murphy v. Commonwealth excludes registration based on juvenile adjudications in other states); In re D.A., 2022-Ohio-1359, No. 4-21-15, 2022 WL 1211190, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2022) (holding court did not err in requiring juvenile, who was adjudicated delinquent of gross sexual imposition in Ohio, to register as a sex offender); but see In re Crockett, 159 Cal. App. 4th 751, 759-63 (2008) (holding that juvenile adjudicated delinquent of sex offense in Texas who was required to register as a sex offender in Texas as a condition of probation was not required to register in California after moving there to be with his mother and could not be convicted of failure to register under California law).}

_{For a summary of how juvenile registration schemes across the United States handle serious sex offenses, see Summary of Prosecution, Transfer and Registration of Juveniles Who Commit Serious Sex Offenses.}

_{[68]    In re A.G., No. 2 CA-JV 2024-0045, 2024 WL 4040825, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2024) (unpublished decision) (holding that the juvenile court has “broad discretion to determine if registration is appropriate” and “was permitted to order [offender] to register due to his delinquency adjudication for child molestation” even though his psychosexual evaluation characterized him as having a low risk to reoffend because the court noted that the offender would only remain at a low risk if he engaged in treatment, which he had failed to do, and, that his refusal to admit having committed the offense does nothing to suggest his threat to the community is diminished; instead, “it suggests the opposite”); N.L. v. State, 989 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. 2013) (holding that juvenile adjudicated delinquent of committing sex offense that, had it been committed by an adult, would constitute felony sexual battery, could only be required to register as a sex offender after an evidentiary hearing, where the court must find by “clear and convincing” evidence that the juvenile offender is likely to reoffend); State v. A.R.H., 530 P.3d 897, 911 (Or. 2023) (affirming juvenile court’s order requiring juvenile adjudicated delinquent of sexual assault of an animal to register as a sex offender and holding that there was substantial evidence to support that the juvenile offender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was rehabilitated and did not pose a threat to the safety of the public); In re K.L.F., 552 P.3d 722, 727-28 (Or. Ct. App. 2024) (reversing denial of petition for relief from sex offender registration where the juvenile court applied the incorrect legal standard and required juvenile adjudicated delinquent of first degree sodomy to prove that he presented no risk to the public and holding that offender proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was rehabilitated and did not pose a threat to the public of committing future sex crimes); In re A.L.M., 469 P.3d 244, 253 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the court did not err in requiring juvenile adjudicated delinquent of attempted first-degree sodomy to register as a sex offender where it found that offender did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he was unlikely to reoffend).}

_{[69]    See, e.g., State v. I.C.S., 145 So. 3d 350, 351 (La. 2014) (holding that adult offenders who entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile are required to register as sex offenders in Louisiana, even though they committed the sex offenses prior to the age of 14 and they would not have been required to register had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court); People ex rel. J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720, 721-22 (S.D. 2011) (holding that requiring 14-year-old boy who was adjudicated delinquent for engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with his 12-year-old girlfriend to register as a sex offender for life did not yield an absurd result, even though the offense would have constituted statutory rape had he been convicted as an adult).}

_{[70]    Nelson v. Landry, 714 F. Supp. 3d 790, 808-09 (M.D. La. 2024) (holding that La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:412(I), which requires registered sex offenders’ driver’s licenses be branded with the phrase “SEX OFFENDER,” is applicable to juveniles adjudicated delinquent and constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment).}  

_{[71]    In re Jonathan T., 193 N.E.3d 1240, 1247 (Ill. 2022) (recognizing that minors in delinquency proceedings have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; juveniles who are found delinquent may be subject to serious, life-altering consequences, including the duty to register as sex offenders if adjudicated guilty of a criminal sexual offense; and juveniles do not have the right to file postconviction petitions and are therefore unable to seek collateral review of their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and holding that the Krankel procedure, which a circuit court must follow when a defendant makes a pro se, post-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings and that the circuit court should have conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry); In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 213-14 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the Rhode Island sex offender registration statute that requires certain juveniles adjudicated delinquent to register as sex offenders does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial).}

_{[72]    United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that SORNA’s registration requirements as applied to juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing aggravated sexual abuse did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Doe I v. Peterson, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1082-83 (D. Neb. 2021) (holding that the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires out-of-state juvenile offenders who were adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense in another jurisdiction and who are required to register as sex offenders in that jurisdiction to register in Nebraska, does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment), aff’d, 43 F.4th 838 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Pretty on Top, 857 F. App’x 914, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.) (affirming conviction for failure to register and holding that application of SORNA to a juvenile sex offender does not violate the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 829 (2022); Mack v. Dixon, No. 21cv963, 2023 WL 2386310, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2023) (holding that requiring a juvenile to register as a sex offender does not violate the Eighth Amendment); In re J.C., 13 Cal. App. 5th 1201, 1217 (2017) (holding that the public disclosure aspect of juvenile sex offender registration in California is not punitive and therefore, requiring juvenile offenders to register as sex offenders does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); In re T.B., 489 P.3d 752, 768-69 (Colo. 2021) (holding that mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications constitutes punishment and is cruel and unusual and, as a result, the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act violates the Eighth Amendment in imposing mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications); People ex. rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 799 (Ill. 2009) (holding that imposition of Illinois’ sex offender registration requirements on juveniles does not amount to punishment and therefore does not violate the state constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 757 (Ill. 2003) (holding that requiring juvenile adjudicated delinquent to register as a sex offender for life does not constitute punishment and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment); State v. Hess, 983 N.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Iowa 2022) (holding that In re T.H. only applies to juvenile sex offenders whose cases are prosecuted and resolved in juvenile court, and requiring juvenile sex offenders prosecuted in district court to register does not constitute punishment); In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578, 596-97 (Iowa 2018) (holding that requiring mandatory sex offender registration for juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense committed by force, threat of serious violence, by rendering the victim unconscious, or by involuntarily drugging the victim was punitive, but did not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under either state or federal constitutions); State v. Graham, 897 N.W.2d 476, 477-78 (Iowa 2017) (holding that requiring juvenile sex offender to register for life does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of either the state or federal constitutions); In re A.N., 974 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (holding that requiring juvenile offender, who was adjudicated delinquent of acts that would constitute second-degree burglary and third-degree criminal mischief if he were an adult and where the court found the offense was sexually motivated, to register as a sex offender does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Iowa Constitution); State v. N.R., 495 P.3d 16, 25 (Kan. 2021) (per curiam) (holding, in an as-applied challenge, that requiring a juvenile sex offender to register for life under Kansas law does not violate state and federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1678 (2022); Earnest E. v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E.3d 778, 784-85 (Mass. 2020) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying juvenile sex offender’s motion to be removed from the sex offender registry where it refrained from deciding whether requiring juvenile sex offenders to register as sex offenders violates the Eighth Amendment); People v. Malone, No. 331903, 2023 WL 6164912, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2023) (per curiam) (holding that requiring juvenile offenders to register for life, even when convicted as adults, does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution), appeal filed and held in abeyance, 9 N.W.3d 525 (Mich. 2024) (mem.); In re Daniel, No. 334057, 2022 WL 357096, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that the imposition of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act on juveniles is not cruel or unusual punishment), vacated on other grounds sub nom., In re M.D., 987 N.W.2d 870, 870 (Mich. 2023) (mem.); People v. T.D., 823 N.W.2d 101, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that requiring juvenile adjudicated delinquent of second-degree criminal sexual conduct to register under Michigan law was not cruel or unusual punishment under Michigan’s Constitution), vacated as moot sub nom., In re TD, 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012); People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that requiring juvenile offender, who was convicted of having consensual sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend when he was 18 and he had successfully completed a juvenile diversion program, to register as a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution), called into doubt by statute as stated in, In re Daniel, No. 334057, 2017 WL 4015764 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that the lower court erred in concluding that juvenile convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct was exempted from registering as a sex offender where it “made the sweeping conclusion that [the victim] consented” and Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act, as applied, does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions), vacated in part, 969 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. 2022) (mem.) (vacating judgment and remanding to address whether Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act, as applied, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment); State v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516, 525 (Ohio 2013) (holding that requiring 21-year-old offender, who was convicted of unlawful sexual contact with a minor, where the victim was 15, to register as a tier II sex offender does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Ohio Constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution while also stating that “the enhanced sex-offender reporting and notification requirements . . . are punitive in nature, and violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to certain juveniles”); In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Ohio 2012) (holding that Ohio statute requiring juvenile sex offenders to register for life violates the Eighth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Spencer, 2023-Ohio-3359, No. 112058, 2023 WL 6153636, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2023) (holding that classification of juvenile offender convicted in adult court as a tier III sex offender does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Ohio Constitution); Commonwealth v. Scheer, No. 485 WDA 2024, 2025 WL 946389, at *7-8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2025) (unpublished table decision) (relying on Asbury and holding that requiring juvenile convicted as an adult of aggravated indecent assault to register as a sex offender for life is not illegal under In re J.B. and Commonwealth v. Haines because aggravated indecent assault is not a “delinquent act” and Haines “is premised on a juvenile offender who committed delinquent acts at the time of offending, not criminal acts”); Commonwealth v. Asbury, 299 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super Ct. 2023) (concluding that “the holding in [Commonwealth v.] Haines is premised on a juvenile offender who committed delinquent acts at the time of offending, not criminal acts,” and holding that offender who committed rape by forcible compulsion while using a firearm when he was 16 was exempted from the term “juvenile offender” because he did not commit a “delinquent act” and was required to register as a sexually violent predator for life and such registration did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Zeno, 232 A.3d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (holding that requiring an offender, who has been convicted in criminal court for acts committed while a juvenile, to register under Pennsylvania’s SORNA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions); In re Justin B., 747 S.E.2d 774, 776 (S.C. 2013) (holding that lifetime GPS monitoring of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense does not violate the Eighth Amendment); State v. Domingo-Cornelio, 527 P.3d 1188, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App.) (holding that mandatory sex offender registration for juveniles is not punishment and therefore, the Eighth Amendment does not apply), cert. denied, 534 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2023); In re C.G., 976 N.W.2d 318, 333-34 (Wis. 2022) (holding that transgender juvenile offender’s placement on the sex offender registry is not “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment and, “[e]ven if it were, sex offender registration is neither cruel nor unusual”).}

_{[73]    Doe I v. Peterson, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1081-82 (holding that the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires out-of-state juvenile offenders who were adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense in another jurisdiction and who are required to register as sex offenders in that jurisdiction to register in Nebraska, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Pretty on Top, 857 F. App’x at 914-15 (holding that application of SORNA to a juvenile sex offender does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Juvenile Male I”) (holding that retroactive application of SORNA’s juvenile registration provisions are unconstitutional and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution), amended and superseded by, 590 F.3d 924 (2010); In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d at 596-97 (holding that Iowa’s sex offender registration statute for juvenile offenders is punitive); N.R., 495 P.3d at 26-27 (holding that Kansas’ lifetime registration requirements, as applied to juvenile sex offender, do not constitute punishment and therefore do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution); In re Nick H., 123 A.3d 229, 241 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (holding that retroactive application of Maryland’s sex offender registration requirement to juvenile offender who had been adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses is not punishment and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Maryland Constitution); State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Logan D.), 306 P.3d 369, 388 (Nev. 2013) (concluding that registration and community notification under Arizona law are not punishment and holding that retroactive application of A.B. 579 to juvenile sex offenders, which required registration and community notification, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions); In re H.R., 227 A.3d 316, 335 (Pa. 2020) (holding that retroactive application of statute governing involuntary treatment of sex offender, who was adjudicated delinquent for committing sex offenses as a juvenile, as a sexually violent delinquent child, does not violate state or federal Ex Post Facto Clauses); but see Juvenile Male II, 564 U.S. 932, 932 (2011) (vacating Ninth Circuit’s judgment that retroactive application of SORNA’s juvenile registration provisions are unconstitutional and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution and holding “that the Court of Appeals had no authority to enter th[e] judgment because it had no live controversy before it”).}

_{[74]    B.K. v. Grewal, No. 19-05587, 2020 WL 5627231, at *4-7 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2020) (unpublished decision) (holding that the registration scheme under New Jersey’s Megan’s Law does not violate procedural due process by failing to allow juvenile sex offenders to prove their likelihood of recidivism since Megan’s Law relies on the offense of conviction and not on the dangerousness of an offender); N.R., 495 P.3d at 26-27 (holding that Kansas Offender Registration Act requiring juvenile sex offender to register for life does not violate procedural due process under the Kansas Constitution); Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Logan D.), 306 P.3d at 379 (noting that “[e]ven assuming A.B. 579 infringes on a liberty interest, [juvenile sex offender] is not entitled to procedural due process to prove a fact that is irrelevant under the statute”); In re D.R., 225 N.E.3d 894, 895 (Ohio 2022) (holding that Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2152.84(A)(2)(b), which requires the juvenile court continue classifying an offender, who was 16 or 17 at the time of offense, as a tier I sex offender at the completion-of-disposition hearing irrespective of whether treatment was effective or whether any risk of reoffense is present, violates due process as applied to juvenile); State v. Buttery, 164 N.E.3d 294, 304 (Ohio 2020) (holding that a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender that arose from a juvenile adjudication does not violate the offender’s constitutional rights to a jury or to due process under the Ohio or U.S. Constitutions); In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 750 (holding that Ohio statute requiring offenders adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses to register for life violates procedural due process); In re B.W., 263 N.E.3d 541, 544-46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025) (holding that Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2152.83(A), which requires the juvenile court to classify an offender, who was 16 or 17 at the time of offense, in one of three registration tiers at the initial classification hearing, does not violate juvenile offender’s rights to procedural due process); In re C.Q., 2020-Ohio-5531, No. 2020 CA 00012, 2020 WL 7078332, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020) (unpublished decision) (holding that the juvenile court’s classification of a juvenile as a tier I offender, who was adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense, at the time of disposition, did not violate the juvenile’s due process rights, where the registration law clearly grants the juvenile court this authority); In re T.R., 2020-Ohio-4445, Nos. C-190165, C-190166, C-190167, C-190168, C-190169, C-190170, C-190171, C-190172, 2020 WL 5544415, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2020) (holding that, because registration of juvenile sex offenders is punitive, juvenile adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense was entitled to be present at the time the court classified the juvenile as a sex offender); In re H.R., 227 A.3d at 335 (holding that statute governing involuntary treatment of sex offender, who was adjudicated delinquent for committing sex offenses as a juvenile, as a sexually violent delinquent child is nonpunitive, its retroactive application does not violate state or federal Ex Post Facto Clauses, and it does not violate due process under Apprendi or Alleyne); Commonwealth v. Haines, 222 A.3d 756, 759 (Pa. 2019) (holding that requiring lifetime registration for juvenile offender, who was 14 at the time she committed indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age and was convicted as an adult, violates due process by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption that all juvenile offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014) (holding that Pennsylvania’s SORNA provision requiring lifetime registration for juvenile sex offenders violates due process right to reputation by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption that all juvenile offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses); Zeno, 232 A.3d at 872 (following Haines and relying on In re J.B. and holding that requiring an offender, who has been convicted in criminal court for acts committed while a juvenile, to register under Pennsylvania’s SORNA violates due process under the state and federal constitutions); State v. Smith, 19 Wash. App. 2d 1048 (2021) (unpublished decision) (holding that imposition of sex offender registration requirement on juvenile sex offender did not violate sex offender’s right to due process); Vaughn v. State, 391 P.3d 1086, 1098 (Wyo. 2017) (finding that In re J.B. is inapplicable because the right to reputation has never been recognized in Wyoming as a fundamental right and holding that, as applied, the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires juveniles adjudicated delinquent to register as sex offenders for life, does not violate procedural due process under the state or federal constitutions because “procedural due process does not entitle him—a juvenile found delinquent of committing a serious sex offense—to a second hearing to demonstrate that he is not a high risk to reoffend”).}

_{[75]    B.K., 2020 WL 5627231, at *4-7 (holding that the registration scheme under New Jersey’s Megan’s Law does not infringe on juvenile offenders’ substantive due process rights where it does not impose an obstacle to their movement within or outside New Jersey, any impact on their right to travel is incidental, and the registration scheme is rationally related to a legitimate interest of public safety); Doe I v. Peterson, 43 F.4th 838, 840 (8th Cir. 2022) (holding that the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires out-of-state juvenile offenders who were adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense in another jurisdiction and who are required to register as sex offenders in that jurisdiction to register in Nebraska, does not violate offenders’ constitutional rights to substantive due process or travel); In re J.A., No. A-0672-21, 2023 WL 4004703, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 15, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (distinguishing In re C.K. and holding that requiring juveniles adjudicated delinquent to register as sex offenders does not violate due process under the New Jersey Constitution), rev’d on other grounds, 316 A.3d 605 (N.J. 2024); Vaughn, 391 P.3d at 1086 (holding that the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires juveniles adjudicated delinquent to register as sex offenders for life, does not violate substantive due process under the state or federal constitutions); but see In re C.K., 182 A.3d 917, 936 (N.J. 2018) (holding that requiring juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses to register as sex offenders for life violates substantive due process rights under the New Jersey Constitution).}

_{[76]    B.K., 2020 WL 5627231, at *8 (holding that registration scheme under New Jersey’s Megan’s Law does not violate equal protection rights since it does not implicate a fundamental constitutional right and it is rational to require registration for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense as opposed to juveniles who have not committed sex offenses); Doe I v. Peterson, 43 F.4th at 840 (holding that the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires out-of-state juvenile offenders who were adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense in another jurisdiction and who are required to register as sex offenders in that jurisdiction to register in Nebraska, does not violate offenders’ constitutional rights to equal protection); United States v. Lafferty, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1144 (D.S.D. 2009) (holding that SORNA’s requirement that juveniles adjudicated delinquent register as sex offenders does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); In re J.A., 2023 WL 4004703, at *4 (holding that requiring juveniles adjudicated delinquent to register as sex offenders does not violate equal protection under the New Jersey Constitution); In re Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D. 2008) (holding that subjecting juveniles adjudicated delinquent to harsher registration requirements than adult sex offenders is unconstitutional and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).}

_{[77]    State v. Clemens, 915 N.W.2d 550, 559 (Neb. 2018) (holding that Nebraska law requires registration in Nebraska where an individual is required to register in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether the registration in the other jurisdiction is based on a juvenile adjudication and holding there was sufficient factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea to attempted failure to register as a sex offender in Nebraska because his Colorado registration, based on a juvenile adjudication, required registration upon moving to Nebraska).}  

_{[78]    In re Diego B., No. 1 CA-JV 20-0391, 2021 WL 1695947, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021) (vacating the juvenile court’s order requiring offender to register as a sex offender where order became final the day after offender turned 18 because juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile ends when the juvenile turns 18); In re Bryan D., No. 1 CA-JV 20-0212, 2021 WL 282272, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2021) (vacating juvenile court’s order requiring offender to register as a sex offender and holding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order because it was filed after offender’s 18th birthday); In re R.B.,165 N.E.3d 288, 298 (Ohio 2020) (holding that the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction to review sex offender classifications, hold hearings, and issue orders authorized under Ohio’s classification statutes, “and this jurisdiction necessarily extends beyond the juvenile’s having reached the age of 21”); In re R.B.,174 N.E.3d 480, 580 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021) (holding, on remand, that the juvenile court, which classified juvenile as a tier I sex offender at the time that it placed him on probation, maintained jurisdiction to review juvenile’s sex offender classification, even after juvenile turned 21, because the plain language of the statute gave the juvenile court jurisdiction to conduct a “completion-of-disposition hearing,” at which the court could modify or terminate juvenile’s sex-offender classification); In re E.S., 179 N.E.3d 724, 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to classify offender as a “tier III sex offender (juvenile offender registrant)” because it did not make that determination prior to his release from a secure facility in violation of Ohio law); Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 374 (Pa. 2023) (holding that Pennsylvania adult criminal courts have jurisdiction over the prosecution of an individual who is over the age of 21 for crimes committed as a juvenile); In re B.R., No. 02-22-00363-CV, 2023 WL 3749886, at *4 (Tex. App. June 1, 2023) (holding that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to require a juvenile adjudicated delinquent at the age of 16 to register as a sex offender even though the court did not order sex offender registration until after offender turned 18 because the statute “states that a juvenile court has jurisdiction to render a sex-offender registration order after a juvenile turns eighteen”); BC-K v. State, 512 P.3d 634, 638-39 (Wyo. 2022) (holding that the juvenile court did not lose subject matter jurisdiction when it failed to hold an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days of the state filing its petition because Wyoming law does not “include a statement of the appropriate remedy for failing to follow the statutory deadline” and it does not “contain an unequivocal expression that the juvenile court loses jurisdiction if the ninety-day deadline is not met”).}

_{[79]    See In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 212 (R.I. 2008) (holding that Rhode Island’s Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act does not violate the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings because “the confidentiality value is not an absolute nor does it exist in a vacuum” and “there are times (and this is one such time) when that value must give way to other legitimate societal priorities”).}

_{[80]    18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5043.} 

_{[81]    United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that SORNA’s reporting and registration requirements for certain juvenile sex offenders do not contravene the confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and the district court properly determined SORNA’s registration requirements applied to juvenile adjudicated delinquent for committing aggravated sexual abuse); Juvenile Male III, 670 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that SORNA’s reporting and registration requirements for certain juvenile sex offenders do not contravene the confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and noting that “Congress, in enacting SORNA, intentionally carved out a class of juveniles from the FJDA’s confidentiality provisions”).}

_{[82]    34 U.S.C. § 20911(2)-(3).} 

_{[83]    Id.; see infra I.E.2.}

_{[84]    In making tiering determinations, courts use the same three approaches that are used to determine whether an offense is a “sex offense.” See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 801 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that Rhode Island offense of first-degree child molestation, which criminalizes sexual penetration with a person 14 years or under, was not comparable to or more severe than any SORNA tier III sex offense, and that it was “significantly broader than a tier III offense, since the state law penalizes sexual conduct alone—without anything more—against victims over the congressionally-designated age of 12”); United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that courts are required to apply the categorical approach to sex offender tier classifications designated by reference to specific federal criminal statute, but must employ the circumstance-specific comparison for limited purpose of determining victim’s age); id. at 196-98 (applying “the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in SORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference to a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an instruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a victim’s age”); United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268, 279 (5th Cir. 2022) (applying the categorical approach and holding that Colorado offense of attempted sexual assault of a child, which prohibits sexual contact with a child younger than 15, so long as the offender is at least four years older than the victim, “sweeps more broadly” than 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and is not a tier II sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Montgomery, 966 F.3d 335, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that “[o]ur court and others determine an offender’s SORNA tier by comparing the offense for which they were convicted with SORNA’s tier definitions using the categorical approach” and holding that offender’s New Jersey conviction for sexual assault in the second degree was not comparable to federal SORNA definitions of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse associated with tier III status); id. at 338 (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261) (“If the offense ‘sweeps more broadly’ than the SORNA tier definition, then the offense cannot qualify as a predicate offense for that SORNA tier regardless of the manner in which the defendant actually committed the crime.”); United States v. Escalante, 933 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Utah offense swept more broadly than comparable federal offense and could not serve as proper predicate for SORNA tier II sex offender designation and that SORNA required circumstance-specific inquiry into victim’s age when classifying sex offender tier levels to determine whether victim was minor or whether victim was younger than 13); id. at 398 (“We employ the categorical approach when classifying the SORNA tier of a defendant’s state law sex offense.”); United States v. McGough, 844 F. App’x 859, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that, under the categorical approach, the Ohio offense of corruption of a minor “is broader than the most closely associated federal offense, abusive sexual contact” because “it criminalizes conduct that may not be unlawful under federal law” and therefore, sex offender should have been classified as a tier I offender); United States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 231-32 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that Tennessee offense of attempted aggravated sexual battery against victim younger than 13 was not a tier III sex offense under SORNA because it was broader than the comparable federal offense where it does not require the offender to act with specific intent, whereas the federal offense does); United States v. Backus, 550 F. App’x 260, 262-64 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the offense of sexual battery in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(3) is comparable to 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) and offender was required to register as a tier II sex offender under SORNA); United States v. Buddi, No. 24-CR-00018, 2024 WL 4304791, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2024) (applying the categorical approach, noting that Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) is “unquestionably comparable to coercion and enticement under § 2422(b)” and “does not cover any more conduct than 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b),” and holding that offender convicted of violating Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) in 2017 is properly classified as a tier II sex offender under SORNA), appeal filed, No. 24-5953 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2024); United States v. Black, 963 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795-96 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (holding that the offense of indecent behavior with a juvenile in violation of La. Rev. Stat. § 14:81 is comparable to both 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3) and 
§ 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and offender was required to register as a tier II sex offender under SORNA); United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that the Sixth Circuit applies a hybrid categorical and circumstance-specific approach in determining an offender’s tier under SORNA and holding that Colorado offense of sexual contact with a child under 15 by anyone who is at least four years older than the child did not qualify as a tier II or tier III sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Burchell, No. 21-cr-40025, 2021 WL 3726899, at *6 (D.S.D. Aug. 23, 2021) (applying the categorical approach and holding that the Texas statute for sexual assault in the second degree is not narrower than 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2242 and the statutes are not comparable, therefore offender’s Texas conviction resulted in him being a tier I offender and, as a result, he is not a tier III offender required to register under SORNA and he did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2250); United States v. Laney, No. CR20-3053, 2021 WL 1821188, at *7 (N.D. Iowa May 6, 2021) (holding that the Minnesota offense of first degree criminal sexual conduct is not comparable to or more severe than abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. § 2244 and “is categorically broader than the federal statute” because it extends to individuals under 16 (for sexual penetration) and under 13 (for sexual contact) and the federal statute requires, as an element, that the person be under 12 years old, and, therefore, offender was properly classified as a tier I sex offender under SORNA, his duty to register for 15 years began on June 6, 2005, and his registration requirement expired before the time period alleged in the indictment); United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying the categorical approach and holding that Oregon sexual abuse statute penalizing penetration with a lack of consent was broader than 18 U.S.C. § 2242 and was not a tier III sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “as to whether an individual is a ‘tier II’ offender [under SORNA], the language of the statute points strongly toward a non-categorical approach with regard to the age of the victim”); United States v. Daniel, No. 20-CR-00112, 2021 WL 3037404, at *8 (D. Idaho July 19, 2021) (applying the categorical approach and holding that offender’s California conviction for assault with intent to commit rape does not qualify as a tier III sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Salazar, Nos. 10-cr-60121, 20-cv-01438, 2021 WL 2366086, at *5-6 (D. Or. June 9, 2021) (applying the categorical approach and holding that offender, who was convicted of handling and fondling a child under 16 in Florida, is a tier I sex offender under SORNA); United States v. Ballantyne, No. CR 19-42, 2019 WL 3891252, at *2, *5 (D. Mont. Aug. 19, 2019) (applying the categorical approach and holding that offender’s conviction for second-degree sexual assault in Colorado was not comparable to or more severe than abusive sexual contact against a minor under the age of 13 or abusive sexual contact where Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than the federal statute and, as a result, “cannot serve as a predicate crime for either a tier two or a tier three designation” under SORNA); United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1133, 1135-37 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that “Congress intended courts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier classifications designated by reference to a specific federal criminal statute, but to employ a circumstance-specific comparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s age” and holding that because the North Carolina offense of taking indecent liberties with a child did not require physical contact, offender was not a tier II or tier III sex offender under SORNA); United States v. Forster, 549 F. App’x 757, 769 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying the categorical approach to determine whether Ohio offense of gross sexual imposition against a minor younger than 13 years of age was comparable to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244 and holding that offender’s offense was properly tiered as a tier III sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Flippins, No. 23-cr-10084, 2024 WL 3360514, at *3-4 (D. Kan. July 9, 2024) (holding that offender convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree of a four-year-old girl in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.110(1)(b)(2) is not a tier III sex offender under SORNA because the Kentucky statute allows an offender to be convicted for conduct, the touching of the legs and thigh, that does not fall under 18 U.S.C. § 2244, and “categorically speaking, [Ky. Rev. Stat.] § 510.110(1)(b) is not equivalent to 18 U.S.C. § 2244” and since “the definition for Tier II offenders also utilizes the federal definition of ‘abusive sexual contact,’ [the Kentucky statute] is also not equivalent to a Tier II classification” and offender “must be classified as a Tier I offender”); J.B. v. Vescovo, 632 S.W.3d 861, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that trial court did not err in classifying offender as a tier III sex offender under Missouri’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA) where he pleaded guilty to a non-registerable misdemeanor offense in 1997 because, by pleading guilty, offender was adjudicated as required under SORA, and SORA specifically enumerates the offense of endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree where the offense is sexual in nature as a tier III sex offense); Nev. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Criner, 524 P.3d 935 (Nev. 2023) (unpublished table decision) (holding that Nevada offense of sexually motivated coercion is not a tier II sex offense because it is not one of the offenses listed under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179D.0357 and is not a crime against a child, and it is not comparable to or more severe than the federal crime of coercion and enticement because the Nevada offense sweeps more broadly than the federal crime); State v. Lingerfelt, 910 S.E.2d 385, 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) (recognizing that, under the categorical approach, the North Carolina offense of sexual activity by a substitute parent “is not fully coterminous with the pertinent federal [] offense” of abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3) because the federal offense requires that the defendant act “knowingly” and the North Carolina statute does not contain a mens rea requirement, but holding that “despite the mens rea mismatch between the statutes at issue, there is no realistic probability that North Carolina could or would enforce its statute in a way that would sweep in unintentional sexual activity by a substitute parent” and the North Carolina offense is a categorical match to the federal offense), cert. granted, No. 38A25 (N.C. Jan. 21, 2025).}

_{[85]    For additional discussion concerning prosecutions for failure to register, see infra I.J.}

_{[86]    34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(C), (4)(C).}

_{[87]    Ward v. Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 97-98 (Alaska 2012) (holding that individual convicted of two or more sex offenses, irrespective of whether the conviction occurred in a single proceeding, is subject to increased reporting requirements under Alaska law and sex offender must register for life); Cunningham v. State, 536 P.3d 739, 755 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023) (holding that offender convicted of first-degree indecent exposure in Alaska was not required to register as a sex offender for life because his prior convictions in Oregon for public indecency do not constitute sex offenses); United States v. Hawkins, 261 A.3d 914, 919 (D.C. 2021) (holding that the recidivism provisions under D.C. Code § 22-4002(b)(3) and (4), which require sex offenders who have been subject to two or more dispositions involving a felony registration offense or a registration offense against a minor to register for life, “apply to individuals upon their second qualifying disposition; or, in other words, that the language ‘two or more’ is inclusive of the instant disposition”); Nichols v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that offender was convicted of two unrelated offenses and therefore was required to register as a sex offender for life under 
Ind. Code  § 11-8-8-19(e)); Commonwealth v. Daughtery, 617 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Ky. 2021) (noting that the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act requires lifetime registration where offenders have two or more convictions for crimes against a minor and the defendant is required to register as a sex offender for life because he was convicted of three crimes involving a minor or depictions of a minor and the fact that these were his first offenses was irrelevant); but see Vandenberg v. Ind. Dep’t of Correc., 153 N.E.3d 1122, 1125-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that sex offender’s offenses were not unrelated under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(e) where his offenses involved the same victim and the same video unlike in Nichols and therefore was required to register as a sex offender for 10 years); Commonwealth v. Wimer, 99 N.E.3d 778, 782 (Mass. 2018) (holding that offender convicted of two counts of open and gross lewdness in a single proceeding was insufficient to require offender to register as a sex offender where statute required registration for a “second and subsequent adjudication or conviction”); State v. Walston, 904 S.E.2d 431, 432-33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that offender convicted of indecent liberties with a minor, who had prior convictions for first-degree statutory sexual offense that were consolidated into a single judgment, was convicted and sentenced at different times for two separate sets of qualifying offenses, qualified as a recidivist under North Carolina, and was required to register as a sex offender for life); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 266 A.3d 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that offender’s 2001 Colorado convictions for multiple sex offenses were part of the same criminal prosecution and therefore do not count as “two or more convictions” for purposes of triggering lifetime registration under Pennsylvania law); State v. Rector, 990 N.W.2d 213, 225 (Wis. 2023) (holding that the court did not err in requiring offender to register as a sex offender for 15 years because “convictions based on charges filed in a single case and occurring during the same hearing have not occurred on ‘2 or more separate occasions’” and offender’s “five convictions for possession of child pornography were filed in a single case and occurred during the same hearing” and therefore, “did not occur on separate occasions”).}

_{[88]    34 U.S.C. § 20911.}

_{[89]    See infra II.C.}

_{[90]    34 U.S.C. §§ 20914, 20916; 28 C.F.R. § 72.6; see also infra I.C.5.}

_{[91]    34 U.S.C. § 20913(a), (c); see also Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,065-38,067. Under SORNA, sex offenders are required to keep their registration information current in each jurisdiction where they live, work, or attend school. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a); Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,065. SORNA requires registered sex offenders appear in person within three days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status in their jurisdiction of residence. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(c); Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,065. When an offender works in a jurisdiction, but does not live or attend school there, SORNA requires the offender immediately appear in person to update employment-related information. Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,065. When an offender attends school in a jurisdiction, but does not live or work there, SORNA requires the offender immediately appear in person to update school-related information. Id. SORNA also requires offenders immediately update the registering agency in their jurisdiction of residence about any changes to their email addresses, internet identifiers, telephone communications, vehicle information, and temporary lodging. Id. at 38,066. But see Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104, 108-110 (2016) (reversing conviction of sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 where offender failed to notify Kansas he was moving to the Philippines and holding that SORNA did not require sex offender to update registration in state where he no longer resides); Carr v. United States, 660 F. App’x 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that SORNA did not require sex offender to update his registration in Tennessee once he moved to Mexico); United States v. Haslage, 853 F.3d 331, 332 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that sex offender had no duty under SORNA to update registration information in Wisconsin where offender had been living, after leaving Wisconsin and moving to Washington).}

_{[92]    Doe 1-36 v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 924 (D. Neb. 2010) (addressing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4004, which requires sex offenders to register in person with law enforcement if they establish a new address, temporary domicile, or habitual living location within three working days prior to the change, and finding that the definition of “habitual living location” was not unconstitutionally vague, because “may stay” did not refer to “virtually anywhere on the planet” that a person might happen to stay, but only to “intended relocations”); Hall v. State, 646 S.W.3d 204, 210-11 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022) (affirming the circuit court’s finding that sex offender violated Arkansas law by failing to report a social-media application and holding that all sex offenders, not just lifetime offenders or sexually dangerous offenders, have a duty to register and update their social-media information); State v. Wiles, 873 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished table decision) (holding offenders who are part of a state department of corrections residential work release program may have a duty to maintain their registration information while there); Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.3d 304, 307-08 (Ky. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that there is a clear duty on sex offender to cooperate in verifying his or her residence information and to interpret Kentucky’s failure-to-register statute as only providing law enforcement with a duty to verify residence information and allowing sex offenders to avoid responding to law enforcement’s attempts to verify the information would “render[] the entire registration system ineffectual”); but see United States v. Lewallyn, 737 F. App’x 471, 473 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that, under Georgia law, offender was not required to update registration information in Georgia after he moved to North Carolina); State v. Drupals, 49 A.3d 962, 971 (Conn. 2012) (reversing offender’s conviction for failure to register under Connecticut law and holding that sex offender had no duty to update his registration information when he temporarily stayed overnight with his mother because “residence means the act or fact of living in a given place for some time, and the term does not apply to temporary stays”); Commonwealth v. Harding, 158 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Mass. 2020) (holding that offender, who was a self-employed home improvement contractor, was not required to report his temporary work site as his work address for purposes of sex offender registration under Massachusetts law); State v. Clausen, 15 N.W.3d 858, 870 (Neb. 2025) (holding that a person subject to SORA cannot establish a temporary domicile pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01, which defines “temporary domicile” as “any place at which the person actually lives or stays for a period of at least three working days,” by staying at a location for any 3-day period, and interpreting “working days” “to refer to Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays with the exception of legal holidays”).} 

_{[93]    Rose v. State, 232 N.E.3d 1179, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App.) (affirming conviction for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of Indiana law and holding that Indiana’s requirement that sex offenders register their username for any social networking website does not require that the website have a built-in messaging or chat function so long as it provides some way for a member to contact another person), cert. denied, 238 N.E.3d 1290 (Ind. 2024); State v. White, 58 A.3d 643, 645 (N.H. 2012) (holding that sex offender’s failure to report the creation of a MySpace account, where a MySpace account constitutes an “online identifier,” supported a conviction for failure to update a registration under New Hampshire law); but see United States v. Pertuset, 160 F. Supp. 3d 926, 940-41 (S.D.W. Va. 2016) (holding that offender who moved from West Virginia to Belize was not required to update his information in West Virginia and could not be convicted of failure to register); United States v. Lunsford, 725 F.3d 859, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2013) (reversing conviction of failure to register where offender failed to update his registration information in Missouri when he moved to the Philippines and holding that an offender has no obligation to update his registration in the state from which he has moved); State v. Lee, 286 P.3d 537, 541 (Idaho 2012) (holding that Idaho law does not require a sex offender, who moves to another country, to update his registration information and therefore, a failure to do so could not be prosecuted under state law); People v. Ellis, 162 A.D.3d 161, 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (holding that a Facebook account did not constitute an “internet identifier” and that sex offender’s failure to disclose the same did not support a conviction for failure to update a registration under New York law). For additional discussion concerning failure to register, see infra I.J.} 

_{[94]    34 U.S.C. §§ 20920, 20923; Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,047. To help facilitate this directive, the Department of Justice developed the SORNA Exchange Portal, a secure internet-based portal that provides sex offender registration personnel with the ability to share information related to the management and tracking of registered sex offenders. For additional information, see SMART’s SORNA Exchange Portal fact sheet.}

_{[95]    Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,058-38,061.} 

_{[96]    Registering agencies and other law enforcement entities submit the information necessary to populate these databases. For example, a local police department might submit an offender’s fingerprints to the FBI at the time of arrest.}

_{[97]    For more information regarding public sex offender registries, see infra I.F.} 

_{[98]    NSOR is a national database of registered sex offenders, available only to law enforcement and authorized criminal justice agencies. It is a single file of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) division. NSOR was established by the Pam Lychner Act in 1996. Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093.}

_{[99]    NGI is the FBI’s electronic repository of biometric and criminal history information, including fingerprints and palm prints, that is searchable by law enforcement nationwide. SORNA requires that all jurisdictions submit fingerprints and palm prints to NGI for all registered sex offenders.}

_{[100]  CODIS is the national DNA database administered by the FBI. SORNA requires that DNA samples be taken from sex offenders during the registration process and entered into CODIS. 34 U.S.C. § 20914(b)(6). Sometimes, as part of their arrest, sentencing, incarceration, or at some other point during the processing of their case, offenders may have already had their fingerprints, palm prints, or DNA taken and submitted. In those circumstances, if a fingerprint, palm print, or DNA record already exists, jurisdictions are not required to submit duplicate entries. Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,057.}

_{[101]  34 U.S.C. § 20914(a); see also IML, supra note 1; Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 42, at 1,637; SORNA Rule, supra note 39. For additional information, see SMART’s SORNA Implementation Documents: Information Required for Notice of International Travel.}

_{[102]  Some jurisdictions have codified this requirement, whereas others have implemented this requirement by policy. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-15(c) (requiring sex offenders report in person to the sheriff in each county of residence and complete travel notification document at least 21 days prior to travel); AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. § 46.2908(r) (requiring sex offenders provide notice 21 days in advance of any travel outside of American Samoa); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(n)(ii) (requiring sex offenders provide notice of international travel at least 21 days prior to the date of departure); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-37 (requiring sex offenders provide notice of intent to travel internationally at least 21 days in advance); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-204 (requiring sex offenders provide notice to law enforcement at least 21 days in advance of international travel).}

_{[103]  See, e.g., Doe v. State, 199 Wash. App. 1007 (2017) (unpublished decision) (holding that Washington’s requirement that sex offenders provide 21-day advance notice of international travel does not violate the right to privacy, substantive and procedural due process, or ex post facto laws); see also infra III.A and corresponding footnotes outlining various constitutional challenges that sex offenders have raised.}

_{[104]  34 U.S.C. § 20913(a).} 

_{[105]  Id.; see also Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,061. Under SORNA, an offender is a “student” if he or she is enrolled in or attends an educational institution. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(11); Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,062. However, “[s]chool enrollment or attendance in this context should be understood as referring to attendance at a school in a physical sense” and “[i]t does not mean that a jurisdiction has to require a sex offender in some distant jurisdiction to register in the jurisdiction based on his taking a correspondence course through the mail with the school in the jurisdiction, or based on his taking courses at the school remotely through the Internet, unless the participation in the educational program also involves some physical attendance at the school in the jurisdiction.” Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,062.}

_{[106]  State v. Wilson, 947 N.W.2d 704, 707-08 (Neb. 2020) (noting that Nebraska law “requires individuals that plead guilty to or are convicted of certain enumerated offenses to register . . . where they reside, work, and attend school”); In re Doe v. O’Donnell, 86 A.D.3d 238, 241-42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that sex offender’s establishment of a residence in another state does not relieve him of his registration requirements in New York even though he no longer has meaningful ties to the jurisdiction).} 

_{[107]  34 U.S.C. § 20913(b); see also Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,062; SORNA Rule, supra note 39, at 69,870 (“[T]he registration period under SORNA begins to run upon release from imprisonment following a sex offense conviction, or at the time of sentencing for a sex offense where imprisonment does not ensue.”); 28 C.F.R. §§ 72.5(b), 72.7(a). Individuals required to register on the basis of foreign sex offense convictions are required to register “within three business days of entering a domestic jurisdiction to reside, work, or attend school.” Final Guidelines, supra note} >_{3, at 38,0565; SORNA Rule, supra note 39, at 69,876.}

_{[108]  34 U.S.C. § 20915; see also Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,068; 28 C.F.R. § 72.5(a).}

_{[109]  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-22-108 (requiring lifetime registration); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121(e)(1) (following SORNA’s tiering structure); FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(11) (requiring lifetime registration for all sex offenders); MO. REV. STAT. § 589.400(4) (following SORNA’s tiering structure).}

_{[110]  34 U.S.C. § 20915(a); see also Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,068 (“[J]urisdictions are not required to ‘toll’ the running of the registration period during . . . subsequent periods of confinement.”). However, sex offenders who are part of a state department of corrections residential work release program may have a duty to maintain their registration information while participating in the program. State v. Wiles, 873 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a work released sex offender housed at a residential correctional facility is required to register as a sex offender).}

_{[111]  Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,068.} 

_{[112]  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(a)(2), (b)(2), (f)(1); see also State v. Schilling, 224 N.E.3d 1126, 1138-39 (Ohio 2023) (noting that Ohio law does not contain a provision “that tolls the period during which a person convicted of a sexually oriented offense in Ohio must register and report when the person resides in another state and registers and reports in the other state” and holding that offender’s duty to register as a sex offender in Ohio was not tolled when offender was convicted in Ohio but resided and registered as a sex offender in Kentucky for ten years).}

_{[113]  34 U.S.C. § 20920.}

_{[114]  The Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website (NSOPW) is available at nsopw.gov.}

_{[115]  In 2005, the National Sex Offender Public Registry was established by the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Off. of Just. Programs, Department of Justice Activates National Sex Offender Public Registry Website (July 20, 2005), www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/archives/pressreleases/2005/BJA05028.htm. In 2006, the site was renamed the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website by the Adam Walsh Act. See Adam Walsh Act, supra note 1.} 

_{[116]  SORNA requires that each public sex offender registry website include the offender’s name, including any aliases; the address of each residence at which the offender resides or will reside; the address of any place where the offender is, or will be, an employee; the address of any place where the offender is, or will be, a student; the license plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or operated by the offender; a physical description and current photograph of the offender; and the sex offense for which the offender is registered and any other sex offense for which the offender has been convicted. 34 U.S.C. § 20914; Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,059.} 

_{[117]  34 U.S.C. § 20920(c); Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,059.}

_{[118]  In 2011, the Department of Justice issued Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, which created additional discretionary exemptions concerning public registry website disclosures and provided jurisdictions with authority to determine whether they will post information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses on their public registry website. Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 42.}

_{[119]  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15‐20A‐8 (requiring posting of information related to juvenile sex offenders who are adjudicated delinquent); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3827 (requiring establishment and maintenance of a public registry website that must include offenders whose risk assessment has been determined to be a level 2 or level 3 and offenders convicted of certain sex offenses); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-913(j)(1) (requiring information about certain level 2 sex offenders and level 3 and level 4 sex offenders be included on the public registry website); NEV. REV. STAT. § 179B.250 (requiring establishment of a community notification website to provide the public with access to sex offender information and prohibiting the posting of information about tier I offenders unless they have been convicted of a sexual offense against a child or a crime against a child); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-13(b) (requiring posting of information about sex offenders with a high risk of reoffense and sex offenders whose risk of reoffense is low or moderate where their conduct was found to be characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-490(E) (requiring posting of information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent for committing a tier III offense); see also Doe v. Keel, No. 20-2755, 2023 WL 6450622, at *7-8, *14 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2023) (holding that the publishing of non-resident sex offender’s information on South Carolina’s public sex offender registry website does not violate substantive due process or equal protection and, because “[South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registry] Act is most certainly a civil, not criminal, penalty,” it does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause); Doe v. Keel, 892 S.E.2d 282, 283-84 (S.C. 2023) (holding that South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registry Act permits the publication of non-resident sex offenders on South Carolina’s public sex offender registry website).}

_{[120]  34 U.S.C. § 20929(a)(1). However, tribes subject to the law enforcement jurisdiction of a state under 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (generally known as “PL-280 tribes”) are not eligible to opt-in as SORNA registration jurisdictions and typically have their registration functions handled by the state where their land is located. Id. § 20929(a)(2)(A); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1162. Public Law 83-280 removed the federal government’s ability to prosecute, on certain reservations, Indian Country crimes based on the Indian Country General Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1152) and the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153), and, with a few exceptions, authorized six states—Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin—to prosecute most crimes that occur in Indian Country. Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162).} 

_{[121]  United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1195-97 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a sex offender must register with, and keep his registration current with, every jurisdiction in which he resides, works, or goes to school” and therefore sex offenders living in Navajo Nation were required to keep their registration current with both Arizona and the tribe under SORNA), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. DeJarnette, 741 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2013); State v. John, 308 P.3d 1208, 1212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that tribal member convicted of a federal sex offense who resides on tribal land in Arizona could not be prosecuted under state law for failure to register unless that tribe’s registration responsibilities had been delegated to the state via SORNA’s delegation procedure); State v. Atcitty, 215 P.3d 90, 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that New Mexico lacked authority to require offenders, who were enrolled members of Navajo Nation, resided on tribal lands, and had been convicted of federal sex offenses, to register as sex offenders); State v. Cayenne, No. 49696-8-11, 2018 WL 3154379, at *3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 26, 2018) (addressing issue of whether an offender who exclusively lives, works, and attends school on tribal land can be compelled to register with the state within which that tribal land is located and holding that offender could not be convicted of failure to register in state court when the trial court excluded evidence that he had registered with the Chehalis Tribe).}

_{[122]  A list of tribes that have substantially implemented SORNA is available at SMART’s SORNA Implementation Status page. Many of the tribes that have substantially implemented SORNA have used the Tribal Model Code, which was developed by Indian Law experts in conjunction with the SMART Office and fully covers SORNA’s requirements.}

_{[123]  This often occurs when a tribe is located within a state that has not substantially implemented SORNA. One example includes the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (Umatilla), located within Oregon. Umatilla was one of the first tribes to substantially implement SORNA and, unlike Oregon, meets all of SORNA’s requirements.} 

_{[124]  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 629-30 (2022) (holding that the General Crimes Act does not preempt state jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian Country and the Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian Country); United States v. Smith, 100 F.4th 1244, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2024) (holding that property owned by a non-Indian that is within the Pueblo of Santa Clara’s exterior boundaries is Indian Country where the property is within the exterior boundaries of a grant from a prior sovereign and Congress confirmed the exterior boundaries of the Pueblo of Santa Clara and non-Indian could be convicted in federal court of involuntary manslaughter for an act he committed on property located within the exterior boundaries of the Pueblo); Brown v. Rogers, No. 17-CV-0651, 2025 WL 1481891, at *4 (N.D. Okla. May 22, 2025) (denying Brown’s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him of first-degree murder where he is non-Indian, the victim was an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation, and the murder was committed in Indian Country and holding that “McGirt affords Brown no relief . . . because he is not Indian, and that Castro-Huerta precludes relief . . . for that same reason even though [his] victim was Indian”); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Kunzweiler, No. 25-cv-00075, 2025 WL 1392057, at *2-3 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2025) (denying motion for temporary restraining order and holding that “the [Muscogee (Creek)] Nation has not identified certain, great, actual, and non-theoretical harm,” and “has not yet explained how state-court jurisdiction over non-member Indians plainly interferes with its powers of tribal self-government”; it has not “yet demonstrated that the harm to its interests pending resolution of the motion for preliminary injunction outweighs the injury to the defendants’ interests in enforcing laws with respect to non-member Indians”; and it “has not persuaded this court that the requested order temporarily enjoining the defendants from exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians is not adverse to the public interest”); United States v. Smith, No. 21-CR-00553, 2023 WL 8358116, at *1-3 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2023) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian Country and “a non-Indian may be charged with aiding and abetting [an Indian defendant in Indian Country for] a crime charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1153”); Stitt v. City of Tulsa, 565 P.3d 857 (Okla. Crim. App. 2025) (relying on O’Brien and holding that the City of Tulsa’s exercise of jurisdiction over an enrolled citizen of Cherokee Nation for a traffic violation that occurred within the boundaries of Muscogee Creek Nation does not unlawfully infringe upon tribal self-government), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-30 (U.S. July 9, 2025); City of Tulsa v. O’Brien, No. S-2023-715, 2024 WL 5001684, at *9 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2024) (holding that the State’s, and therefore the City of Tulsa’s, criminal jurisdiction was not preempted under federal law or by principles of tribal self-government and the City of Tulsa has concurrent jurisdiction to proceed with the prosecution of O’Brien, an enrolled citizen of Osage Nation, for misdemeanor traffic crimes committed in Muscogee Creek Nation).}

_{[125]  Denezpi v. United States, 596 U.S. 591, 592, 594, 605 (2022) (addressing whether the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when “a single sovereign (the United States) that enforced its own law (the Major Crimes Act) after having separately enforced the law of another sovereign (the Code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe) [in the Court of Indian Offences or C.F.R. court],” noting that offender’s “single act transgressed two laws: the Ute Mountain Ute Code’s assault and battery ordinance and the United States Code’s proscription of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian Country,” “[t]he two laws—defined by separate sovereigns—proscribe separate offenses, so [the offender’s] second prosecution did not place him in jeopardy again ‘for the same offence,’” and holding that “[b]ecause the Tribe and the Federal Government are distinct sovereigns, those “‘offence[s]’ are not ‘the same,’” and the Double Jeopardy “Clause prohibits separate prosecutions for the same offense; it does not bar successive prosecutions by the same sovereign”); United States v. Kills Warrior, 128 F.4th 999, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2025) (holding that offender’s underlying federal conviction for which he was required to register as a sex offender did not violate double jeopardy even though he had previously been convicted in tribal court for the same conduct), aff’g, Nos. CR 19-50163, CR. 22-50066, 2023 WL 4541115, at *4-5 (D.S.D. July 14, 2023) (holding that prosecution of offender for the same sex offense by the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the federal government does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause even though both prosecutions were predicated on a single act).}

_{[126]  United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140, 157 (2016) (holding that use of an offender’s underlying uncounseled tribal court convictions, which were obtained in proceedings that comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304, may be used as predicate convictions in a subsequent federal prosecution and doing so did not violate the Sixth Amendment or due process).} 

_{[127]  See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, No. 13-30158, 2014 WL 4294529, at *4 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2014) (recognizing that “tribes retain the inherent power to exclude outsiders from tribal territory”); Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise ‘some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,’” including the right to exclude a nonmember of the tribe from the reservation).}

_{[128]  McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894, 930-31 (2020) (holding that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction because Creek Nation is “Indian country” and therefore, crimes covered by the Major Crimes Act that are committed by an Indian on the land in question must be tried in federal or tribal court); Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 2022) (holding that the rule announced in McGirt is not applicable because Minnesota is a Public Law 280 jurisdiction and “[u]nlike Oklahoma, Congress endowed Minnesota with ‘jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in . . . [a]ll Indian country within the state’ when it passed Public Law 280” and therefore “Minnesota has the power to ‘enforce the same criminal laws within tribal boundaries as would be enforced elsewhere in the state’”); Hogner v. State, 500 P.3d 629, 635 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) (applying McGirt and holding that “Congress did establish a Cherokee Reservation and that no evidence was presented showing that Congress explicitly erased or disestablished the boundaries of the Cherokee Reservation or that the State of Oklahoma had jurisdiction in this matter” and the State of Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to prosecute Indian offender who committed the crime in Indian Country), overruled on other grounds by, Deo v. Parish, 541 P.3d 833 (Okla. Crim. App. 2023); State v. Lawhorn, 499 P.3d 777, 778-79 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) (holding that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute offender, who was an Indian, with one count of lewd or indecent acts with child under 16, where the offense occurred in Indian Country); McClain v. State, 501 P.3d 1009, 1012 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) (holding that “for purposes of federal criminal law, the land upon which the parties agree [offender, a registered member of the Choctaw Nation,] committed [rape by instrumentation, lewd acts with a child under 16, and pattern of criminal offenses in violation of Oklahoma law] is within the Chickasaw Reservation [and Congress never explicitly erased those boundaries and disestablished the Chickasaw Nation] and is thus Indian Country” and pursuant to McGirt, “the State of Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to prosecute [offender]”), overruled on other grounds by, Deo v. Parish, 541 P.3d 833, 838 & n.7 (Okla. Crim. App. 2023) (holding that Oklahoma district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over Indian Country is not federally preempted); State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686, 693-94 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) (reaffirming recognition of the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Reservations and holding that “McGirt and . . . post-McGirt decisions recognizing these reservations shall not apply retroactively to void a conviction that was final when McGirt was decided”).}

_{[129]  United States v. Red Tomahawk, No. 17-cr-106, 2018 WL 3077789, at *5 (D.N.D. June 20, 2018) (holding that offender, who was convicted of abusive sexual contact in federal court and had an independent duty to register under SORNA for 15 years as well as a duty to register with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe for 25 years, could not be prosecuted for a federal failure to register when his 15-year registration requirement had elapsed); United States v. Still, No. 21-CR-53, 2021 WL 1914217, at *5 (N.D. Okla. May 12, 2021) (holding that offender, who is a member of the Cherokee Nation, who committed his crime in Indian Country, and who was convicted of rape in Oklahoma, had a duty to register and update his registration under SORNA when he resided in Indian Country, notwithstanding the fact that the court vacated his conviction for lack of jurisdiction); State v. Shale, 345 P.3d 776, 780, 782 (Wash. 2015) (holding that state had jurisdiction to prosecute sex offender, who is an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation living on the Quinault Indian Nation’s reservation and who failed to register with the county sheriff’s office, for failing to register under Washington law).}

_{[130]  Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,064 (“There is no separate federal registration program for sex offenders required to register under SORNA who are released from federal or military custody. Rather, such sex offenders are integrated into the sex offender registration programs of the states and other (nonfederal) jurisdictions following their release.”); SORNA Rule, supra note 39, at 69,876 (“There is no separate Federal registration program for [sex offenders who are released from Federal or military custody or sentenced for a Federal or military offense].”).}

_{[131]  See supra I.G regarding registration in Indian Country.}

_{[132]  See infra note 134 and corresponding text.}

_{[133]  Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,064; 28 C.F.R. § 72.8(b); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(8), 3583(d), 4209(a); see also infra III.C.6.}

_{[134]  18 U.S.C. § 4042(c). In 2014, BOP issued guidelines regarding its notification requirements upon release of sex offenders. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5110.17, NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UPON RELEASE OF SEX OFFENDERS, VIOLENT OFFENDERS, AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS (May 16, 2014), www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5110_017.pdf.}

_{[135]  BOP uses a form to notify prisoners of their registration responsibilities. See Sex Offender Registration and Treatment Notification Form, BP-A0648, www.bop.gov/policy/forms/BP_A0648.pdf.}

_{[136]  Although not governed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c), BIA’s law enforcement handbook requires its Office of Justice Services to assist tribes who are operating SORNA registration and notification systems. See BIA, OFF. OF JUST. SERVS., LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT, SPECIAL ORDER 21-01 (4th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2021). The BIA’s corrections handbook also directs detention facility staff to “ensure that all inmates required to be registered under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act are identified and, when applicable, provide all necessary information to the local government Registry Entity.” See BIA, OFF. OF JUST. SERVS., CORRECTIONS HANDBOOK, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT, C2-34 (2010). For additional discussion concerning sex offenders and Indian Country, see supra I.G.}

_{[137]  For additional discussion concerning the deportation of sex offenders, see infra III.C.12.}

_{[138]  Notice of Amendment of Privacy Act System of Records, 80 Fed. Reg. 24,269 § HH (April 30, 2015), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-04-30/pdf/2015-09615.pdf. For additional discussion concerning issues pertaining to sex offenders and immigration and deportation, see infra III.C.12.}

_{[139]  34 U.S.C. § 20915(b). Under SORNA, tier I sex offenders can petition for a reduced registration period after maintaining a clean record for 10 years and tier III sex offenders who are adjudicated delinquent can petition for a reduced registration period after maintaining a clean record for 25 years. Id. An offender maintains a “clean record” by not being convicted of any offense for which imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed; not being convicted of any sex offense; successfully completing (without revocation) any periods of supervised release, probation, and parole; and successfully completing an appropriate sex offender treatment program certified by a jurisdiction or by the Attorney General. Id.; see Gillotti v. United States, No. 21-cv-404, 2023 WL 1767462 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (dismissing offender’s lawsuit seeking a declaration that he is no longer required to register as a sex offender under SORNA for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and holding that SORNA does not provide for a private right of action and the court has never had jurisdiction over offender’s criminal case where he was convicted and sentenced in military court, rather than in federal court); United States v. Nazerzadeh, 73 F.4th 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that, because offender was convicted of distribution of child pornography, he is a tier II sex offender who is required to register for 25 years, and he is not entitled to any reduction of the required registration period under SORNA); United States v. McGrath, No. 04-0061, 2017 WL 6349046, at *2 (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2017) (denying sex offender’s motion to reduce registration period under SORNA’s clean record exception and holding that the court has no authority to “oversee the state’s interpretation of its own registration laws, even where those laws are given content by reference to the elements of a federal crime”); United States v. Myers, No. 15-cr-41, 2025 WL 1080599, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2025) (denying petition for removal from sex offender registry and holding that tier II sex offender who was convicted of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and who has registered as a sex offender for approximately 11 years is not entitled to a reduction of registration period under SORNA’s clean record exception); United States v. Dubin, No. 12-cr-20828-1, 2023 WL 3261578, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2023) (holding that tier I sex offender, who registered as a sex offender for ten years, has not been convicted of another felony or sex offense during that time, and who has successfully completed his term of supervised release and a sex offender treatment program, should be relieved of his duty to register under SORNA’s clean record exception); Wiggins v. United States, No. 18-cv-03492, 2019 WL 5079557, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2019) (granting the government’s motion to dismiss and holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to reduce registration period under SORNA’s clean record exception for offender convicted of child pornography offenses under the UCMJ because SORNA does not provide a private cause of action); Gore v. United States, No. 21-CV-00535, 2021 WL 4430040, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2021) (holding that a federal court has jurisdiction to consider sex offender’s action noting that he “seeks ‘a Declaratory Judgment from this Court recognizing that he no longer has a duty to register as a sex offender under federal law’—or a declaration of his rights under federal law . . . [and s]uch relief would not amount to the Court instructing Missouri on how to conform to its own law as Defendant suggests. If the sought relief was granted, a Missouri court would have the freedom to interpret the declaratory judgment according to its own state law principles”); Gore v. United States, No. 21-cv-00478, 2021 WL 2915073, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss and transferring case to the Western District of Missouri noting that the basis of sex offender’s complaint, registering as a sex offender where he resides, does not arise in the Eastern District of Missouri; he has been a resident of Jackson County; and he is registered as a sex offender in Jackson County, Missouri, where the Western District is located); United States v. Saari, No. CR 05-31, 2024 WL 4133024, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 10, 2024) (granting sex offender’s motion to terminate his registration requirements under SORNA and holding that, because the requirements of 34 U.S.C. § 20915(b)(1) have been met, offender’s federal obligation to register as a sex offender under SORNA is reduced by five years and “is therefore effectively terminated”); United States v. Davenport, No. CR 06-06-M, 2022 WL 4547652, at *1 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 2022) (granting offender’s motion to terminate registration requirements under SORNA’s clean record exception and terminating sex offender’s federal registration obligation under SORNA); United States v. Studeny, No. CR11-0180, 2019 WL 859271, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2019) (denying sex offender’s request to reduce his registration period under SORNA’s clean record exception and holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where offender is no longer on supervised release and SORNA does not provide jurisdiction to federal courts to reduce registration requirements); United States v. Zwiebel, No. 06CR720, 2023 WL 2480052, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 13, 2023) (granting sex offender’s petition to reduce his registration requirement, recognizing that “[a]s the sentencing court in this matter, the court maintains jurisdiction to decide this petition,” and holding that because sex offender “satisfies the definition of maintaining a clean record for ten years because [he] has not been convicted of any offense, he has successfully completed his term of supervised release, and he successfully completed a state-certified sex offender treatment program,” his duty to register under SORNA must be terminated); United States v. Stovall, No. 06-cr-00286, 2021 WL 5086067, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Nov. 2, 2021) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to address sex offender’s duty to register under SORNA because offender’s SORNA registration requirement was a consequence of his conviction in the case, federal district courts frequently address the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction in closed criminal cases, and noting that, because sex offender met the “clean record” exception under SORNA by maintaining a clean record for 10 years, his duty to register under SORNA must be terminated immediately); Wagner v. Garland, No. 24-cv-899, 2024 WL 5125745, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2024) (holding that SORNA does not create a private right of action and therefore the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to terminate sex offender’s registration requirement); MacColl v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 665 S.W.3d 290, 301 (Mo. 2023) (en banc) (holding that SORNA’s clean record reduction does not take effect automatically).}

_{[140]  United States v. Amin, No. 01 CR 491, 2025 WL 902150, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025) (holding that the court “lacks jurisdiction to direct the [Florida Department of Law Enforcement] to release [offender convicted of engaging in sexual contact with an inmate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b)] from his obligation to register as a sex offender under Florida law”); Matthews v. State, Nos. SC-2024-0447, SC-2024-0480, 2025 WL 1198358, at *6 (Ala. Apr. 25, 2025) (holding that offender convicted of custodial sexual misconduct is not entitled to relief from the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act’s registration and notification requirements and residency restrictions); People v. Slusher, No. D081443, 2024 WL 4539413, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2024) (unpublished decision) (holding that Cal. Penal Code § 290.5 only offers termination relief to “California registrants—that is, individuals who are currently registered with local law enforcement in California” and, because non-resident sex offender is “not registered in San Diego County (or any other California county), . . . he is ineligible for relief in that court (or any other superior court in this state)”); People v. Warren, 555 P.3d 656, 658-59 (Colo. App. 2024) (holding that an intellectually disabled sex offender who is required to register for life is eligible to petition to discontinue sex offender registration under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-113(2.5)(a)); Hardin v. State, 562 P.3d 516 (Mont. 2025) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying offender’s petition for relief from sex offender registration where offender was convicted of a sex offense in Colorado in 2014, he committed a felony offense in Montana, and was incarcerated during his 10-year registration period, “because he has not maintained a clean record nor met the 10-year registration requirement,” and he “has always been on notice that if he commits a crime during his registration period, then he will not be relieved from registration”); In re R.H., 316 A.3d 593, 605 (N.J. 2024) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-2(f)’s requirement that sex offenders remain offense-free for 15 years before they can petition to terminate their sex offender registration requirements “applies to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults and convicted of a listed sex offense, or released from a correctional facility, but not to those who are adjudicated delinquent in proceedings in the family court”); In re J.D.-F., 256 A.3d 958, 965-66 (N.J. 2021) (holding that the relevant date for determining whether N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-2(g), which prohibits sex offenders from applying to terminate their registration under § 2C:7-2(f) if they have been convicted of certain sex offenses or of more than one sex offense, is effective as to a particular offender is the date on which offender committed the sex offenses that would otherwise bar termination of registration under subsection (f)); In re P.C., No. A-3863-19, 2021 WL 4851285, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 19, 2021) (holding that sex offender’s subsequent 2002 conviction for failing to register rendered him ineligible to be relieved of his sex offender registration requirements under New Jersey law where the offender’s 15-year period commenced in September 1999, when his registration requirement was imposed, and his opportunity to be relieved of that requirement terminated in January 2002, when he was convicted of failing to register); People v. Corr, 251 N.E.3d 1226, 1228-29 (N.Y. 2024) (holding that out-of-state sex offenders who are classified as level one sex offenders in New York cannot receive credit for their time registered as sex offenders in another jurisdiction and the phrase “initial date of registration” in SORA provision governing duration of registration refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA and not when the offender is required to register under the laws of another jurisdiction); State v. Fritsche, 895 S.E.2d 347, 349-50 (N.C. 2023) (holding that North Carolina statute allowing registered sex offenders to petition for early termination requires ten years of registration in North Carolina to be eligible for early termination); In re Goldberg, 907 S.E.2d 405, 407-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.12A, which requires sex offenders convicted of a registerable North Carolina sex offense to file a petition to terminate their registration requirements in the district where the person was convicted and requires sex offenders convicted of an offense that occurred in another state to file a petition in the district where the person resides, allows offenders whose underlying conviction occurred outside of North Carolina and who no longer reside in the state to petition for removal from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry in the district where they previously resided and registered in North Carolina); In re Hall, 768 S.E.2d 39, 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (identifying incorporation of SORNA’s tiering structure and requirements for offenders to petition for termination of sex offender registration into North Carolina law); In re McClain, 741 S.E.2d 893, 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (acknowledging that North Carolina’s sex offender registration and notification laws directly incorporate SORNA’s clean record provisions); Bourn v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 565 P.3d 873, 874 (Or. Ct. App. 2025) (holding that the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision properly denied non-resident sex offender’s petition for relief or reclassification from sex offender registration in Oregon because offender’s relocation to California relieved him of his duty to report to Oregon authorities and divested the Board of authority to grant relief); Wood v. Wallin, No. 21-CV-1702, 2022 Vt. Super. LEXIS 131, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2022) (holding that offender, who was convicted and sentenced concurrently for felony sexual assault and murder, had a duty to register and his ten-year reporting requirement, which is not triggered until an offender is released from prison, discharged from probation, or discharged from parole, whichever is later, has not yet begun where he is still on parole for his murder conviction), rev’d and remanded by, No. 22-AP-274, 2024 Vt. LEXIS 21, at *15 (Apr. 19, 2024) (holding that there was an unresolved factual question as to whether offender’s parole was connected to his sex offense and that Vermont law was ambiguous as to whether the ten-year reporting period was triggered for an offender released from prison on a sex offense but on parole for a conviction totally unconnected to the sex offense); Alvarado v. State, 541 P.3d 1097, 1101 (Wyo. 2024) (holding that offender was not required to complete probation before the clock started on the ten-year period before he could petition for termination of his duty to register as a sex offender in Wyoming); but see State v. Willey, No. 0802013700, 2024 WL 2746122 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2024) (recognizing that children depicted in pornography are not only victims of the initial exploitation and dissemination but also of the subsequent possession of those files and holding that a tier II sex offender convicted of possession of child pornography was ineligible to petition for redesignation as a tier I sex offender under Delaware law because the children depicted in the files he possessed were victims); Smith v. St. Louis Cnty. Police, 659 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Mo. 2023) (en banc) (affirming denial of sex offenders’ petition for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry and holding that offenders, who were convicted of sex offenses in Missouri, required to register in Missouri as tier I and tier II sex offenders, and required to register under federal SORNA, were not entitled to removal because Missouri law mandates registration for a person’s lifetime if they have been required to register under federal law).}

_{[141]  See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 62.402, 62.405.}

_{[142]  See FLA. STAT. §§ 943.0435(11)(a)(3), 943.04354.}

_{[143]  18 U.S.C. § 2250. A sex offender violates § 2250(a) if the offender is required to register under SORNA (i.e., the offender has been convicted of a sex offense requiring registration), travels in interstate or foreign commerce (or is convicted of a sex offense under federal law, including the UCMJ, the law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or possession of the United States), and knowingly fails to register or update his or her information as required by SORNA. Id. A sex offender violates § 2250(b) if the offender is required to register under SORNA, knowingly fails to provide advance notice of international travel, and engages or attempts to engage in international travel. Id. See Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104, 109-111 (2016) (reversing conviction of sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) where offender failed to notify Kansas he was moving to the Philippines because SORNA did not require sex offender to update registration in state where he no longer resides); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 447 (2010) (addressing retroactive applicability of SORNA and finding that liability predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) cannot be based on a sex offender’s interstate travel that occurred prior to SORNA’s effective date); United States v. Picard, 995 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2021) (addressing the elements required to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250); United States v. Marrero, No. 22-2030, 2024 WL 1253643, at *1-3 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2024) (reversing offender’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that offender convicted of attempted rape in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 130.30 in 2001 was a tier I sex offender under SORNA and his duty to register expired before the failure to update his registration charged in the indictment); United States v. Brumett, No. 09-CR-37, 2009 WL 2005308, at *1 (D. Vt. July 7, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that California offense of annoying a child under the age of 18 in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 647.6(a) qualifies as a “specified offense against a minor” under SORNA because it involves conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor where California case law holds that “annoy and molest” ordinarily relate to offenses against children with a connotation of abnormal sexual motivation); United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268, 280 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that a failure to register conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) is based on violation of SORNA’s registration requirements, which are independent of state law, and because offender was a tier I sex offender under SORNA, his duty to register terminated in 2016, he did not have a federal duty to register in 2019, and he could not be convicted of a § 2250(a) offense); United States v. Parkerson, 984 F.3d 1124, 1132 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that sentence of 120 months of imprisonment for conviction of failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 was substantively reasonable and sex offender’s history of sexual violence was sufficient to justify a statutory maximum sentence), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 753 (2022); United States v. Capri, No. 23-CR-00105, 2024 WL 3381305, at *2-3 (E.D. Tenn. July 11, 2024) (dismissing indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and, in applying the categorical approach, holding that offender convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor in violation of Ind. Code Ann. § 25-42-4-9(b), and child molesting in violation of Ind. Code Ann. § 25-42-4-3(b), is not a tier II sex offender under SORNA because neither Indiana statute is comparable to the federal offense of abusive sexual contact); United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 2019) (vacating conviction for failure to register under SORNA where defendant was a tier I sex offender and was not required to register during relevant period—which was more than 15 years after his conviction for Colorado sex offense); Harder v. United States, Nos. 21-cv-188; 14-cr-67, 2021 WL 3418958, at *1, *6 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2021) (holding that the Louisiana conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile is a sex offense under SORNA because there is “a categorical match between the SORNA definition of sex offense and the Louisiana statute,” and, as a result, offender “was previously convicted of a sex offense, and he was thus properly convicted of failing to register as a sex offender”); United States v. Karsten, No. 23-CR-3063, 2024 WL 4225893, at *1-2 (D. Neb. Sept. 18, 2024) (dismissing indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that the offense of attempted first degree sexual assault, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(a)-(c), “sets forth three ways in which one could be found guilty of the offense,” is indivisible, overbroad, and therefore a tier I sex offense, and as a result, offender could not be convicted of failing to register between October 10, 2022, and November 1, 2022, where he was convicted of a tier I sex offense in 2001); United States v. Marrowbone, No. 24-CR-40106, 2025 WL 1951890, at *6 (D.S.D. July 16, 2025) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that, because “[t]his Court stands by its previous ruling and again concludes that assault with intent to commit rape is a sex offense,” “the Indictment in the present case states an offense”); United States v. Marrowbone, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1108 (D.S.D. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that “the crime of assault with intent to commit rape [in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)] is, in substance, attempted rape,” “assault with intent to commit rape—an attempted rape—is an offense ‘comparable to or more severe than’ an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse as described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241,” and “a person . . . convicted of assault with intent to commit rape thus is a tier III sex offender under SORNA, as would be a person convicted of attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse”); United States v. Shoulderblade, No. 24-3940, 2025 WL 1482787, at *1-2 (9th Cir. May 23, 2025) (holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that sex offender knowingly failed to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and the “district court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have concluded that [offender] knew of his requirement to register, and his failure to do so was not out of ignorance, mistake, or accident” where offender alleged he believed he was registered because he completed some but not all of the required paperwork with a Northern Cheyenne Reservation SORNA compliance officer in February 2023 and he was fingerprinted, photographed, and had his address verified over the course of his 59 contacts with local law enforcement such that they were aware of his identity, location, and status as a sex offender); United States v. Lusby, 972 F.3d 1032, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 2020) (addressing the elements required to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250); United States v. Fitzgerald, No. 24-CR-0059, 2025 WL 567019, at *1-3 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 20, 2025) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and, in applying the categorical approach, holding that the Washington offense of attempted rape in the second degree is comparable to or more severe than attempted aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241, a tier III sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Lyte, No. CR-20-01859, 2021 WL 940986, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2021) (noting that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) does not require the government to prove that offender has also violated a state sex-offender-registration law); United States v. Ballantyne, No. CR 19-42, 2019 WL 3891252, at *2, *5 (D. Mont. Aug. 19, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that offender’s conviction for second-degree sexual assault in Colorado is a tier I sex offense under SORNA); United States v. Jackson, No. CR-09-1115, 2010 WL 3325611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and concluding that the plain meaning of “sex offense” under SORNA includes offender’s conviction for indecent exposure under Cal. Penal Code § 314).} 

_{Notably, at least two cases have held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) must be predicated on a sex offender’s failure to comply with a statutory requirement under SORNA and that the requirements set forth by the Guidelines do not create an additional basis for criminal liability. See, e.g., United States v. Belaire, 480 F. App’x 284, 286-88 (5th Cir. 2012) (differentiating between SORNA’s requirement to report residency changes within three business days and the requirement to provide temporary lodging information that is contained in the Final Guidelines, noting that the latter does not create criminal liability under § 2250(a); and holding that offender could not be prosecuted for failing to update temporary lodging information where neither Texas nor New York required that such information be provided); United States v. Ward, No. 14cr24, 2014 WL 6388502, at * 5-6 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2014) (holding that “a provision of the Attorney General’s Guidelines directing jurisdictions, which may or may not implement it, to require sex offenders to update temporary lodging information cannot be the basis for imposing federal criminal liability against a sex offender for failing to update as required by SORNA” where, “[i]n § 2250, Congress did not criminalize a sex offender’s failure to update as required by the Attorney General or as required by state law, but as required by SORNA”).}

_{[144]  Under SORNA, jurisdictions are required to provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum penalty of greater than one year for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the SORNA requirements. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(f); see also Final Guidelines, supra note 3, at 38,069 (noting that Indian tribes are not included in this requirement because tribal court jurisdiction does not extend to imposing terms of imprisonment exceeding a year). For additional discussion concerning prosecutions for failure to register based on offenders’ failure to update information, see supra I.C.4. See, e.g., United States v. Shinn, No. 22-1731, 2022 WL 2518014, at *1 (8th Cir. July 7, 2022) (per curiam) (holding that offender failed to register under Iowa law where there was sufficient evidence that sex offender knew or should have known of the requirement to notify the sheriff of a change in his license plate number within five days and offender failed to do so); Anderson v. State, 351 So. 3d 556, 558 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (holding that the trial court erred in revoking sex offender’s probation for violating Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act by failing to register a change of address where the only evidence indicating that offender did not live at the registered address was a law enforcement officer’s nonhearsay observation that the offender was not present at his registered address); Dorsey v. People, 536 P.3d 314, 322 (Colo. 2023) (holding that the recidivist provision of the Colorado failure to register as a sex offender statute is a sentence enhancer, not an element of the offense, and “that allowing a judge to elevate a conviction for failure to register from a class 6 felony to a class 5 felony, based on a prior conviction for failure to register, doesn’t violate a defendant’s right to a jury trial under either the Sixth Amendment or . . . the Colorado Constitution”); People v. Dorsey, 503 P.3d 145, 148 (Colo. App. 2021) (holding that a prior state conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is a sentence enhancer and is not an element of the offense for a subsequent violation of that offense under Colorado law), aff’d on other grounds, 536 P.3d 314 (Colo. 2023); State v. Cooley, 21 N.W.3d 137, 143 (Iowa 2025) (holding that appearing in person is an essential element of the crime of failing to register a change of address and the court erred by omitting the in-person language from the jury instructions); State v. Mixon, 958 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision) (holding that there was substantial evidence to support the conviction of failure to comply where sex offender was aware he was on the sex offender registry as a result of his 2002 conviction, the state established he was a tier III offender and had a duty to appear in person to notify of any changes to his residence within five business days of the change, offender did not appear in person until October 9, 2019, well over five business days after he was evicted on September 9, 2019, and there was ample testimony to show offender was required to comply with his registration requirements in September 2019 after his eviction); State v. Moler, 519 P.3d 794, 801 (Kan. 2022) (reversing sex offender’s conviction for violating mandate requiring registration of any vehicle owned or operated by the offender and holding that a “rational fact-finder could not have found [the offender] ‘owned or operated’ or ‘regularly drives’” a vehicle under the Kansas Offender Registration Act where he only used the vehicle on one occasion and there was no evidence showing who owned the vehicle or to whom it was registered); Commonwealth v. Embrey, No. 2023-CA-0671, 2025 LX 65898, at *1, *7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 9, 2025) (holding that the court erred in finding that offender convicted of third-degree rape in 1994 was only required to register for 10 years under Kentucky’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and in dismissing indictment for failing to register as a sex offender in 2022 because subsequent amendments to SORA applied to offender, making him a lifetime registrant), petition for cert. filed, No. 2025-SC-0215 (Ky. June 6, 2025); State v. Berry, 314 So. 3d 1110, 1118 (La. Ct. App. 2021) (affirming conviction of failure to register under Louisiana law where offender failed to provide his email address or Facebook page); State v. Clausen, 15 N.W.3d 858, 868 (Neb. 2025) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to find that offender had a temporary domicile or habitual living location at his fiancée’s house and failed to register under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4004(2), which requires sex offenders to register a new address, temporary domicile, or habitual living location within three working days prior to the change, where offender’s mother-in-law testified that offender had been living at the Washington County residence with his fiancée for six months and offender admitted that he was staying at the Washington County residence most nights because the evidence would not “allow a rational trier of fact to find, without engaging in speculation, that [offender] stayed at the Washington County residence for 3 consecutive weekdays”); State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6904, No. CA2020-02-003, 2020 WL 7690665, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2020) (affirming offender’s conviction for failure to register under Ohio law where offender was convicted of a sex offense and signed a registration form on which he acknowledged his registration duties, including his requirement to provide at least 20 days’ advance notice of any change in residence address, and offender was not at his registered address on the multiple occasions that various local law enforcement went to locate him, and both his landlord and a relative indicated that he had moved); State v. Ribas, 554 P.3d 280, 281 (Or. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that the date of the offense was a material element of the offense of failure to register and the State was required to prove that offender committed the offense by the date alleged in the indictment (i.e., “the state was required to prove that defendant did not report by the 10th day after a change of residence—in other words, that on February 25, a 10-day period had passed during which defendant failed to report a change of residence”) and that there was sufficient evidence to establish that offender acquired a new residence more than 10 days before the date alleged in the indictment, as required to support a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under Oregon law), cert. granted, 569 P.3d 987 (Or. 2025); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 329 A.3d 1129, 1139-40 (Pa. 2025) (holding that the “evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to prove that [offender] possessed at all relevant times the requisite knowledge that he was subject to [Pennsylvania] SORNA’s terms and conditions for the remainder of his life” and “th[e] evidence [that offender signed a form outlining his duty to register every time he registered] was more than sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,” that offender knew that he was required to register for life and that he was required to verify his residence and be photographed for life); Commonwealth v. Brashear, 331 A.3d 669, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (reversing offender’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of Pennsylvania law where he provided the address of his general housing location but did not include the specific room number and holding that Subchapter I of Pennsylvania’s SORNA does not require an offender to verify the specific room or apartment in which he resides and offender was under no obligation to provide that information when he registered his new residence in November 2019); Silber v. State, 371 S.W.3d 605, 613 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that sex offender, who was seldom seen at his registered address, frequently visited his parents, and did not have electricity service during the time that he lived there, did not change his residence from his registered address and therefore could not be convicted of failure to register); State v. Triebold, 955 N.W.2d 415, 422-23 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that offender, who was convicted of a sex offense in Wisconsin, subsequently moved to Minnesota, and failed to inform both Wisconsin and Minnesota of his change of residence, could be convicted of failure to register in both Wisconsin and Minnesota without violating double jeopardy).}

_{[145]  34 U.S.C. § 20941(a). To assist with these investigations and to provide support to law enforcement “in identifying, locating and apprehending noncompliant sex offenders,” the U.S. Marshals Service runs the National Sex Offender Targeting Center (NSOTC) in collaboration with the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children’s Sex Offender Tracking Team. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, FACT SHEET: SEX OFFENDER INVESTIGATIONS 2024 (Oct. 1, 2023), https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/2024-Sex-Offender-Investigations.pdf.}

_{[146]  State v. Carslake, No. 1 CA-CR 23-0383, 2024 WL 4165319, at *2-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2024) (unpublished decision) (holding that the court did not err in allowing introduction of evidence regarding sex offender’s active warrants and absconder status in California in prosecution for failing to register as a sex offender in Arizona where the evidence was relevant because “[t]he State needed to demonstrate that [the offender] had knowledge of his registration requirement” and his “California parole violation for failing to register and his absconder status show he knew he had to register and was trying to avoid doing so”); Adkins v. State, 264 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Ark. 2007) (holding that the offense of failure to register as a sex offender under Arkansas law is a strict liability offense and does not require proof of intent); State v. T.R.D., 942 A.2d 1000, 1020 (Conn. 2008) (holding that the crime of failing to register as a sex offender is a strict liability offense); People v. Jones, No. 5-23-0005, 2024 WL 4010754, at *4-5 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 27, 2024) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting sex offender’s prior conviction for unlawful failure to register as a sex offender at offender’s bench trial to prove he knowingly failed to register as a sex offender in violation of Illinois law where “[a]lthough the defendant’s charged conduct . . . , providing a false address on his registration, was somewhat dissimilar, it still had probative value regarding the issue of whether his failure to register on time was due to an honest mistake of fact” and “[b]oth offenses evinced a general disregard and indifference on the part of the defendant in complying with his registration and reporting duties under the Act, thereby undermining his defense at trial” that he was mistaken about his next registration deadline); State v. Genson, 513 P.3d 1192, 1201 (Kan. 2022) (holding that failure to register under Kansas Offender Registration Act is a strict liability offense and “imposition of strict liability for a KORA registration violation does not offend substantive due process under the United States Constitution”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1092 (2023); In re C.P.W., 213 P.3d 413, 455-56 (Kan. 2009) (noting that mens rea must be proven before an offender can be convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under Kansas law); State v. Younger, 386 S.W.3d 848, 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming sex offender’s conviction of failure to register under Missouri law where he knowingly changed his address and failed to notify the authorities noting that “the ‘knowingly’ mens rea attached to whether [the offender] ‘knowingly’ changed his address and ‘knowingly’ failed to notify the authorities” and not “to whether he knowingly broke the law”); People v. Haddock, 48 A.D.3d 969, 971 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that the state must prove sex offender knowingly failed to comply with the state’s registration requirements before he or she can be convicted of failure to register); Roberts, 329 at 1140 (Pa. 2025) (holding that, in order to convict a sex offender of failing to register under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4915.2(a)(1) or (a)(2), “the Commonwealth must prove not only that the offender knowingly failed to register or verify, but also that the offender knew that he was required to do so”); Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding that Texas offense of failure to register requires a culpable mental state only regarding the circumstances of the conduct, or, the duty to register); Honea v. State, No. 11-19-00319-CR, 2021 WL 3919437, at *9-10 (Tex. App. Sept. 2, 2021) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that sex offender resided in Cisco, Texas, and knowingly failed to comply with his duty to register as a sex offender where he previously updated his address in January 2018; he had initialed that he understood all the registration terms and conditions that he was required to comply with; his wife had a home in Cisco; he constantly changed his story about where he lived; a neighbor observed him living at his wife’s home in Cisco; and his cellphone records showed multiple days where calls were only made from Cisco); Prouty v. State, No. 03-19-00073-CR, 2020 WL 7294616, at *3-4 (Tex. App. Dec. 11, 2020) (holding that offender’s failure to register, where he did not disclose his Facebook account despite actively maintaining the same, was voluntary); Clark v. State, No. 05-17-01384-CR, 2018 WL 5816879, at *2 (Tex. App. Nov. 7, 2018) (holding that state did not need to prove an additional culpable mental state regarding sex offender’s failure to register beyond establishing offender’s awareness of the registration requirement); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 708 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that failure to register under Virginia law does not require “specific intent or purpose” and “an accused ‘knowingly fails to register or reregister in violation of the statute if he has knowledge of the fact that he has a duty to register or reregister, but does not do so”).}

_{[147]  18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3), (b)(2); see United States v. Picard, 995 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that the government only needs to show general intent to prove a failure to register violation of SORNA); United States v. Phillips, No. 19-4271, 2022 WL 822170, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2022) (per curiam) (allowing admission of sex offender’s prior convictions for failing to register in New York for the limited purpose of showing his knowledge of his duty to register as a sex offender under SORNA and holding that “[a]n essential element of the SORNA offense was that [offender] knowingly failed to register or update a registration as required by SORNA,” “evidence was probative of this element, [and therefore] it was ‘necessary,’” and “any possible unfair prejudice, in light of the appropriate limiting instructions, did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence”); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that knowledge of an offender’s federal obligation under SORNA is not required to sustain a conviction of failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and “SORNA merely requires that a defendant have knowledge that he was required by law to register as a sex offender”); id. (“The government need not prove that, in addition to being required to register under state law, a defendant must also know that registration is mandated by a federal statute.”); United States v. Thomas, No. 22-50208, 2023 WL 8542683, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (affirming conviction for failing to give notice of foreign travel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(b) and holding that offender’s knowledge of the foreign travel notice requirement was evidenced by his signature and initials on his 2020 and 2021 registration forms, which listed the requirement); United States v. Beck, No. 24-CR-28, 2024 WL 3489200, at *2-4 (E.D. Okla. July 21, 2024) (admitting evidence regarding sex offender’s prior crimes and/or bad acts in prosecution for failure to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and holding that evidence of sex offender’s past conviction for lewd or indecent proposals to a child under 16 is “undeniably relevant to the Government’s case” because the “Government must prove that [the offender] is required to register under SORNA” and “the fact of the conviction is the foundation for one of the essential elements of the charged crime”; evidence of offender’s Oklahoma conviction for failure to register as a sex offender “is both relevant and offered for a proper purpose” because it is “relevant evidence of [offender’s] knowledge of his obligation [to] register as a sex offender and could also be probative of absence of mistake or accident”; and evidence that offender was on federal supervised release “is ‘part and parcel of the proof of the offense charged’”); United States v. Tosca, 848 F. App’x 371, 377-78 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that sex offender knowingly violated SORNA after he moved to Florida from Massachusetts and that he lied when he said he didn’t know he had an obligation to register as a sex offender in Florida).}

_{[148]  Additional issues may also arise when proper notice of the requirement to register as a sex offender has not been given. See infra III.A.13 and III.C.13 and accompanying notes.} 

_{[149]  United States v. Benevento, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1197 (D. Nev. 2009) (holding that offender had constructive notice of his obligation to register as a sex offender and could be held criminally liable for failure to register); Petway v. State, 661 S.E.2d 667, 667-68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that pre-release notice of sex offender registration requirements is not a prerequisite to a sex offender’s statutory obligation to register and affirming conviction of failure to register as a sex offender where offender was informed of his duty to register soon after his release); State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479, 488 (N.C. 2005) (holding that offender was provided with actual notice by South Carolina of his duty to register as a convicted sex offender which was “sufficient to put defendant on notice to inquire into the applicable law of the state to which he relocated, in this instance North Carolina” and therefore offender’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in North Carolina was constitutional), superseded by statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.11, as recognized in, State v. Moore, 770 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); State v. Binnarr, 733 S.E.2d 890, 894 (S.C. 2012) (holding that offender must have actual notice of sex offender reporting requirements before he can be convicted of failure to register and that an unreturned letter, without more, was insufficient); Barrientos v. State, No. 05-12-00648-CR, 2013 WL 3227658, at *5-6 (Tex. App. June 24, 2013) (affirming conviction for failure to register as a sex offender where both of the offender’s judgments noted the requirement that he register, the registration requirements were read to offender, and offender was given copies of the registration form).}  

_{[150]  Garrison v. State, 950 So. 2d 990, 994 (Miss. 2006) (holding that the state must prove an offender had actual knowledge of the duty to register or provide “proof of the probability of such knowledge” in order to sustain a conviction for failure to register).}

_{[151]  28 C.F.R. § 72.8(a)(1)(iii) (“As a condition of liability . . . for failing to comply with a requirement of SORNA, a sex offender must have been aware of the requirement he is charged with violating, but need not have been aware that the requirement is imposed by SORNA.”); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 465-67 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that offender, who stipulated when he pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender in violation of Maryland law that he “knowingly failed to register” under state law, “was fully aware of his registration duties [under SORNA] and was able to comply with them”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974 (2010); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that “[f]ailing to actually register lies at the core of all sex-offender registry offenses, whether the state is SORNA-compliant or not” and because offender “clearly did not comply with the Tennessee law in effect at the time, which was consistent with SORNA insofar as it provided for and required registration with a registry,” offender’s argument that he lacked notice failed); United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that offender could not argue he lacked notice when he “admitted in his plea agreement that he knew about SORNA’s registration requirement”); United States v. Baccam, 562 F.3d 1197, 1200 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming sex offender’s conviction of failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and holding that sex offender had adequate notice of his registration obligations based on the information provided to him in the California registration forms, even if the notice did not explain that failure to register would be a violation of federal law as well as state law); United States v. Thomas, No. 22-50208, 2023 WL 8542683, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (recognizing that offender was provided with notice of his duty to provide advance notice of international travel where he signed and initialed his 2020 and 2021 sex offender registration forms, which listed the requirement); United States v. Simon-Marcos, 363 F. App’x 726, 728 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The failure to be notified of SORNA registration requirements did not excuse [offender’s] duty to register.”); United States v. Griffey, 589 F.3d 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that SORNA “does not require that [an offender] specifically know that he was violating SORNA, but only that he ‘knowingly’ violated a legal registration requirement upon relocating”).}

_{[152]  People v. Lopez, 140 P.3d 106, 108 (Colo. App. 2005) (noting that failure to register as a sex offender under Colorado law is a continuing offense); State v. Cook, 187 P.3d 1283, 1287 (Kan. 2008) (holding that failure to register as a sex offender under Kansas law is a “continuing offense”); Longoria v. State, 749 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that failure to register as a sex offender under state law is a continuing offense); In re Hines, No. 37647-8-III, 2021 WL 687946, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2021) (holding that “failure to register as a sex offender is an ‘ongoing’ offense that must be considered a ‘course of conduct’” and, therefore, “multiple convictions for the offense of failure to register are barred”); State v. Green, 230 P.3d 654, 656 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that Washington statute requiring sex offender to register “in person, every ninety days” was ambiguous regarding whether the unit of prosecution, for double jeopardy purposes under the state and federal constitutions, was “each 90-day period in which an offender with a fixed residence fails to register” or if an offender’s failure to register is treated as “an ongoing course of conduct,” and holding that the unit of prosecution would be construed as involving an ongoing course of conduct).}

_{[153]  United States v. Ogburn, 590 F. App’x 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that failure to register or update a registration under SORNA is a continuing offense); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that failure to register under SORNA is a continuing offense); United States v. Clements, 655 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Failure to register pursuant to SORNA, or to keep one’s registration current, is a continuing offense.”); United States v. Caldwell, 128 F.4th 1170, 1774 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2025) (recognizing that failure to register under SORNA in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is a continuing offense); United States v. Lewis, 768 F.3d 1086, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that failure to register as a sex offender is a continuing offense that commenced when offender left his residence and continued until he was arrested); id. at 1093 (“[A] potential offense under [18 U.S.C.] § 2250 extends from the moment a sex offender abandons his residence in the departure jurisdiction . . . until the peripatetic fugitive either registers or is arrested.”); United States v. Pietrantonio, 637 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that “all of the courts that have recognized a ‘continuing’ SORNA violation have found that the violation continues until the defendant is arrested or registers”); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the crime of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is a continuing offense), vacated on other grounds by, 672 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2012).}

_{[154]  A “state sex offender” is an offender who is required to register based on a state, local, territorial, or tribal conviction and a “federal sex offender” is an offender who is required to register based on a federal conviction. “A federal sex offender, unlike a state sex offender, does not need to travel interstate to commit a SORNA offense.” United States v. Holcombe, 883 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 445-46 (2010) (noting that, for an offender to be convicted of failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), the government must prove that the offender was required to register under SORNA, that the offender traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, and that the offender knowingly failed to register or update a registration as required by SORNA, and “the statute’s three elements must ‘be satisfied in sequence, culminating in a post-SORNA failure to register’”); United States v. Seward, 967 F.3d 57, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that interstate travel is a necessary element of an 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) offense where it involves a state sex offender and “[f]ederal offenders, unlike state offenders, ‘do[] not need to travel interstate to commit a SORNA offense’”); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.) (noting that “a sex offender whose underlying conviction was obtained pursuant to state law and who never crosses state lines, international borders, or the boundaries of Indian country, cannot be criminally liable for failure to comply with SORNA”), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019 (2010); United States v. Spivey, 956 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding “interstate travel” is an essential conduct element for conviction under 18 U.S.C. §2250(a) and relevant for purposes of determining venue); United States v. Snyder, No. 13-CR-48, 2014 WL 1408066, at *5 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 11, 2014) (finding that “it is a crime for an offender required to register to move in interstate commerce and change his or her residence without registering in the new state or updating his or her registration in the state from which the offender moved”), affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 611 F. App’x 770 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Thompson, 811 F.3d 717, 722 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2010)) (“By contrast, ‘[o]ne convicted of federal sex offenses is liable for his knowing failure to register or update his registration regardless of whether he travels in interstate or foreign commerce.’”); United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 74 F.4th 503 (7th Cir. 2023) (holding that there was substantial evidence presented at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that offender was previously convicted of rape, a qualifying sex offense under SORNA, thereby requiring registration as a sex offender; he traveled in interstate commerce to and from Indiana, and he knowingly failed to register as required by SORNA), aff’g, No. 21-cr-00160, 2021 WL 5014947, at *5-6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2021); Sanders, 622 F.3d at 781-82 (noting that a sex offender “convicted of federal sex offenses is liable for his knowing failure to register or update his registration regardless of whether he travels in interstate or foreign commerce”); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that Congress limited the enforcement of the registration requirement under § 2250(a) to only sex offenders who were either convicted of a federal sex offense or who move in interstate commerce); United States v. Lusby, 972 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) does not require that a defendant’s interstate travel not be legally compelled).}

_{[155]  Herron v. State, 625 S.W.3d 144, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (noting that a person’s physical presence in the location at issue is a prerequisite to having an obligation to register there and holding that conviction for failure to register under Texas law requires an individual to actually travel to the location where he or she intends to reside and that offender, who never physically arrived in a particular location, could not have violated an obligation to register there).}

_{[156]  Venue is most often challenged in federal failure-to-register cases where a state sex offender travels in interstate or foreign commerce. Seward, 967 F.3d at 67 (holding that venue for federal prosecution of a state sex offender under SORNA is proper in the jurisdiction where the offender’s travel began or the offender’s departure jurisdiction and venue was proper in Massachusetts where sex offender was convicted of a sex offense in Massachusetts, initially registered in Massachusetts, moved to New York, and failed to register in New York); Holcombe, 883 F.3d at 16 (holding that venue for federal failure-to-register prosecution was proper in the Southern District of New York, the offender’s departure jurisdiction, where offender was convicted of a sex offense in New York, initially registered in New York, and moved to Maryland and failed to register in Maryland); Spivey, 956 F.3d at 217 (holding that venue is proper in the Eastern District of North Carolina, the offender’s departure jurisdiction, where offender was convicted of a sex offense in North Carolina, registered in North Carolina, and moved to Colorado and failed to register in Colorado); United States v. Snyder, 611 F. App’x 770, 772 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that venue for failure to register prosecution was proper in the Northern District of West Virginia, the departure jurisdiction, where the “offense necessarily involved more than one district because it required interstate travel, beginning when [the offender] moved from West Virginia to North Carolina, which gave rise to his obligation to register in either state, and ending when he failed to register in either state”); United States v. Atkins, 498 F. App’x 276, 277 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that venue is proper in the departure jurisdiction, not where the defendant’s interstate travel ends and the defendant fails to register); United States v. Stewart, 843 F. App’x 600, 603-04 (5th Cir. 2021) (refusing to address circuit split regarding proper venue for SORNA failure to register cases and, because sex offender forfeited any legal argument that venue is improper in the Northern District of Texas, the court reviewed only for plain error and found that there was more than enough circumstantial evidence to support venue in the Northern District of Texas where offender lived with his aunt, he had been arrested in Dallas and reportedly told law enforcement he lived in Dallas, and before moving to Colorado, his girlfriend told a neighbor that he was moving from Texas); id. at 603 (noting that because “SORNA does not contain a venue provision,” the court “instead rel[ies] on the general venue statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a),” which states that “where a crime is ‘begun in one district and completed in another,’ venue is proper ‘in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed’”); United States v. Elias, No. 19-CR-190, 2019 WL 3803111, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2019) (holding that venue for 18 U.S.C. § 2250 prosecution was proper in the Southern District of Texas where offender was convicted of a state sex offense in North Dakota, registered in North Dakota, moved to Texas and registered in Texas, and then moved to Arizona and did not register in Arizona, and noting that “[v]enue also lies in multiple districts if the particular crime being prosecuted is a continuing offense” and, because “[a] SORNA violation for a state sex offender is a continuing offense,” venue was also proper in the Southern District of Texas, the offender’s departure-district); United States v. Haslage, 853 F.3d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that venue in 18 U.S.C. § 2250 prosecution was not proper in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the sex offender’s departure jurisdiction, where she was convicted of a state sex offense in Wisconsin, registered as a sex offender in Wisconsin, moved to Washington and failed to register in Washington, and instead, venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington, the destination jurisdiction since the violations “began, were carried out, and ended in the place of the new residence”); United States v. Banes, Nos. 21-1187, 21-1188, 2021 WL 5407458, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (holding that the Southern District of Iowa was proper venue for failure to register prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 where sex offender left Fort Des Moines Correctional Facility in Iowa and traveled by bus to Oklahoma and failed to register in Oklahoma); Howell, 552 F.3d at 718 (holding that venue was proper in the Northern District of Iowa where offender was convicted of a sex offense in Michigan, offender moved to Iowa, and after being prosecuted for failing to register in Iowa, registered in Iowa after he was released from jail, traveled from Iowa to Texas, and failed to notify the Iowa sex offender registry of his move and of his new residence, and did not register in Texas), abrogated by, United States v. Lunsford, 725 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2013); Lewis, 768 F.3d at 1090 (holding that an offender can be prosecuted in either the departure district where the offense began or in other districts where the offender was required to update his registration and that the District of Kansas, the departure jurisdiction, was proper venue for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 where offender was convicted of a sex offense in Kansas, registered in Kansas, traveled to Missouri to visit relatives and did not register in Missouri, and moved to Georgia and did not register in Georgia); United States v. Kopp, 778 F.3d 986, 988 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that, where offender traveled from Georgia to Florida, Georgia was proper venue for prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 because his crime “began” in Georgia where “his interstate journey started”).}

_{[157]  State v. Peterson, 230 P.3d 588, 593 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (holding that failure to register as a sex offender under Washington law is not an alternative-means crime and that the elements of the crime do not include an offender’s particular residential status); State v. Peterson, 186 P.3d 1179, 1182 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that there is no need to prove where an offender was during the time that he failed to register in prosecution for failure to register under state law), aff’d, 230 P.3d 588 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).}

_{[158]  United States v. Thompson, 431 F. App’x 2, 3 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2010)) (holding that “under SORNA, ‘the registration requirements for sex offenders are neither conditioned on nor harnessed to state implementation of SORNA’s state-directed mandates’” and offender’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 did not violate due process even though neither Maine nor New Mexico had yet enacted statutes or promulgated regulations implementing SORNA at the time of offender’s interstate travel and failure to register); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.) (“SORNA creates a federal duty to register with the relevant existing state registries regardless of state implementation of the specific additional requirements of SORNA.”), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019 (2010); United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that sex offender had a duty to register under SORNA even though New York and Florida had not yet implemented it); Blocker, 2022 WL 2870151, at *4-5 (holding that “a sex offender’s obligation to register is separate from a state’s obligation to comply with federal SORNA” and “a state’s ‘failure to implement [SORNA] does not give sex offenders a reason to disregard their federal obligation to update their state registrations’”); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2010) (“New York and Pennsylvania may never implement SORNA, choosing, for whatever reason, to forego a portion of their federal funding. This failure to implement a federal law, however, does not give sex offenders a reason to disregard their federal obligation to update their state registrations. When a sex offender travels in interstate commerce and disobeys the federal command to keep his or her registration current, as required by SORNA, he or she is subject to prosecution.”), abrogated on other grounds by, Reynolds v. United States, 566 U.S. 432 (2012); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 465-66 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that the requirement imposed on individuals to register is independent of the requirement imposed on the States to implement the enhanced registration and notification standards of SORNA. Accordingly, SORNA’s requirement that a sex offender register applies whether registration would be accomplished through preSORNA registration facilities or under SORNA-compliant programs.”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974 (2010); id. at 466-67 (recognizing that “a sex offender is able to register under SORNA if he is able to register by means of an existing state registration facility, even if he was released before SORNA was enacted” and holding that sex offender had a duty to register under SORNA even though Maryland had not yet implemented it); United States v. Banks, No. 22-1095, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 5045, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2023) (affirming conviction for failing to register and holding that, for purposes of sentencing, sex offender did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he attempted to register but was prevented from registering by uncontrollable circumstances where he relied on the sheriff’s website stating that registration verification was postponed because of the pandemic); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The duty to register in a state registry is independent of a state’s degree of implementation of SORNA.”); United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the “obligation SORNA . . . impose[s]—the obligation to register—is imposed on sex offenders, not states” and “[t]hat obligation exists [for sex offenders] whether or not a state chooses to implement SORNA’s requirements and whether or not a state chooses to register sex offenders at all”); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “the federal government’s prosecution of an alleged violation of SORNA is not dependent on the individual state’s implementation of the administrative portion of SORNA”); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Without regard to whether SORNA is implemented by Washington or any other state, registration under it is required.”), vacated on other grounds by, 672 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Simon-Marcos, 363 F. App’x 726, 728 (11th Cir. 2010) (“SORNA is enforceable in states which have yet to implement the Act.”); United States v. Brown, 586 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (“SORNA was not enacted in a vacuum. To the contrary, every state and the District of Columbia had a sex offender registration law prior to 2006. An individual may therefore comply with SORNA’s registration requirements by registering through the state’s sex offender registry, even if that jurisdiction has not implemented SORNA’s administrative procedures. Accordingly, a jurisdiction’s failure to implement SORNA results in a loss of federal funds, ‘not in an excuse for an offender who has failed to register.’”).}

_{[159]  Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 650 F. Supp. 3d 957, 986 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2023) (recognizing that California would not register sex offenders where they are no longer required to register as sex offenders under California law); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 94 A.3d 791, 809 (Md. 2014) (“In other words, there will be ‘situations where SORNA imposes a registration requirement directly on an offender, but the jurisdiction where that offender lives, works or attends school refuses to register him because the jurisdiction’s laws do not require registration for the offense of conviction.’”).}

_{[160]  18 U.S.C. § 2250(c) (providing that, “[i]n a prosecution for a violation under [§ 2250(a) or (b)], it is an affirmative defense that (1) uncontrollable circumstances prevented the individual from complying; (2) the individual did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to comply; and (3) the individual complied as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist”); SORNA Rule, supra note 39, at 69,859 (recognizing that “a sex offender is not held liable for failing to provide a type of information if he is unaware of a requirement to provide that information . . . and failure to provide any type of information may be excused if a jurisdiction will not accept that information for inclusion in its registry”); see also United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268, 277 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted) (noting that “SORNA sets federal registration requirements that are independent of state law,” but that “[s]tate law is relevant only in one narrow circumstance. If it is impossible for an offender to register in the state in which he resides, either because that state lacks proper procedures or does not allow that offender to register, then the offender has an affirmative defense to a § 2250(a) charge. Said another way, where an offender has a duty to register under SORNA in a given state, he must register if it is possible for him to do so, regardless of whether the state requires him to”). But see United States v. Adolph, 552 F. App’x 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that offender could be prosecuted for failing to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and it was not impossible for sex offender to register in Washington even though Washington had not implemented SORNA); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 939 (10th Cir. 2008) (dismissing offender’s argument that “Oklahoma had not yet statutorily implemented SORNA, thereby making registration in Oklahoma impossible” and finding that offender had “knowledge of his duty to register under similar state and federal provisions”), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1240 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by, Reynolds v. United States, 566 U.S. 432 (2012); United States v. Benevento, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (D. Nev. 2009) (holding that it was not impossible for sex offender to register in Nevada where Nevada had failed to substantially implement a SORNA-compliant system prior to offender’s arrest and offender could be prosecuted for failing to register under SORNA); United States v. DeMarco, 634 F. App’x 253, 255 (11th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that “[i]n a prosecution for a violation [of a failure to register or update a registration], it is an affirmative defense that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the individual from complying” but holding that uncontrollable circumstances did not prevent offender, who failed to update his registration in Alabama before traveling to Louisiana to work on tow boats and who failed to register in Louisiana, from updating his registration in Louisiana where his coworkers testified that he was onshore periodically and could have updated his registration). Cf. Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 650 F. Supp. 3d at 1013 (granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, holding that they demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim, and enjoining the Department of Justice from prosecuting any California resident under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for any violation of SORNA, the SORNA Rule, or any other regulation, without first seeking and obtaining certification from the State of California that the individual was required to register under California law and, in a prosecution concerning failure to provide specific information, seeking and obtaining certification that California allows the individual to furnish that information).}

_{[161]  Scott v. State, 396 So. 3d 515, 523-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that admission of offender’s prior conviction for failing to register as a sex offender as impeachable evidence in prosecution for child abuse was not reversible error where the court noted that offender’s “failure to abide by a law intended to safeguard the public from harm had impeachment value,” “[b]y failing to register his new address, [offender] left the authorities under the impression that he remained at his former address,” and “[a]ccordingly, the conviction goes to his truthfulness, which weighs in favor of admissibility”); Tristan v. State, 393 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that conviction for failure to register was a “crime of deception,” rendering it admissible in a subsequent criminal trial to impeach the defendant’s testimony); but see United States v. Okafor, No. 23-116, 2025 WL 819577, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2025) (holding that a witness’s 2010 West Virginia conviction for failure to register as a sex offender could not be used to impeach the witness in a drug-distribution prosecution because, while “the failure to register as a sex offender might sometimes involve a false statement, as one way the West Virginia statute is violated is by the knowing provision of ‘materially false information’ by somebody required to register as a sex offender,” it “is equally violated by the simple failure to act, without any false statement,” “the simple failure to comply with a legal requirement is not itself untruthful; if it were, any crime would be untruthful,” and the “jury’s likely takeaway would be that [the witness] had committed a sex offense, not simply that he had failed to register as a sex offender. And a sex offense, maybe more than any other sort of crime, risks inflaming the jury’s passion”); Dingman v. Cart Shield USA, LLC, No. 12-20088-CIV, 2013 WL 3353835, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2013) (holding that the defendant failed to meet its burden of showing that the plaintiff’s conviction of failure to register as a sex offender involved a dishonest act or false statement); Correll v. State, 81 A.3d 600, 613 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (holding that failure to register as a sex offender is not an impeachable offense under Maryland Rules of Evidence).}